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AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT IN THE  
FILIPINO RESISTANCE MOVEMENT ON  
MINDANAO DURING THE JAPANESE  
OCCUPATION, 1942-1945

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A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S Army  
Command and General Staff College in partial  
fulfillment of the requirements for the  
degree


MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

LARRY S. SCHMIDT, MAJOR, USMC  
B.A. The Johns Hopkins University, 1966  
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School of Advanced International Studies, 1970

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This historical study documents the resistance of the Filipinos to the Japanese on the island of Mindanao in the Philippines during World War II and discusses the contribution which American servicemen and civilians made to the guerrilla fighting. The methodology focuses upon a four-part model used to analyze the resistance movement: the island's geography; Filipino culture; Japanese occupation policies; and external support provided by United States forces in the Southwest Pacific Theater.		

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The study concludes that Americans played a vital role in the guerrilla organization on Mindanao. The analysis of the resistance movement discusses the political nature of the decision to resist, the impact of harsh occupation policies on the will of the Filipinos, the unique role American leadership played in the development of the guerrilla organization, and the critical importance of external support for the guerrillas.

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other government agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)



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# ABSTRACT

AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT IN THE FILIPINO RESISTANCE MOVEMENT ON MINDANAO DURING THE JAPANESE OCCUPATION, 1942-1945, by Larry S. Schmidt, Major, USMC, 274 pages.

This historical study documents the resistance of the Filipinos to the Japanese on the island of Mindanao in the Philippines during World War II and discusses the contribution which American servicemen and civilians made to the guerrilla fighting. The methodology focuses upon a four-part model used to analyze the resistance movement: the island's geography; Filipino culture; Japanese occupation policies; and external support provided by United States forces in the Southwest Pacific Theater.

The study concludes that Americans played a vital role in the guerrilla organization on Mindanao. The analysis of the resistance movement discusses the political nature of the decision to resist, the impact of harsh occupation policies on the will of the Filipinos, the unique role American leadership played in the development of the guerrilla organization, and the critical importance of external support for the guerrillas.

#### ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The inspiration for this study came from Dr. David Syrett, Professor of History at Queens College, The City University of New York and Visiting John F. Morrison Professor of Military History at the Command and General Staff College. His own curiosity about the events on Mindanao acted as a gadfly to my own interest. Dr. Syrett's guidance on the search for information was invaluable and his opinions always illuminating. Sergeant First Class Robert Cordell wields plentiful red ink, and his rigorous adherence to the accepted forms of our mother tongue spared the reader the higher flights of prose to which I am prone. I am grateful to the members of the American Guerrillas of Mindanao with whom I have corresponded and spoken. I hope this brief history recognizes in some small way the patriotism and duty to their country demonstrated by these courageous Americans. It is only regretted that all who served on Mindanao were not recognized. Those who assisted in compiling research sources are too many to name, but their help is deeply appreciated. Sandra Rodgers is a marvelously patient and hardy typist, and her expertise was invaluable. The completion of this paper was a photo finish with the birth of her first child. The unofficial motto of the Command and General Staff College is: "The Best Year of Your Life." Perhaps it was, but only because of the understanding and forbearance of my wife, Deanna, who has her own unofficial motto: "The only thing tougher than being a Marine is being married to a Marine."

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# GLOSSARY OF FILIPINO AND JAPANESE WORDS USED IN TEXT

abaca - hemp  
 amok - a desperate impulsive frenzied killing; Moro custom with no religious foundation  
 amor proprio - self-esteem  
 anting-anting - Moro charm or amulet. Good luck charm  
 balicuate - (slang) evacuate  
 banca - small boat, very common  
 barong - a large two-handed sword of the Moros  
 barrio - a small native village  
 carabao - water buffalo  
 cargadore - porter  
 dalama - boat  
 datu - Moro title; tribal or community leader  
 hapons - (slang) Japanese  
 hiya - a sense of shame  
 ilustrados - community leaders, land owners  
 juramentado - frenzied, well-prepared ceremonial killing; Moro religious rite  
 kaingineros - nomadic gardeners  
 Kalibapi - political party of the Philippine puppet government  
 Kempei Tai (Japanese) - military police  
 kris - Moro wavy-edged knife  
 mestizo, mestiza - mixed blood  
 nipa - palm; leaves of which are used to make houses  
 pakikisama - desire to avoid placing others in a stressful situation  
 paltik - homemade shotgun fashioned of pipe, wood, wire and a nail  
 peso - Philippine currency; approximately 50¢ during occupation  
 sacada - person captured for forced labor  
 sultan - temporal and spiritual leader of the Moros  
 suyoks - sharpened bamboo stick placed in ground for a trap  
 tankong - fern greens  
 taos - farmers, laborers, share croppers  
 tapa - beef jerky made from water buffalo meat  
 tinghoy - counterfeit, useless (refers to guerrilla currency)  
 tuba - coconut beer  
 tulisan, tulisaffe - (slang) - thief  
 utang na loob - denotes primary debt, reciprocal obligations  
 voluntarios - home guard  
 zona - "zonification." Japanese terror tactic



## CHRONOLOGY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS FOR MINDANAO GUERRILLAS

### 1941

Jul 26	USAFFE formed
Dec 8	Japan attacks the Philippines
Dec 20	Japanese forces land at Davao

### 1942

Jan 3	Hqtrs, Visayan-Mindanao Force relocated from Cebu to Del Monte, Mindanao
Mar 4	Visayan-Mindanao Force divided into two commands
Mar 13-16	Gen. MacArthur on Mindanao. Reviews plans for guerrilla resistance
Apr 9	Bataan falls
Apr 29	Japanese forces land at Cotabato and Parang on Mindanao
Apr 30	Col. Wendell Fertig arrives on Mindanao
May 2-3	Japanese forces land at Cagayan and Bugo on Mindanao
May 6-7	Corregidor falls
May 7	Gen. Wainwright orders surrender of all United States and Philippine soldiers in the Philippines
May 10	Gen. Sharp surrenders the Visayan-Mindanao Force
Jun	Capt. Luis Morgan begins consolidation of guerrilla bands in Misamis Oriental Province
Sep 12	Morgan offers command to Fertig
Sep 18	Fertig establishes Mindanao-Sulu Force
Oct 7	Fertig establishes guerrilla Hqtrs in Misamis
Nov	Morgan departs on unification expedition
Dec 4	Cpts Smith and Hamner sail to Australia

### 1943

Jan 1	Misamis Occidental, Zamboanga now secured
Jan 23	105th Division established
Jan 31	KZOM establishes contact with San Francisco
Feb 13	MacArthur appoints Fertig CO of the 10th Military District. Radio communication with GHQ, SWPA authorized
Mar 5	The first GHQ, SWPA intelligence teams and supplies arrive on Mindanao by submarine
Apr 14	10 Americans escape from Davao Penal Colony
Jun	Morgan expedition returns
Jun 26	Japanese attack in force at Misamis. 10th Military District Hqtrs moved to Liangen, Lanao Province
Jul	Morgan revolts, forms Mindanao and Dutch Indies Command

#### 1943

Sep Morgan deported to Australia  
Oct Laurel government installed. 120-day amnesty  
period for guerrillas  
Oct 7 Salipada Pendatun concedes authority to Fertig  
Nov 10th Military District Hqtrs moved to Esperanza,  
Agusan Province  
Dec Japanese issue proclamation that all unsundered  
Americans will be summarily executed  
Dec 10th Military District Hqtrs moved to Esperanza,  
Agusan Province


#### 1944

Jan 1 "A" Corps established. Sulu Archipelago command  
separated from 10th Military District  
Jul 10th Military District Hqtrs moved to Waloe, Agusan  
Province  
Aug-Sep First bombings of Davao City

#### 1945

Mar-Sep All guerrilla units deactivated  
Apr 18 United States forces invade Mindanao  
Sep 7 Japanese forces on Mindanao formally surrender  
Sep 15 6th Infantry Division (PA) reactivated

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS




MAP 1


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PROVINCES OF MINDANAO

(General Areas)



MAP 2



MAP 3

## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

December 8, 1941 brought the armed might of Japan to the Philippines as part of Japan's effort to bring the Filipinos into the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. After the long struggle waged by American and Filipino forces on Luzon and a brief battle fought in the Southern Islands, Japan accepted the surrender of the Philippines in May, 1942. As the occupation of the Philippine nation by Japan commenced, a resistance movement was born among the defeated people. Americans are widely familiar with the resistance movements in Europe, but very few are aware of this resistance of the Filipinos to the Japanese. As David Steinberg has written, for the Filipinos "The guerrilla movement has become one of the greatest romantic themes of subsequent Philippine history and lore" because for the Filipinos the "resistance was one of the finest hours for the Philippine people."<sup>1</sup>

The Philippine resistance was also "the finest hour" for many Americans who did not surrender to the Japanese but who took to the hills and joined the Filipino guerrillas who gathered to fight the Japanese. As with many guerrilla resistance groups elsewhere in World War II, many of these units were led by Americans. The Philippine resistance movement, however, gives us the first historical example of Americans, military and civilian, organizing guerrilla units on a grand scale. The movement is also prototypical of an effective, coordinated guerrilla resistance, and it is well worth studying for that reason, if for no other.

There were many guerrilla organizations operating throughout the 1,000 mile long Philippine Archipelago. They had names like "Blackburn's Headhunters," "Marking's Guerrillas," "President Quezon's Own Guerrillas," "Lawin's Patriot and Suicide Forces," and "The Live or Die Unit," among the many. Some of the groups had an almost opera bouffe character, and others "were complete and formal organizations, down to training camps, maneuvers, GCS, orders of battle, and the usual military red tape."<sup>2</sup> In all, some 260,715 guerrillas in 277 guerrilla units fought in the resistance movement as organized, armed, and tactically employed units.<sup>3</sup>

Among the many guerrilla units in the Philippines was the 10th Military District, the Mindanao guerrillas, commanded by Colonel Wendell W. Fertig. Fertig had been a United States Army Reserve officer and mining engineer before the war and had found himself in a position to lead the guerrilla resistance on the island of Mindanao in the Southern Philippines.

This paper studies the Mindanao guerrilla organization for several reasons. The subordinate organizations of Fertig's 10th Military District were predominantly American led. This fact makes its study worthwhile not only because it was unique among the guerrilla organizations in the Philippines but also because it provides a good historical example against which to measure concepts for the support of resistance movements. Furthermore, the Mindanao guerrilla organization is generally illustrative of the growth of the other guerrilla organizations throughout the Philippine Islands, so a study of its growth will provide clues as to how the other guerrilla organizations were established and sustained.

Americans -- military, foreign service, or civilian -- may find themselves isolated unexpectedly in territory occupied by a nation at war with either the United States or a nation allied with the United States.

Initially, the decision which must be made by such an individual is whether or not to surrender to the enemy, and there are many factors which will influence that decision. If the individual chooses not to surrender, than as a person non-indigenous to the occupied population, entirely unforeseen hardships may be encountered. Cunning and ingenuity coupled with strong courage and loyalty are the personal qualities which will become mandatory for survival. Beyond these personal traits, an understanding of how resistance movements grow and achieve success will be highly useful. The decision to resist is, for the people of a conquered nation, a political decision and therefore has ramifications much beyond the basic decision to survive. This knowledge will also be useful to American military and State Department planners as they measure the potential of a resistance movement to contribute to the overall strategic and tactical plans of the regular forces.

The Philippine resistance movement has not been studied in any detail by American historians, yet the United States played a vital role in the organization and ultimate success of the movement. This paper seeks to fill some of this void by contributing a historical study of one organization within the resistance movement -- the 10th Military District on Mindanao. The challenges confronted in acquiring source material for the study will be addressed in Chapter 2. Chapter 3 establishes a methodology for the study of the Mindanao guerrilla organization by identifying specific areas which must be addressed when analyzing a resistance movement. The succeeding chapters apply the model to the experience on Mindanao.

On December 28, 1941, President Franklin D. Roosevelt broadcast the following message to the people of the Philippines:



4

I give the people of the Philippines my solemn pledge that their freedom will be redeemed and their independence established and protected. The entire resources, in men and material, of the United States stand behind that pledge.<sup>4</sup>

It was two years and 10 months later before that pledge was fulfilled.

In the meantime, guerrillas -- Filipinos and Americans together -- fought a desperate resistance against a cruel conqueror against very long odds of achieving success. In General Douglas MacArthur's tribute to the Filipino guerrillas, he said:

We are aided by the militant loyalty of a whole people -- a people who have rallied as one behind the standards of those stalwart patriots who, reduced to wretched material conditions yet sustained by an unconquerable spirit, have formed an invincible center to a resolute overall resistance.<sup>5</sup>

This paper is the story of the "invincible center."

## CHAPTER 1

### ENDNOTES

<sup>1</sup>David Joel Steinberg, Philippine Collaboration in World War II, 1967, p. 57.

<sup>2</sup>David Bernstein, The Philippine Story, 1947, p. 157; see also Patricia McDermott Clement, "The Philippine Archives," May 8, 1981, p. 11.

<sup>3</sup>Recognition of guerrillas by the American and Philippine governments was important because recognition carried with it post-war veteran's benefits and political qualifications. Many individuals and units had fought the Japanese in one fashion or another but had failed to achieve recognition. 1,172 guerrilla units claimed guerrilla status of which only 277 were recognized. 1,277,767 individuals submitted claims that they were guerrillas. Only 260,715 of these claims were approved. In the Southern Islands, the focus of this paper, 1% of the population are recognized as having fought as guerrillas. Details and figures on the recognition policy can be found in Headquarters Philippines Command, United States Army, "U.S. Army Recognition Program of Philippine Guerrillas," no date.

<sup>4</sup>Catherine Porter, Crisis in the Philippines, 1942, p. 104.

<sup>5</sup>General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area, "Special Release," October 25, 1944.

## CHAPTER 2

### RESEARCH SOURCES

After reading thousands of pages of literature on the Philippine resistance and the exploits of the Filipino guerrillas, a simple observation finally hits the reader: the faces of the prominent characters of the resistance remain a mystery because there are virtually no photographs of the guerrillas. Almost none of the personal accounts have pictures of any kind, and few of the secondary sources do. This is symptomatic of the general phenomenon, which is that the Philippine resistance did not have its chroniclers moving with the guerrillas to detail its adventures and accomplishments. It is understandable why there were no cameras or photographers on the Japanese occupied islands, of course, but this one small observation underscores the reason why so little is known of the resistance of the Filipinos to the Japanese.

Several authors have alluded to the fact that the "definitive book" on the Philippine resistance movement has yet to be published. Whereas historians have been provided with multitudinous accounts and analyses of the European resistance movements and the general public satisfied with novels and movies showing the daring of these resistance fighters, few in the West are even aware of the Filipino's struggle against the Japanese. That is not to say that accounts of the Philippine resistance do not exist -- they do, and in large numbers in the Philippines. The void lies in English language accounts available in the West. There are some English language accounts available, but judicious use must be

made of them in order to create an accurate picture of the events in the Philippines during the resistance.

Accounts of the Philippine resistance generally focus either on the Japanese treatment of prisoners in the internment camps or upon the collaboration issue. Personal accounts written by or about members of the various guerrilla organizations for the most part do not deal adequately with the problems of guerrilla organization, logistics, relationship to the civil government, tactics or the politics of the guerrilla resistance. The various accounts -- including the guerrilla unit histories -- tend to be self-serving, short on facts, and exercises in ax-grinding. But this problem is surmountable, given enough sources from which to glean information and make comparisons. Many diaries were kept by guerrillas, and some very good personal accounts have been written from them. Official documents can sometimes serve as the catalyst to extract the truth from this information. Nevertheless, there is no one book which is a scholarly, in-depth account of the Philippine resistance movement as a whole, and there is no exhaustive record published on the guerrilla organization on Mindanao.

Research for this paper relied heavily upon personal accounts and upon United States Government documents. Because little was known of their activities during the war, government documents provide information on the guerrillas sparingly. The personal accounts are subject to the criticisms already given. One heretofore untapped source for information on the Philippine guerrillas which was used for research on the paper is the Philippine Archives in the National Personnel Records Center in St. Louis, Missouri. Virtually unknown to the academic world, the Philippine Archives are the repository for all of the Filipino guerrilla

records used by the United States Army to implement the guerrilla recognition policy both during and after the war. It is still used for this purpose today, and the Archives staff routinely researches and acts upon inquiries concerning Filipino guerrillas by using these files. These holdings are quite extensive, considering that the guerrilla units did not have a large record keeping task such as found in conventional Army units. The Archives have about 850 cubic feet of organizational records, organized by unit. The holdings were inventoried in 1981 for eventual accession into the National Archives.

The files contain general orders, special orders, proclamations and regulations published by the various guerrilla organizations. Casualty reports, periodic personnel reports, correspondence, transfer orders, promotion, demotion and court-martial results are also in the files. Some unit histories are contained in the Archives. The holdings for the 10th Military District, the Mindanao guerrillas, are the largest of the 10 military district files, filling some eight large file cabinets. Much of the material appears to have never been viewed, and the paper reflects the field conditions under which the documents were prepared.

The annotated bibliography of this paper displays some of the research which went into its composition. Still, there are several major sources of information left unexplored which could yield huge dividends if pursued further. Given the time constraints placed on writing this paper, it was not possible to pursue these sources to an exhaustion of their potential.

Probably the most fertile source of information, and one which would pay the highest dividends if used, would be an oral history program pursued with the surviving Americans who fought with the guerrillas on

Mindanao. They have an organization called the American Guerrillas of Mindanao, and telephone conversations with a number of these former guerrillas have been very useful. The use of information provided by the guerrillas should wait pending a thorough and methodical effort to gather information from them.

A second source of information is the 10th Military District files in the Philippine Archives in St. Louis. Some of the information available in the Archives was used, but time was not available for a detailed document-by-document analysis of the many thousands of documents in the files. Such an investigation would have been beyond the scope of this paper in any case.

A third source which was not available for this research is the personal papers of Brigadier General Courtney Whitney who was General MacArthur's principal staff officer with responsibility for coordinating the guerrilla activities in the Philippines. The Whitney papers fill 21 boxes and are located at RG 16, MacArthur Memorial Bureau of Archives, Norfolk, Virginia. These papers may illuminate the relationship between GHQ, SWPA and the various guerrilla organizations.

The last of the four sources which was unavailable for research on this paper were the personal diary kept by Colonel Fertig, leader of the Mindanao guerrillas, and the unpublished manuscript of a book on the Mindanao guerrillas written by him immediately after the war. At the time of his death in March 1975 Colonel Fertig also had in his possession the sole copy of the official unit history of the 10th Military District: "Historical Record Mindanao Guerrilla Resistance Movement, 10th Military District, from 16 September 1942 to 30 June 1945 Colonel Wendell W. Fertig Commanding." These materials are in the possession of the Fertig

family and copies have not been made available to the historian for the American Guerrillas of Mindanao organization nor to the archives of any United States Government agency.

Of these four sources described, an oral history program, the Fertig papers and the 10th Military District "Historical Record" would be the most valuable. They would provide the greatest insight into the politics involved in organizing the Mindanao resistance movement, thereby filling a void which currently exists in the research on this subject.

## CHAPTER 3

### THE RESEARCH PARADIGM

Throughout history, the resistance of a conquered people against the foreign invader has become one of the most romanticized of events. Many resistance movements have become the inspiration for national folklore, and many have been celebrated through the writings of novelists and historians. The Tyrolese uprising against Napoleon's armies, the legendary French Maquis, and the Yugoslav "Sons of the Eagle" are well-known examples. From these accounts the researcher is enabled to derive a paradigm for the successful resistance movement. It is also from the study of these movements that one is able to construct the model against which a resistance movement may be measured to gauge its success. But whereas the exercise may be of interest only to students of the social sciences, the paradigm can be used to derive basic concepts for the successful initiation and sustainment of resistance movements as well. In short, the historical model for a successful resistance movement may become the doctrine for any nation which contemplates supporting a resistance movement.

The United States provides in its military doctrine for the support of resistance movements engendered by a people friendly to United States interests. That provision lies at one extreme of the scale of policy contingencies. Along this scale of contingencies lies the possibility that members of the American armed forces will be isolated behind enemy lines of the conquered territory of an American ally, whether by design or by circumstance. In the most extreme case--to



which the doctrine does not, presumably, speak--is the possibility that a conquered America would evolve its own resistance movement. The study of resistance movements and how they are led and supported by external sources is within the purview of the United States Army Special Forces. But as the contingency scale alluded to suggests, the understanding of the dynamics of resistance movements is of general interest to all Americans who serve in an area where during war they could become isolated behind enemy lines. This scenario includes the majority of Americans serving in overseas posts today.

The subject of this thesis deals directly with the abrupt change of fortune which can thrust Americans into participating in a resistance movement on foreign soil. The sudden, dramatic and wholly unexpected Japanese successes in the Pacific in December 1941 found American servicemen, as well as Americans in the Commonwealth of the Philippines government, totally unprepared for the conditions forced upon them by the conquering Japanese.

The Filipino resistance to the Japanese represents a near classic example of the conditions which encourage and sustain a resistance movement. And it is no diminution of the courage and leadership of the Filipinos to say that the Americans who fought by their side contributed substantially to the success of the movement, particularly on the island of Mindanao. To understand why the resistance movement in the Philippines was so successful, it is useful to establish in this thesis the model against which the Filipino resistance can be measured. The focus of this model will narrow on the resistance movement on Mindanao which provides the clearest example of the strength of the paradigm as an analytical tool.

In broad terms the model which describes the potential for growth and direction of a resistance movement is defined by: (1) the terrain of the occupied country; (2) the culture of the conquered people; (3) the policies implemented by the occupying power to control the indigeneous population; and (4) the sources of assistance to the partisans from sources external to the country itself. Certain conditions when present will tend to strengthen the prospects for success of a resistance movement. A wide cross-section of the population will ideally be sympathetic to the aims of the resistance movement, and a people which are tenacious and hardy will provide a more fertile base from which to support the movement. Those who take up arms against the occupier must fight on terrain suitable for guerrilla warfare, the ground must be of their own choosing, and the terrain must not be geographically confining to the guerrillas. Support for the guerrillas must come in several forms: basic needs should be provided from within the population itself, and the movement must be supported by a regular army or receive political and other assistance from an external source. The resistance movement must be susceptible to organization with some degree of pyramidal leadership, and it must evince the potential for establishing a civil administration once the occupying force is evicted.<sup>1</sup> To this latter end resistance forces will fight not only against the oppression of the conqueror, but they will fight for one of two goals to be met once the oppressor has been ejected: restoration of the pre-invasion regime or the establishment of a new political order.<sup>2</sup>

A resistance movement may be divided into three comparatively distinct elements. Although the categories tend to blur as one moves along the continuum, the three elements are nevertheless discernible

and the definitions workable. The three elements are the guerrilla force itself, the auxiliary, and the underground.<sup>3</sup> The guerrillas are the most easily identified and defined of these categories. Generally, they are committed to furtherance of the movement on a full-time basis; they carry arms or provide a combat support function; and, they are joined together in a paramilitary organization. The auxiliary provides combat service support functions such as food, medical support, labor, local security, or cottage industry craftsmanship. The underground is the most amorphous because it conceals its affiliation while providing important services to the resistance forces. Taxi drivers and mistresses relay intelligence information coaxed from their customers, the military personnel and civilian administrators of the occupying force. Loyal civil administrators act as buffers to protect the citizens while serving in the government under the auspices of the occupying force. This paper focuses on the guerrilla organization on Mindanao, so some further elaboration on guerrilla forces is useful.<sup>4</sup>

Without the conditions favorable to a resistance movement the guerrilla force would not be able to survive an aggressive elimination effort by the occupying force. The guerrilla forces conduct military and paramilitary operations to further their own strategy or to "complete, support, or extend conventional military operations."<sup>5</sup> These operations are characteristically violent and brief, and depend upon surprise and mobility. Successful operations lower enemy morale and prestige, increase support for the guerrillas, and inflict casualties upon the enemy's forces and his political and economic infrastructure causing him to divert manpower and resources to combat the guerrilla. The guerrilla force generally receives food and clothing from local

sources, and arms, ammunition and communications equipment from external sources. The latter is absolutely essential in order for the guerrilla force to be effective.<sup>6</sup>

The guerrilla forces may be militarily and politically useful to invading liberation forces. The guerrillas can be used to execute a wide variety of missions ranging from employment as a conventional military force to the control of refugees, stragglers and prisoners. They provide sabotage, information collection, reconnaissance, guides, and a well-trained counter guerrilla force.

Individuals will join the guerrillas in a resistance movement for any number of reasons. Some are motivated by ideology, and some seek personal or political gain through the acquisition of power or rank within the guerrilla organization itself. Many will join because of hatred for the enemy caused by loss of loved ones or property. Still others will join the guerrillas because it is safer to be a guerrilla or because they cannot find work in an economically damaged country. Some will become guerrillas as a result of coercion or intimidation.<sup>7</sup>

This thesis will not deal to any length with the legal status of guerrillas under the Law of Land Warfare. In the accepted sense of international law, the legal status of guerrillas was not a factor in the Japanese-Filipino relationship because the Japanese did not recognize the international codes concerning prisoners of war and the status of belligerent soldiers. In this regard, however, the Filipino resistance movement differs little from the historical prototype, because conquering powers have rarely granted guerrillas a recognized legal status.<sup>8</sup>

The resistance movement on Mindanao will be measured against the model discussed above in order to weigh its success and to determine if

the model does, in fact, serve as an adequate analytical tool. In doing so, a disclaimer should be made at the outset in regard to U. S. Army doctrine on leadership of resistance movements. Although some may perceive Army doctrine as envisioning the employment of American personnel as leaders and organizers of indigenous guerrilla forces in an area of operations, this is clearly not the Army's intention.<sup>9</sup> The Army has concluded that "The history of resistance movements shows conclusively that the guerrilla leadership must be indigenous--not imported from outside."<sup>10</sup> Therefore, American personnel (the doctrine speaks directly to U. S. Army Special Forces) are not to seek command of guerrilla forces with whom they have contact. The experience on Mindanao would suggest a major departure from this principle, but as this paper will demonstrate, the introduction of Americans as leaders of Filipino guerrilla units was a direct result of the unusual nature of the American experience in the Philippines prior to the war. In some measure it is the exception which proves the rule.

Chapter Four in this paper will discuss three of the four elements included in the resistance movement model: (1) the terrain of Mindanao and what impact it had upon the resistance movement; (2) the culture of the Filipino people in the broad sense and the cultural aspects peculiar to the resistance on Mindanao; and (3) the policies of the Japanese in the Philippines in general and on Mindanao in particular.

Chapter Five will focus entirely upon the leaders who guided the resistance movement on Mindanao and how they organized the guerrilla organization.

Chapter Six continues the discussion of the Filipino culture on Mindanao but addresses a very specific aspect of the island's culture --

the Filipino Mohammedans, or Moros. The discussion of the Moros is better appreciated after having read how the guerrillas were organized, and so it is placed after the chapter on organization.

The same is also true of the subject of Chapter Seven which is the external support received by the Mindanao resistance movement. The fourth element in the model used in the thesis is external support to the movement, and its role in the Mindanao resistance is better understood after having read how the guerrillas were organized.

Chapter Eight discusses the operational employment of the guerrilla force and details the methods under which it functioned; the response of the Japanese to the guerrilla forces; and, what effectiveness the guerrillas demonstrated as the combat arm of the Mindanao resistance.

Chapter Nine draw conclusions from the discussion presented in the paper.

## CHAPTER 3

### ENDNOTES

<sup>1</sup>F.O. Miksche, Secret Forces: The Technique of Underground Movements, 1950, p. 96; Headquarters, Department of the Army, Special Forces Operations (U), Field Manual 31-20, September 30, 1977, pp. 46-47.

<sup>2</sup>Hugh Seton-Watson, The East European Revolution, 1956, p. 108.

<sup>3</sup>Headquarters, Department of the Army, "The Role of U.S. Army Special Forces," Training Circular 31-20-1, October 22, 1976, pp. 16-17.

<sup>4</sup>The definition of a guerrilla may vary depending upon the specificity desired by the writer. Irwin R. Blacker, for, example, distinguishes "guerrillas" who fight outside of cities from "partisans" who fight within cities. Irwin R. Blacker, Irregulars, Partisans, Guerrillas: Great Stories From Rogers' Rangers to the Hagadah, 1954, p. xvi.

<sup>5</sup>HQ, DA, Role of Special Forces, p. 17.

<sup>6</sup>For example, see "Logistical Support of Guerrilla Warfare," The Review, May-June 1962.

<sup>7</sup>HQ, DA, Special Forces Operations, pp. 55-56.

<sup>8</sup>Useful, succinct discussions of the legal status of partisans and guerrillas under international law can be found in: Otto Heilbrunn, Partisan Warfare, 1962, Chapter 10, pp. 143-148; Robert D. Powers, Jr., "Guerrillas and the Laws of War," Studies in Guerrilla Warfare, 1963, pp. 23-27.

<sup>9</sup>For example, see Marco J. Caraccia, "Guerrilla Logistics," Student Thesis, U.S. Army War College, April 8, 1966, p. 36.

<sup>10</sup>HQ, DA, Special Forces Operations, p. 53.

## CHAPTER 4

### BACKGROUND TO THE RESISTANCE MOVEMENT ON MINDANAO

#### Geography of Mindanao

There are 7,083 islands within the Philippine Archipelago, half of which have no names. From the northernmost island of Luzon south to Mindanao lie great expanses of jungle, mountains and generally roadless terrain broken up by 11,000 miles of coastline. The island chain is divided roughly into three sections, the northern islands (Luzon), the central islands (Panay, Negros, Cebu, Bohol, Samar and Leyte: all known collectively as the Visayas), and the southern islands (Mindanao, Palawan, and the Sulu Archipelago). The comparative size of these areas can be expressed in percentage of land area and population within the Philippine Archipelago:<sup>1</sup>

	<u>Area Percentage</u>	<u>Population Percentage</u>
Northern Islands	37	47
Central Islands	20	35
Southern Islands	<u>43</u>	<u>18</u>
	100%	100%

The southern islands are the largest in land area and smallest in population, a factor which would affect the growth of the resistance movement on Mindanao.

Mindanao is the second largest island in the Philippine Archipelago with 36,537 square miles, about the size of the state of Indiana--



or the island of Hokkaido in the Japanese frame of reference. The island's coastline measures 1,400 miles and is defined by many gulfs, bays, inlets, capes, points and large peninsulas. Described by General Robert Eichelberger as "bewildering," the island has five major mountain systems with a varied and complex topography that includes numerous rivers and a number of lakes.<sup>2</sup> Elevations in the mountain ranges run from 2,000 feet at the plateaus to a high at Mount Apo of 9,690 feet. There are two major river systems. The Agusan River flows for 100 miles in the Davao -- Agusan Trough from south to north on the east side of the island. In the southwest the Cotabato Lowlands surround the Mindanao River which flows from east to west through large swampy stretches. The Bukidnon -- Lanao Highlands with peaks rising to 9,500 feet contain the 134 square mile Lake Lanao. Colonel Wendell Fertig described this area as being "nearest to paradise. A high, cool, grassy plateau, cut by deep vertical walled canyons with blue-black mountains arising on all sides" which reminded him of New Mexico.<sup>3</sup>

Mindanao is actually divided into Zamboanga and Central Mindanao, "central" Mindanao including the eastern portion of the island as well. The island narrows to a width of nine miles between Illigan and Pagadian Bays, separating Zamboanga from Central Mindanao. Geographically, the island is a single entity, but from a military tactical perspective, the island represents two distinct entities because of the narrowness of the strip of land which joins the two portions. Zamboanga, the westernmost portion, rises to a height of 8,420 feet just west of the narrow juncture of the two portions and tapers to a long narrow peninsula to the south-west.

The terrain is rugged and inhospitable. The impenetrableness

of the island's geography has been portrayed by the recent discovery of the Tasaday tribe. This primitive tribe had lived undetected in a rain forest among 200 foot trees in an unexplored area of Cotabato Province near Supu for an estimated 500 to 1,000 years. The irony is that this tribe, which has no word in its vocabulary for "war," was never accidentally discovered by the Filipino guerrillas who hid from the Japanese in this area. The existence of the tribe was reported in 1971.<sup>4</sup> In 1939 Mindanao's population density was 53 persons per square mile, with the population concentrated for the most part in the more hospitable coastal areas.<sup>5</sup>

Two main roads bisected Mindanao: Highway One running east - west and the Sayre Highway running north - south. These main arteries were little more than improved trails, and roads throughout the entire island totalled only 790 miles. There were many short, fast-running streams which hindered even foot traffic along jungle trails. On one 145 mile stretch along Highway One from Parang to Davao, bridges averaged one to each mile and one-half of road.<sup>6</sup> Normally considered obstacles, the two major water systems in Mindanao -- the Mindanao and Agusan Rivers -- were used for troop transport, resupply and evacuation by all the military forces which operated on Mindanao. By the end of the Japanese occupation, Mindanao had 60 airfields, of which from 11 to 22 were operational for normal operations, depending on whose figures are used: Japanese, American, or guerrilla intelligence. The island had eight major ports with anchorages at three of them for capital ships.<sup>7</sup>

Earthquakes occasionally shook Mindanao with little effect on the hardwood timber which was two feet thick and so hard with silicon that a gang of men with axes needed four days to chop one down. Wild

black bees that could kill carabaos (water buffalo) and pythons that would kill men were common. The natives would smear their legs with tobacco leaves to repel one-half inch long leeches which lived on shrubs and in slimy streams. Swarms of mosquitoes infested the island, along with cobras, poisonous snakes, and crocodiles which dogged the footsteps of the unwary. Farmers were subjected to recurring locust plagues, and during the period of the Japanese occupation vast hordes of rats left the forests to destroy entire rice crops. Not least of the hazards were inch-long rattan needles, bamboo spike traps set along trails for wild pigs, deer, and humans, and headhunters who inhabited the interior.

Avoidance of these hazards was no guarantee of long continued health, however, for disease abounded. Yaws, filariasis, scabies, tropical ulcers, worm infestations, dysentery, dengue, cholera, typhoid, scrub typhus and fungus infections were prevalent in varying degrees. The largest killer was malaria. Davao received rainfall of up to 11 inches a year, making the area a breeding ground for disease.<sup>8</sup>

The Mindanao terrain was, in short, ideal guerrilla territory. The Japanese were unable to bring the strength of their army to bear upon the guerrillas: the airplanes, ships, trucks, and conventional tactical formations were only marginally effective in this terrain. But the terrain is neutral, and the advantage the guerrillas gained by withdrawing to the island's interior was often negated by the reduced ability of the guerrillas to move quickly and to communicate in the mountains and jungle. And, of course, by withdrawing to the interior, the guerrillas were to take a very heavy toll in casualties from disease and the natural hazards of the jungle. The generally accepted figure for the percentage of the island controlled by the guerrillas is 95

percent.<sup>9</sup> The Japanese were "confined" to the roadways, ports, air-fields, best agricultural areas on the island, and the major cities with their running water and electricity.

In 1938 Vic Hurley reflected upon this rugged island and penned this prophetic observation:

There is a feeling of permanence about Mindanao that seems to hang in the air. One has but to step upon its gritty sand beaches and look back along the rolling jungled hills to know that here is a land which is pregnant with unpleasant memories and bristling with unwritten stories. It had been stained with the blood of a dozen races of men. It was a land where illusions and men had died -- and where more men were to die.<sup>10</sup>

#### The Culture of Mindanao

On the eve of the Japanese invasion in 1939, the population of the Philippines was 16,000,303 Filipinos. Throughout the islands there were 8,709 Americans, 117,000 Chinese, 1,149 Germans, and 29,300 Japanese.<sup>11</sup> Unofficial estimates of the Japanese population ran as high as 50,000.<sup>12</sup>

There were three primary religious groups in the islands: pagans, Christians, and Mohammedans. The Census Bureau defined two classifications, Christians and non-Christians. The Christians represented 90 percent of the population, and 88 percent of these were Roman Catholic, the religion inherited from the Spanish. There were 500,000 Mohammedan Filipinos, or Moros as they are called.<sup>13</sup> On Mindanao the Christians were the largest religious group, and they were made up mainly of Visayans who had migrated to Mindanao from Cebu, Panay and Bohol and settled along the island's northern coast in the Misamis Oriental region. Although largest in number, this group was second in political power to the Filipino Christians of Spanish and Chinese descent, the Mestizos.<sup>14</sup>

The Filipinos were divided racially into three broad groups -- Negrito, Indonesian and Malay -- and many subgroups, almost indistinguishable

from one another, resulting from centuries of intermarriage. Consequently, the best test for distinguishing one group from another was the language spoken by each. Language grouping is generally accepted as the primary means of cultural differentiation among the Filipinos, rather than race, religion or socio-economic levels.<sup>15</sup>

The 1939 census reported eight major native languages with 60 different dialects.<sup>16</sup> Of the eight major languages known collectively as the Lowland Christian languages, Ilokano and Pangasinan were spoken on Northern Luzon, and Cebuano, Tagalog, Ilongo, Bikolano, Waray-Waray and Pampangan were spoken south of Luzon.<sup>17</sup> Cebuano was the major language spoken on Mindanao, with many dialects found additionally among the Moros and tribes of the interior. In 1939 English was the second language with approximately 28 percent of the Filipino population able to speak or understand the language.<sup>18</sup> The ability to communicate among the various guerrilla groups was important to the success of the resistance movement, and an appreciation for the subtleties of the Filipino expression of ideas was crucial to the non-Filipino. The Filipino dialects are "flowery languages, principally because it is possible to transmit exact ideas only by means of the ellipsis and the illusion," and in this respect they differ from the Japanese and Western languages.<sup>19</sup> The ability to communicate ideas using Filipino expressions was fundamental to Colonel Fertig's success in organizing the Filipino guerrillas on Mindanao; conversely, the evidence would suggest that the Japanese failed to make the attempt.

"Mindanao has always been something of 'another country'" wrote Beth Day in her account of the Philippines.<sup>20</sup> Or, as the Japanese pre-invasion assessment had it, Mindanao was the "most uncivilized" island

in the archipelago.<sup>21</sup> Malay had fought against Ming, Moro against conquistadore, Moro against American regulars, Moro against Philippine Constabulary, and now Moros, Americans and Christian Filipinos were to fight against the Japanese and amongst each other.<sup>22</sup> The French, Portuguese, English and Japanese, no strangers to warfare on Mindanao, would sit this one out.

The recorded history of Mindanao dates from 1521 A.D., the year Magellan sailed through the Surigao Strait and landed at the mouth of the Agusan River, thereby making Mindanao the first island in the archipelago known to have been walked upon by a white man. Earlier, in the 13th Century, Mohammedan missionaries from Java had converted the Filipino natives from their Hindu influences and had colonized the island to some extent. There followed centuries of warfare under Spanish rule through 1898, and Mindanao was then to become the scene of bitter fighting between the Moros and the Americans through 1913.

Mindanao is geographically divided chiefly between the plains and the mountains. Broadly speaking, the Moros lived in the mountains, and the Christians lived in the lowlands, with little or no interchange among the people. The warrior-like mountain people despised the lowlanders as cowards and would occasionally raid their villages for women and slaves.<sup>23</sup> The lowlanders thought the mountaineers ignorant barbarians. The pagan, or Malayan, tribes were nomadic and lived both in the interior and along the coast, engaging in fishing, rice cultivation, and the raising of livestock and poultry. Included in this group were the Manobos, Bagobos, Mandayas, Bukidnons, Titurays, Subanums, Bilaans, Magahats and Negritos. The latter, the Negritos, were black nomadic aborigines of near-pygmy proportions who slept in nests of leaves in the

trees and hunted with potassium cyanide-tipped arrows. The Christian inhabitants were principally Cebuanos and Mestizos. The Principal Moro tribes, on whom a later chapter is devoted, were the Maranaos and Magindanaos. These groups -- the Christians, Moros and Pagans -- all spoke different dialects, warfare could break out between them on the slightest pretense, and traders normally represented the only link among the groups.

The guerrilla leader was handicapped from the start with an island people that were not homogeneous in any way other than their common racial heritage - virtually all were of Malayan descent. It was not uncommon as the American guerrillas moved deep into the interior to come upon tribes who had never seen a white man before, far less be able to understand or care about the resistance movement against the Japanese. Because they chose to garrison only the port cities and principal lowland agricultural areas of the island, the cultural make-up of the island was of commensurately less consequence to the Japanese.

Citizens of the principal antagonists in the general conflict lived on Mindanao. The Chinese, whose country was ravaged by the Japanese, might have been expected to take up arms against the Japanese, but this was not the case. Eleven percent of the Chinese in the Philippine Islands lived on Mindanao, but they played a negligible role in the resistance.<sup>24</sup> They were primarily shopkeepers who endeavored to divorce themselves of the attentions of both adversaries. There were 570 German males in the Philippines in 1939, only 32 of whom were on Mindanao. They were concentrated in Davao City and Zamboanga City, both occupied by the Japanese.<sup>25</sup> Only one German appears to have made his mark in the resistance, and he was an officer in the Mindanao guerrilla "coastal navy."

The American population in the Philippines was not as large as

the Japanese population which numbered 29,000. Excluding active duty military personnel, the number of Americans totalled 8,707 (5,129 males). On Mindanao in 1939 there were 712 Americans, primarily businessmen, clergy and retired soldiers who had served in the Philippines during the Philippine Pacification. Many had taken Filipino wives and were permanent residents. Where the Americans were located at the time of the Japanese landings on Mindanao dictated in large measure what role they would play in the assistance movement, if any. The chart below depicts the locations of Americans on Mindanao in 1939. The chart does not include active duty members of the United States or Philippine Commonwealth Armed Forces, nor is there any way to know exactly how many of these people departed from Mindanao when war with Japan appeared imminent.<sup>26</sup>

AMERICANS AND JAPANESE ON MINDANAO 1939

<u>PROVINCE</u>	<u>AMERICANS*</u>	<u>JAPANESE</u>
Agusan	7 (6)	28
Bukidnon	38 (24)	3
Cotabato	45 (33)	337
Davao	112 (75)	17,782
Lanao	47 (35)	48
Misamis Occidental	10 (7)	33
Misamis Oriental	76 (49)	120
Surigao	87 (62)	77
Zamboanga	<u>290 (186)</u>	<u>345</u>
	712 (477)**	18,773

\*( ) indicates number of males.

\*\* ( ) 50% of these males were between 20 and 64 years of age.



The chart also contains figures for the Japanese presence on Mindanao for comparison with the location of the Americans.<sup>27</sup>

The population of Mindanao was reported by the census to be 1,997,304, so the impact of the Americans and Japanese on the population would appear to be negligible. But the influence of each was disproportionate to its percentage, because within the social and economic fabric of the Mindanao culture, each played a leading role both in 1939 and for the next six years.

#### The Japanese Occupation Policies

In the decade preceding Japan's invasion of the Philippines, the Japanese had established strong economic ties with the Filipinos. The focus of this activity was centered upon Davao Province in Mindanao. In the period 1930 to 1939, 18,946 Japanese immigrants had come to the Philippine Islands, averaging just over 2,000 a year. Two-thirds of these immigrants were males, over half of whom were 20 to 44 years of age. Eighty percent of the immigrants settled in Davao, Manila and the Mountain Province of Luzon.<sup>28</sup> The Japanese lived in every province in the Philippines except Romblon, and every town had at least one or two Japanese nationals living in it. Most of the Japanese owned small shops which sold Japanese goods. Although it sounds like a trite overcharacterization today to say it, many carried cameras, and "They knew the countryside in some localities as its own nationals did not; they were sometimes called upon to conduct strangers through little known districts."<sup>29</sup> Of some 29,000 Japanese in the islands, 64 percent (18,733) were living on Mindanao, and approximately 95 percent of those on Mindanao lived in Davao Province (17,888 residents).<sup>30</sup>

Japanese economic penetration of Davao was begun in 1907 by the Ohta Development Company which initially imported 150 Japanese laborers to work in the abaca fields.<sup>31</sup> This early foothold grew into Japanese interests in shipping, fishing, lumber, and in the iron, manganese and copper mines. The immigrants established their own schools, newspapers, stores and banks. The crown piece of the economic exploitation remained the abaca plantations, however, for ultimately the Japanese owned 70 percent of the hemp produced in Davao, and they controlled the remainder through one means or another. The Japanese investment in the Philippines was over 64 million pesos (32 million dollars), 50 million pesos of which was invested in Davao.<sup>32</sup>

Japanese ownership of Philippine land ultimately caught the attention of the Philippine central government. To stem the Japanese investments, the Commonwealth government passed the Public Land Act of 1936 which required that at least 60 percent of the capital of any corporation dealing with the public be owned by Filipinos. The Japanese circumvented this law, and by 1939 Japanese investors owned between 142,000 and 148,000 acres of land in Davao of which only 70,000 (approximately) acres were legally acquired.<sup>33</sup> The Filipinos began to view Japanese manipulation of the laws with concern, and it became a commonly held view in both Manila and Davao that once the Philippines gained independence from America in July, 1946, the Japanese would increasingly gain political and economic control of the islands. This was not viewed by most Filipinos with any real alarm, however, because generally speaking the Japanese had been good citizens and had brought economic growth to Davao.<sup>34</sup>

The opposing view was that the Japanese represented a real threat to the Philippines as a whole. Some Filipinos did hold to the view that the Japanese were arrogant, and there was a pre-war saying in Tagalog which went: "Pasukáb kung tumingin, parang Hapon" -- "He eyes you in a treacherous manner like a Jap."<sup>35</sup> Americans complained of Japanese pirates in the waters around the Philippines who raided merchant shipping, causing American and Filipino businesses to close down because they could no longer pay the prohibitive shipping rates caused by the pirating.<sup>36</sup> In addition, Japan's war on China had taught many Filipinos what they might expect from Japan in the long run, and "America's unconcealed sympathy for China brought her in turn the hatred of Japan and as a side issue left the Filipino...to face the direct enmity of Japan."<sup>37</sup> The large number of Chinese in the Philippines led also to the popularity of the idea that China was "waging the war of the democracies," a direct affront to the Japanese.<sup>38</sup> The upshot of this was passage of the Immigration Act of 1940 whereby the Philippine government established a quota on the number of foreigners who could enter the Philippines as immigrants. The quota limit, set at 500 immigrants per country, was viewed by the Japanese as an open challenge and consequent "loss of face," although the logic of the Japanese position could not bear close argument for the Filipino immigrants in Japan were barred from owning land in Japan.<sup>39</sup>

During the war itself the Japanese not only recognized the importance of Mindanao to the prosecution of their war efforts in the Southwest Pacific, but they also realized the necessity for ensuring the security of the long-held interests in Davao Province. The First Air Fleet Headquarters with the Army's 15th Air Regiment was located here,

as was the Army headquarters for the Mindanao forces. The Japanese placed some symbolic importance upon Mindanao as an expression of the Japanese claims on the Philippines because of the pre-war commitments in the Davao area, and one may conclude that the Japanese knew at least as much about the island of Mindanao as they did about any island in the archipelago because of their pre-war commitment in Davao.<sup>40</sup> But the knowledge which the Japanese had gained in their years of cultural and economic exchange with the Filipinos was either ignored or not understood, for the Japanese occupation policies demonstrated a profound ignorance of the Filipino culture.

Japanese success in the Philippines was necessary if they were to expect to weld the Far East into an anti-Western bloc. But in the application of their Greater Far East Co-Prosperity Sphere policies, the Japanese demonstrated a twisted form of logic, as expressed in the following proclamation, the substance of which was to be published many times in different forms in the Philippines:<sup>41</sup>

We have no intention of conquering any Asiatic people, nor do we have any territorial desire on any Oriental nation...But if you fail to understand the true and lofty purpose of Japan, and instead obstruct the successful prosecution of the military activities and tactics of the Imperial Japanese Forces, whoever you are, we shall come and crush you with our might and power, thus compel you to realize by means of force the true significance and meaning of our mission in the Far East.

Commander in Chief of the  
Imperial Forces  
February 1942

The Japanese occupation policy in the Philippines developed in roughly three phases. The first phase was the early months, December 1941 through May 1942. This phase was characterized by military cruelty and Japanese irritation, befuddlement and impatience caused by the reaction

of the Filipino population -- the Filipinos were sullen, unfriendly, and openly unenthusiastic with their "liberation" by the Japanese conquerors. The second phase began with the fall of Bataan and Corregidor and lasted through August 1944. During this period, the occupation government emphasized the principles of the Co-Prosperity Sphere, and the Filipino puppet government with its Japanese dictated constitution was established. Nevertheless, harsh treatment of the populace continued during this phase. The Japanese referred to the period covered by the first two phases as the "quiet period."<sup>42</sup> The beginning of the third and final phase was marked by the first Allied air attacks on Davao City and Manila in August and September 1944. Japanese policy quickly became hysterical and the brutality was less calculated and more wanton.

The Japanese began economic exploitation of the Philippines soon after their invasion. This exploitation and the mistreatment of the people exposed the real nature of Japan's true purposes. Schools, businesses and small shops were closed, utilities were turned off, transportation shut down, and theaters, radios and newspapers banned. By 1943 there were 1,149 Filipino businesses with Japanese administrators, from dancing schools to banks.<sup>43</sup> The economic infrastructure was stripped and exported to other Japanese occupied areas in Asia. Mining equipment was dismantled and shipped away, and thousands of automobiles, trucks, and pieces of farm equipment were dismantled, pressed, baled and shipped to Japan as scrap.<sup>44</sup> Grain and rice harvests were seized by the Japanese to provide supplies for the Imperial Forces, and those not seized were oftentimes burned.<sup>45</sup> This policy was especially damaging on Mindanao where the staple of the Filipino diet, rice, could be grown only in the coastal regions and river basins, areas controlled by the

Japanese or easily accessible to them. The Japanese destroyed not only the mining and manufacturing infrastructure of the economy, but they dismantled the support system for the peasant farmers as well. The Japanese slaughtered carabaos for meat, leaving the farmer without the animal labor needed to cultivate the fields at the same time that they were taking approximately one-third of the fertile land out of cultivation through destruction.<sup>46</sup>

The results of the economic disruption caused by the occupation policies were nearly disastrous. There was a high rate of unemployment, inflation drove prices very high, and goods needed for daily living were no longer available, which led to a thriving black market. The production and import of medicines stopped with the Japanese occupation allowing disease to take hold on the population -- malaria, pellagra, beriberi and typhus in particular.<sup>47</sup>

The Japanese administrators never really seemed able to come to grips with the problem. They perceived that the populace was "gradually" turning against them, but they blamed this on the failure of the Filipinos themselves to support the "Philippine industry" whose policies of "unsuitable employments (sic) resulted in a marked increase in numbers of the poor."<sup>48</sup> In other words, they blamed it on the Filipinos themselves. The Japanese believed that their "subjugative operations" brought peace and order to this Filipino problem, however.<sup>49</sup> When American forces invaded Mindanao, they found plentiful food stores in the Japanese garri-  
sons, providing further evidence of how the Japanese had misperceived their responsibility to the people of the country they were administering. In fact, the Japanese had used food as a weapon, rewarding collaborators with food and withholding it from those who did not collaborate.<sup>50</sup>

The Japanese had not completely ignored the generally hostile attitude of the Filipinos. Nevertheless, as they did with other guerrilla and resistance movements elsewhere, they gave the Filipino resistance short shrift. A Japanese battle order for the Philippines directed soldiers to "Shoot guerrillas. All who oppose the Emperor...will be killed."<sup>51</sup> The Japanese perceived the guerrillas to be a manifestation of Filipino dissatisfaction and this can be seen in their terminology. Guerrillas were "bandits," and counterguerrilla operations were called "punitive expeditions" in internal Japanese documents.<sup>52</sup> Japanese radio broadcasts in both Japan and the Philippines assured the listeners that all was "quiet and secure" in the Philippines, and, in Mindanao's case, the "Peace and order in Mindanao and Sulu are highly satisfactory."<sup>53</sup> The Filipinos themselves had become "very astute at identifying contradictions and rationalizing discrepancies" in both Allied and Japanese radio broadcasts, for by now they could gather in the barrio (village) plaza and listen to each on the short-wave radio, provided Japanese soldiers were not in the area.<sup>54</sup> At five o'clock P.M. everyday, an Allied broadcast would be beamed at the Philippines. It would begin with General MacArthur intoning "I shall return" and end promptly at six o'clock P.M. with another promise to return.<sup>55</sup> Ultimately, although the Japanese continued to underestimate -- or at the very least understate -- the degree of unrest and popular support for the guerrillas, they did come to recognize the growing support for the guerrillas and the impact that this support would have when the Americans eventually returned to the Philippines in force.<sup>56</sup>

Japanese propaganda belied the real struggle that was on-going between the guerrilla resistance and the Japanese forces. Described as

a "bitter, endless struggle," the war between the guerrillas and the Japanese was played out with no quarter given by either side. "Filipino and American guerrillas shot down Japanese whenever they could." The Japanese would retaliate by placing the severed heads of guerrillas "on stakes around the Philippine barrios as a warning to others not to join the Resistance movement."<sup>57</sup> Ultimately, the Japanese used the full range of tools traditionally available to a government to fight guerrillas. They coordinated the activities of regular military units, national and local police, national intelligence and security elements, special police, agents, informers, and the public communications system.<sup>58</sup> Bounties for dead guerrillas were paid to Filipinos in the form of food -- for example, a bag of rice or passes for meat or other foodstuffs would be exchanged for the head of a guerrilla.<sup>59</sup> These tactics rarely worked, for few Filipinos would involve themselves with bribes, rewards or bounties. The Japanese "concept of counterinsurgency was still rudimentary" because in the end their tactics boiled down to saturation of a particular area with combat troops in the hopes of isolating and eliminating the guerrilla leadership.<sup>60</sup> The tactic rarely worked. The tools described above, although utilized by the Japanese, were often employed in a manner most likely to ensure failure. In today's expression, the Japanese were either simply not interested in "winning the hearts and minds" of the Filipinos, or they had no clue as to how to go about doing so. The remainder of this chapter will deal with this failure and the impact it had upon the guerrilla movement.

One student of Philippine history wrote of the Japanese occupation policies: "There seems to have been such an unshakable prepossession with Japan's inherent superiority, divine mission, and glorious destiny that the very idea of resistance was intolerable heresy."<sup>61</sup> The magnitude of



this tolerance is found in the estimate that one out of every 20 Filipinos died at the hands of the Japanese during the occupation.<sup>62</sup>

The most fearsome instrument through which the Japanese dealt with those who resisted was the Kempei Tai.<sup>63</sup> Administered by the War Ministry, the Kempei Tai was the Army's military police which had full authority for the arrest and investigation of civilians and combatants alike. Experts in the application of torture and the implementation of terror, the Kempei Tai, worked with the occupation army and civil administrators, which sought to turn the people against the guerrillas through brute force.<sup>64</sup> The Kempei Tai even had a training manual entitled Notes for the Interrogation of Prisoners of War. Two common methods for gaining information were "the magic eye" and "zona," (or "zonification"). Under "zonification" the Japanese would seize a barrio or town and zone it off (encircle it). The men of the barrio would then be herded into the town square. After proclamations, denunciations, and general haranguing was finished, a hooded man with eyelets cut in the hood would be brought out; "the Magic eye". This individual -- a traitor, spy or purported captured guerrilla -- would scan the crowd and pick out guerrilla spies, guerrillas or sympathizers. These unfortunates would then be publicly tortured, roasted alive, drawn and quartered, buried alive, or, the end result in most cases, beheaded. Needless to say, the approach of the Japanese to any barrio normally resulted in immediate evacuation and flight to the hills. On return to their barrios, people would find ransacked homes, homes leveled for their lumber or just burned to the ground, and half-eaten animals and fowls left rotting in the street. Bodies would have been disinterred in a search for jewelry and family belongings buried around the houses dug up.<sup>65</sup> The International War

Crimes Commission used detailed information of this sort collected by guerrilla units in its post-war deliberations.

Japanese treatment of prisoners held in their internment camps was also widely known by Filipinos outside the prison walls.<sup>66</sup> The internment camp on Mindanao was the Davao Penal Colony which remained agonizingly just beyond the reach of the Mindanao guerrillas. In the period April 1942 to September 1942, no fewer than 200 prisoners were buried each day in this Japanese internment camp. In this period 27,000 were buried in all.<sup>67</sup> The Filipino prisoners generally fared even worse than American prisoners in these camps, presumably because their heresy to the Japanese cause was greater than the crime of just being a Westerner.<sup>68</sup> The Filipinos often worked things out, however. For example, the Japanese would not give Red Cross packages sent from the United States to the American prisoners. The Filipino cooks in the prison camp would pilfer portions of the food when preparing it for the Japanese guards and give it to the prisoners -- a unique logistics chain.<sup>69</sup>

The Japanese dealt with captured guerrillas according to their ancient code of Bushido.<sup>70</sup> Insisting that captured Americans and Filipinos were "captives of war," not prisoners of war, they were told that they could expect nothing. This applied to Army regulars as well as guerrillas. The Japanese again demonstrated a twist in logic, for Japanese officials declared on the one hand "unprecedented clemency of the Imperial Japanese Forces in the Philippines," yet on the other hand they would declare that all captives were merely bandits and that they had "every right to kill all prisoners."<sup>71</sup> An indication of the severity and extent of Japanese meanness in dealing with the guerrillas can be found in records of trials held for captured guerrillas. The records

contain the names of hundreds of Filipino guerrillas who were tried and summarily sentenced to death on charges of "baneful action" and being a "guerrilla."<sup>72</sup> The Japanese certainly ignored the wisdom of Sun Tzu, whose writings had served the Samurai well. Sun Tzu had written, "Treat the captives well, and care for them...All soldiers taken must be cared for with magnanimity and sincerity so that they may be used by us."<sup>73</sup> Of the Japanese treatment of prisoners in the Davao Penal Colony, General Douglas MacArthur had this to say: "This unimpeachable record of savagery and merciless brutality to captured prisoners-of-war fills me with unspeakable horror."<sup>74</sup>

The Japanese were particularly picqued by the protection provided by the Filipinos to the Americans still remaining unsundered throughout the islands. This group included priests, women and children as well as American guerrillas. The continued freedom of the Americans was a testament to the courage of the Filipinos, for any Filipinos found to have sheltered or protected an American were summarily executed after much torture.<sup>75</sup> The courage was widely distributed, for there are many accounts of Americans coming down from the hills, having been ordered to appear for public execution by the local Japanese military commander, in order to save entire villages from being put to the sword for having harbored them. In December 1943, the Japanese published the following proclamation: "The amnesty under which Americans have been guaranteed safety and internment by the Imperial Japanese Government is about to expire. After January 25, 1944, any American found in the Islands, whether unsundered soldier or civilian, will be summarily executed."<sup>76</sup> The Japanese were true to their word, for aggressive Japanese patrols hunted down American families hiding in the mountains and killed many

prior to the January 25th deadline.<sup>77</sup> This proclamation led General MacArthur to drastically increase his efforts to extract by submarine Americans who were not fighting with the guerrillas. This effort, coordinated by Colonel Fertig on Mindanao for the most part, is generally viewed as one of the most significant contributions the guerrillas made during the war. That the Japanese would become so obsessed with a handful of women, babies and elderly men hiding deep in the mountainous rain forests speaks volumes about their hatred for the Americans and the bankruptcy of their policies to achieve total domination of the Filipinos. The extreme actions implemented by the Japanese merely served to increase the bitterness and brutality of the engagements between the guerrillas and Japanese regulars.

As the last statement intimates, brutality was not solely within the purview of the Japanese. Guerrilla units committed a share of the atrocities, as well. As Teodoro A. Agoncillo concludes in his assessment of the Japanese occupation, the guerrillas often brutalized the Filipino civilians far worse than the Japanese did. The guerrillas were very hard on any Filipino who was perceived as willingly giving aid and comfort to the Japanese, and Filipinos had been killed for merely talking to the Japanese.<sup>78</sup> Japanese civilians were not entirely safe from guerrilla reprisals either. When the American invasion forces assaulted Leyte and Luzon, the Japanese began to consolidate the Japanese civilians on Mindanao in order to evacuate them to Japan. In a brutal march from Surigao to Cagayan, the Japanese Army attempted to conduct a forced march of 5,000 Japanese including women and children to the Cagayan evacuation point. Less than 3,400 made it, and very few women and children survived the march. Disease, exhaustion and the guerrillas had taken their toll

on the column.<sup>79</sup>

The difference between the Japanese and the guerrillas in these matters ultimately became one of judicial procedures, for General MacArthur had made his influence felt all the way from Australia.<sup>80</sup> While he would not have condoned much of what the guerrillas did, his insistence that the laws of war, Article 82 of the Philippine Articles of War, and the laws of America be strictly adhered to tempered the excesses of the guerrillas. Unlike the Japanese, the guerrillas maintained records of trial for informers and spies, testimony was heard and affidavits filed. GHQ, SWPA was the Convening Military Authority for these courts-martial. A judgement of guilty brought a swift and merciful execution as opposed to the prolonged suffering common to the Japanese executions. As with the Japanese, the preferred method of execution was decapitation, which the Filipinos delivered with the barong, a large two-handed Moro sword.<sup>81</sup>

Brutalization of the civilians by the guerrillas is commonly associated with the early phase of the resistance movement, the latter half of 1942. In these cases the civilians were most often mistreated for reasons having nothing to do with the Japanese.<sup>82</sup> It was during this period that the few Americans involved with atrocities rose to notoriety. John P. O'Day on Luzon and Harry Fenton on Cebu were the most notorious of these. Colonel Fertig was aware of Fenton's practices and was building a record against him when the effort was made moot -- Fenton was assassinated by his own chief of staff.<sup>83</sup>

Of the Philippine guerrillas and their standing under international law, this has been said: "No guerrilla movement can operate entirely within the restrictions of the Articles of War, the Geneva

Conventions, or the Rules of Land Warfare, and the World War II guerrilla movement in the Philippines was no exception to this generalization."<sup>84</sup>

The people who suffered for this extra-legal activity were most often the Filipino civilians. Although less common on Mindanac than on other islands, guerrillas would ambush Japanese patrols on the outskirts of a town. The Japanese would then come and burn the town in reprisal and kill everyone in it. The civilians were happy to help the guerrillas if they would just confine their ambushes to the unpopulated areas. The guerrillas, in turn, saw no reason to invite the Japanese into their mountain sanctuaries and thought it reprehensible and unpatriotic for the men in the villages to object to being slaughtered along with their wives and children on behalf of the guerrillas.<sup>85</sup> The rate varied, but the Japanese would exact a ratio of anywhere from 100:1 to 200:1 to an entire barrio for every Japanese soldier killed.<sup>86</sup>

Generally throughout the islands, guerrilla units led by Americans did not develop the strategy of attacking Japanese patrols near the villages.<sup>87</sup> And the guerrillas on Mindanao were under strict guidance from Colonel Fertig to avoid situations which would invite Japanese reprisals against the civilian populace.

Colonel R. W. Volckmann nevertheless described a dilemma on Luzon which Colonel Fertig had to confront on Mindanao. Volckmann wrote: "It was generally found that areas which had no guerrilla for long periods were the hardest to bring back under control. In some instances severe measures had to be taken against individuals or groups who resisted the move to re-establish control." And: "The Filipinos' fear of the Japs, created by their barbarous and inhuman acts, was overpowered by the quiet, sometimes ferocious, but always persistent methods of their own

people."<sup>88</sup> The idea was that once committed to the resistance movement, irrespective of the motivation for the commitment, an individual was unlikely to turn again to the enemy. In eastern Mindanao the Japanese maintained control through most of the war. In this coastal area a Japanese captain had treated the population well. This forced Fertig into a decision he did not want to make. The Filipinos were either on the side of the Philippine resistance or they sided with the Japanese. As a principle there could be no neutral, middle ground. The guerrillas were, therefore, directed to conduct sabotage and assassinate Japanese leaders in the area in order to provoke Japanese reprisals against the towns. The Japanese, in doing so, would now be exposed as the true enemy. This was done, but it appears to be the only instance recorded where Fertig consciously made such a decision.<sup>89</sup>

In implementing the more brutal aspects of the Philippine occupation policy, the Japanese confronted, unwittingly or otherwise, the fundamental character of the Philippine culture. "The Filipino holds sacred beyond all things his church, his family and his home. All these were systematically violated."<sup>90</sup> By attacking the things held most dear by the Filipinos, the Japanese calculated that leverage would be achieved over each individual. The policy had much the same result as the reprisals, because a situation was created by which each action from either side brought an equal or greater counterreaction from the other.

The church in the Philippines was strengthened during the occupation period, and the Mindanao experience reflects this conclusion. At the war's beginning there were 80 Catholic priests on Mindanao. By August 1944, there were just 40 priests remaining alive or out of captivity to administer baptisms, conduct marriages, and preside over

funerals. There clergymen became known as "guerrilla priests" for they travelled clandestinely with guerrilla units and were considered to be the most secure means of messenger communication.<sup>91</sup> Father Edward Haggerty, who provides one of the best personal accounts of the Mindanao guerrillas, gives the reason why this was so: "I knew no Filipino would betray, above all, an American priest. I remembered that I once lived safely with a man who was the chief of Japanese spies."<sup>92</sup> The priests would travel to remote areas to conduct services, hear confessions, and conduct mass marriages and baptisms. One step ahead of the Japanese, they served as a vital link which helped hold the island population together. One might also conclude that because of their close relationship with both the guerrilla leaders and the civilian leaders they were able to encourage moderation by the guerrillas in their treatment of the civilians who had to live under the Japanese.

The Area Handbook for the Philippines gives this assessment of Filipino social values: "The system of social values adhered to by Filipinos of all walks of life emphasizes a strong sense of personal honor, dignity, and pride." Filipinos have "a great reluctance to act in any way that might offend or insult others."<sup>93</sup> Of paramount importance within this framework is the family which is the focus of social, economic, religious and, to a degree, political activity. Loyalty to the family transcends loyalty to the community, the church and to political affiliations. Marriages are especially important within this scale of values.<sup>94</sup>

Within the framework of these values, it is easy to understand why various Japanese practices in the treatment of the population caused



such a strong reaction from the Filipinos. The Japanese treated the Filipino civilians much the same as they treated their prisoners of war and civilian internees. Civilians, regardless of station in the society, were required to bow to the meanest soldier or bureaucrat. Failure to do so would elicit a wide range of responses, the most common of which was a slap in the face. Slapping was a common form of rebuke in the Japanese army. Therefore, the Japanese perception of the act was not intended to carry with it the meaning it had for the Filipinos, for whom it was a most grievous insult to the sense of personal honor and machismo inculcated in them by centuries of Spanish rule.<sup>95</sup> But the Japanese were not benignant sovereigns, and failure to bow could carry the severest penalties, such as being executed, trussed and hung in the barrio square or fried alive on galvanized iron in the hot sun.<sup>96</sup> Teodoro Agoncillo appraises the Filipino and gives a hint to his likely reaction to Japanese arrogance: "Generally vindictive, the Filipino does not easily forget an insult or an injury inflicted upon him."<sup>97</sup> Predictably, a strong reaction from the people in response to these slapping incidents merely invited a stronger Japanese reaction.

The Japanese made one of their most grievous errors through their treatment of the Filipino women. As one Japanese commander announced on Mindanao, "'Formerly women under America, so high' -- gesturing above his head -- 'now, under Nippon, so low!' stooping to the ground."<sup>98</sup> Daughters were taken from their families to be prostitutes and concubines for the Japanese army.<sup>99</sup> When husbands and fathers would not cooperate with the Japanese, wives and daughters were raped and otherwise sexually abused before the man.<sup>100</sup> For the Filipino, personal honor, and in particular a woman's honor, "is sacred and can only be abused at the risk

of one's life."<sup>101</sup> As the seasoned Japanese combat units were reassigned elsewhere in the Pacific after the American surrender, poorly disciplined third rate occupation troops, many of whom were Korean and Formosan conscripts, were brought to Mindanao to garrison the island.<sup>102</sup> As the abuse of the Filipino women and personal wrongs inflicted became widespread, so did the number of men who had a debt to pay. Since one individual, family, or barrio could not pretend to deal with the Japanese army alone, there was only one alternative -- join the guerrillas as their means to repay the affront to their honor.

In this discussion of Japanese occupation policies a word must be said of the Philippine government which helped administer the Japanese policies. The discussion in this paper only alludes to the issue of collaboration and how the puppet government functioned. This issue is very complex and emotion-filled with sources on the subject found in the bibliography. What the government actually did that directly affected the guerrillas will be discussed here.

In August 1943 the Japanese sought to persuade the Filipino people to support the Japanese war effort by establishing an independent government and giving the Philippines independence.<sup>103</sup> A nominal Philippine government enabled the Japanese to conclude a treaty of alliance with the Philippines calling for close political, economic and military cooperation for prosecution of the "military actions to be undertaken by Japan."<sup>104</sup> Furthermore, by creating a Philippine government, jurisdiction over the guerrillas now reverted to the puppet government. The Filipino guerrillas were, therefore, no longer combatants in a war but were now traitors to their own government, or just common bandits, under the fictions of the new legal code.<sup>105</sup>

In an abrupt change of policy in October 1943, the newly-installed president Jose P. Laurel declared amnesty for all political prisoners and set free thousands of imprisoned guerrillas. The government further declared amnesty for all guerrillas and set a January 20, 1944 deadline for their surrender after which the government "may take drastic action to force the guerrillas to surrender."<sup>106</sup> The government demonstrated thereby no resolution to carry out the threat, and the guerrillas, sensing the weakness of the government's position, simply ignored the threat. The consequence of these actions, and one that was privately supported by some members of the Laurel government, was that the newly-freed prisoners, having survived the brutality of the internment camps, joined the guerrillas, and the free guerrillas did not turn themselves in. During the 120 day "pacification program" many Filipino leaders publicly remonstrated against the guerrillas but privately aided the resistance movement. The three-month hiatus gave the guerrillas an opportunity to regroup, and the respite gave the guerrilla units the chance to assimilate and train their new members.<sup>107</sup> However, the program was given the appearance of success because lists of fictitious names and unserviceable firearms were "surrendered" to the local Filipino authorities. On paper the amnesty program was working.<sup>108</sup> On Mindanao the standdown in activity came at a critical time. Colonel Fertig had reached a critical point in his organizing of the Mindanao guerrillas, having just weathered a three-month period during which the Japanese had mounted a concerted offensive against his headquarters and his chief of staff had led a revolt against him.<sup>109</sup>

The Japanese did not initially consider the guerrillas a military threat, but they did fear the power gained by the guerrillas which came

from the approval given the guerrillas by the bulk of the population. To deal with the guerrillas the Japanese reconstituted the Philippine Constabulary in February 1942 and gave it limited authority in May 1942.<sup>110</sup> The Japanese hope was that the Constabulary, in confronting the guerrillas, Filipino against Filipino, would bring legitimacy to the Japanese counter guerrilla program and that they would eventually be used against the Americans as a conventional force. The irony here is that the Japanese tried to use the Philippine Constabulary for the same purpose for which it was originally formed by the Americans, to wit: to pursue and eliminate guerrilla bands. All parties were happy with this decision: for the Japanese the Constabulary would free Japanese troops for other duty, MacArthur's headquarters believed that the brutal treatment of the Filipino people would lessen, and the guerrillas saw in the Constabulary an impotent if not neutral foe.

President Laurel, who categorized the guerrillas as "fools" and "renegades," decided in November 1943 to increase the size of the Philippine Constabulary to 40,000, and he recruited or impressed many former officers and noncommissioned officers of the Constabulary back into service. Major General Paulino Santos, a former Constabulary officer, Governor of Lanao and Director of the Land Settlement Administration, was appointed February 4, 1944 as Commissioner of Mindanao with quasi-military authority over the island.

The Philippine Constabulary had very limited success in controlling guerrilla activity, so on June 10, 1944 Laurel created the Bureau of Investigation within the Constabulary, apparently to mimic Japanese practices, for the bureau had the powers and mission of the Kempei Tai. By July 14, 1944 Laurel had published Proclamation Number 20 which, in

effect, reverted responsibility for dealing with the guerrillas back to the Japanese. The proclamation made sabotage a violation of Japanese military law, publicly admitted for the first time the existence of such Filipino activity, and made execution the punishment for interfering with Japanese activities in the islands. By October 1944 the Japanese began to disarm, disband and intern the Constabulary members.

The guerrillas had made good use of the Constabulary while it existed. It was a ready source of weapons, whether turned over conspiratorially or won through military action. The Constabulary felt an affinity for the guerrillas, often readily assisted the guerrillas where possible, and struck tacit agreements on "no contact" zones. Many served concurrently with the Constabulary and the guerrillas. Many of the Constabulary saw little reason to die fighting Filipinos, and of course, many knew that to openly engage the guerrillas, who had the support of the local populace, was bargaining for a post-war firing squad.

Another means through which the Japanese sought to deal with the guerrillas was through a universal single-party political organization -- the Kalibapi.<sup>111</sup> The Japanese launched the Kalibapi in December 1942 as the sole, exclusive political party for the Philippines. In actual purpose it was a propaganda arm for the Japanese Military Administration and served to gather intelligence on local populations to assist in their monitoring and control. The Kalibapi was a Japanese importation which was a close cousin of the Japanese Imperial Rule Association. On May 8, 1944 President Laurel made the Kalibapi a Philippine organization, but this was in name only for the continued involvement of the Japanese and the compulsory nature of the organization doomed the effort to failure.<sup>112</sup>

The Kalibapi as the political arm of the Japanese Army was tied

into the Japanese-established Neighborhood Associations. The Neighborhood Associations were incorporated into the framework of the Kalibapi and given policing functions in addition to the Association's already existing responsibility for distributing food and commodities. Thus, the Japanese not only determined who would receive food and staples, but also created a spy network for rooting out guerrilla sympathizers. The towns were divided into districts, the districts into sections, and the sections into the smallest element, the unit, which was ten families (or ten houses). The leader of a unit was responsible for the actions of every member of each of the ten families. He was responsible for periodically reporting the exact number of individuals under his ten roofs and for explaining any additions or reductions to the number. In this manner the Japanese sought to control the movement of the guerrillas into and out of the barrios and to quickly identify local recruiting efforts by the guerrillas. Spot checks by Filipinos loyal to the Japanese or by Japanese patrols which revealed unexplainable discrepancies in the unit roster versus the "actual on-board strength" of the ten families would mean very harsh punishment for the unit leader and his family and torture and death for families who were assisting the guerrillas in any way.<sup>113</sup> This method was coupled with the always useful method of seizing the family of a guerrilla in order to force him to surrender.

The long arm of the Kalibapi and the Neighborhood Association placed a great strain upon the Filipinos, for it introduced daily the issue of collaboration, both with the Japanese and with the guerrillas.<sup>114</sup> Each side could be extremely hard on collaborators, and the issue was a very complex and personal one with which the guerrilla leaders had to contend. Using the most critical and least critical estimates, it is

thought that between 67 percent and 90 percent of the population as a whole resisted the Japanese in whatever way possible.<sup>115</sup> Most collaborators were the elites in Manila, or at least they received the greatest attention for having collaborated.<sup>116</sup> On Mindanan, the collaboration issue was most often settled "in the trenches," and the guerrillas had a good idea of who had supported them and who had not. Fertig himself was no hardliner on collaboration. He believed that Filipinos who subjected themselves to the Japanese treatment in order to protect their own people were courageous in their own right. He distinguished these people from the traitors who purposely aided the Japanese in their fight against the guerrillas. And, of course, Mindanao was populated in the interior by tribes who had no idea who the Japanese and Americans even were, and any assistance they may have rendered to either side was apolitical from the standpoint of the resistance movement itself.<sup>117</sup>

Important to the resistance movement throughout the Philippines, and critical to the guerrilla effort on Mindanao, was the Filipinos' attitude towards the Americans. The persistent irony was that the Filipino guerrillas had established contact with, urged leadership upon, and collaborated with a people who had been the past conquerors of their country. Unlike most other Asian peoples who had been sympathetic to Japan's "Asia for the Asians" theme, the Filipinos did not react the way the Japanese had expected them to react.<sup>118</sup> The Filipino early response to the Japanese had been sufficiently vexing to cause General Masaharu Homma, Commanding General of the Fourteenth Army, to declare that Filipinos with "pro-American sympathies" would "be annihilated without mercy."<sup>119</sup> As the Japanese policies became increasingly counterproductive, the Japanese propaganda became more shrill. A propaganda booklet published

in 1943 called Americans in the Philippines "foul water flowing down from the sewerage of a country that has been formed upon impure foundations."<sup>120</sup>

The Japanese had failed to appreciate that the Filipinos were "no longer true Orientals" but had become a hybrid of American political principles coupled with inherited Spanish values and Oriental philosophy.<sup>121</sup> Close on the heels of the Philippine Insurrection the Americans had introduced widespread literacy, improved public health, promoted an expanding prosperity throughout the society, established free speech, increased civil liberties, and founded a representative government that drew upon a people with an increased sense of opportunity.<sup>122</sup> The Japanese had not tried to understand the Filipinos, or at the very least they had no inclination to tailor their occupation policy to the Filipino culture. The Americans had respected the Filipino dignity, and that had become the true basis for American power in the Philippines. It would now pay large dividends.<sup>123</sup> The Filipino people would help Americans who were complete strangers, providing the best food and shelter available to them. They would transport gravely ill Americans, again strangers, miles over treacherous mountain trails to keep them from falling into the hands of the Japanese. Often, the visit of an American to a village was enough reason in itself for the village to have a fiesta.<sup>124</sup> America in the Philippines was supported by the common citizen, a fact with which the Japanese were unable to come to grips.<sup>125</sup>

The swiftness of Japanese victories in the Pacific had left the Japanese unprepared to cope with the administration of the conquered countries. They lacked the trained colonial administrators and technicians to run the banks, mines and factories. With no colonial civil service, the inexperienced bureaucrats assigned for service in the



Philippines "were full of condescension toward the local people and were largely ignorant of their customs and traditions...They found it easier to bully and intimidate than to understand strange ways." They turned to the military -- and the military answered to no one.<sup>126</sup> The terrorism and brutality practised by the Japanese was predestined to be counter-productive, a fact well-demonstrated in the history of resistance movements.<sup>127</sup> John Keats has Colonel Fertig assessing the situation in Mindanao in this way: "It was the civilians whom the Japanese butchered, and as long as the Japanese were bestial, popular support of the resistance was assured. And as long as there was resistance, the Japanese would continue to be bestial."<sup>128</sup>

Almost certainly, had the Japanese policies been genuinely benevolent the resistance movement would have been less universal. But the "almost incredible stupidity of the Japanese occupation policies" demonstrated that the Japanese conquerors had routinely underestimated or ignored the role their own policies played in producing the conditions from which a resistance movement could grow. Again, turning to Sun Tzu, we find that the Japanese ignored the ancient wisdom available to them: "Those who excel in war first cultivate their own humanity and justice and maintain their laws and institutions. By these means they make their governments invincible."<sup>129</sup>

## CHAPTER 4

### ENDNOTES

<sup>1</sup>U.S. War Department, Planning Division, Office of Director of Plans and Operations, U.S. Army Service Forces, "Logistic Study for Projected Operations: Philippine Base Development," February 26, 1945, p. 74.

<sup>2</sup>Robert L. Eichelberger, Our Jungle Road to Tokyo, 1950, p. 216.

<sup>3</sup>Wendell W. Fertig, "Guerrillero," Part I, Undated Manuscript, p. 24.

<sup>4</sup>Kenneth MacLeish, "Stone Age Cavemen of Mindanao," National Geographic, August 1972, pp. 2 249.

<sup>5</sup>War Department, Planning Division, "Philippine Base Development," p. 74.

<sup>6</sup>Headquarters, X Corps, History of X Corps on Mindanao 17 April 1945-30 June 1945, June 30, 1945, p. 5.

<sup>7</sup>Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas, "Philippines and Halmahera," CINCPAC-CINCPAC Bulletin 125-44, August 15, 1944.

<sup>8</sup>See American and Japanese intelligence estimates in Headquarters, Eighth U.S. Army, "Report of the Commanding General Eighth Army on the Palawan and Zamboanga Operations: Victor III and IV," undated; and General Headquarters, Far East Command, "Philippine Operations Record, Phase I November 1941 to July 1942" (Originally 14th Army Operations Vol. I), Japanese Monograph No. 1, undated (circa October 1946). Excellent descriptions of the terrain are found in Edward Haggerty, Guerrilla Padre in Mindanao, 1946; Steve Mellnik, Philippine Diary 1939-1945, 1969; Hugh L. Scott, Some Memories of a Soldier, 1928.

<sup>9</sup>Eichelberger, Jungle Road, p. 218.

<sup>10</sup>Vic Hurley, Jungle Patrol: The Story of the Philippine Constabulary, 1938, p. 254.

<sup>11</sup>Office of Strategic Services, "Studies Based on Census of the Philippines, 1939," March 19, 1942.

<sup>12</sup>It was rumored that the Japanese had assisted in taking the census and had purposely understated the true Japanese presence in Davao Province, Mindanao. See Catherine Porter, Crisis in the Philippines, 1942 for discussion of the Japanese Activities in the Philippines before the invasion.

<sup>13</sup>David Bernstein, The Philippine Story, 1947, pp. 12-13, 20.

<sup>14</sup>X Corps, History...Mindanao, p. 9.

<sup>15</sup>Bernstein, Philippine Story, p. 12 and Nena Vreeland and others, Area Handbook for the Philippines, 1976, p. 76. However, in political terms, the real division in the Philippines was probably along class lines, divided into two classes. Five percent of the population were the wealthy and educated elite, and the remainder were the taos - the small farmers, manual laborers and share croppers. See Bernstein, Philippine Story, p. 21.

<sup>16</sup>Office of Strategic Services, "Studies Based on Census," p. 6. As many as 87 different dialects have been recorded, however. See Bernstein, Philippine Story, p. 3.

<sup>17</sup>Vreeland, Area Handbook, p. 75.

<sup>18</sup>Bernstein, Philippine Story, p. 17. The Philippines at this time was the third largest English-speaking country in the world.

<sup>19</sup>Ibid.

<sup>20</sup>Beth Day, The Philippines: Shattered Showcase of Democracy in Asia, 1975, p. 181.

<sup>21</sup>General Headquarters, Far East Command, Japanese Monograph No. 1, p. 5.

<sup>22</sup>The fighting has not ceased on Mindanao. In the early 1970's the Moros and Huks engaged the Filipino government in open warfare. The fighting continues today, in much the same fashion has been customary on the island. See "Charlies Angels," Newsweek, March 15, 1982, p. 42.

<sup>23</sup>These raids had virtually ceased under American rule. But the surrender of the Americans and the intrusion of the Japanese created a vacuum and the centuries-old custom was quickly revived.

<sup>24</sup>Office of Strategic Services, "Studies Based on Census," p. 12.

<sup>25</sup>Ibid., pp. 42-4.

<sup>26</sup>Ibid., pp. 27-29.

<sup>27</sup>Ibid., pp. 21, 24.

<sup>28</sup>Ibid., pp. 18-19.

<sup>29</sup>Porter, Crisis, p. 104. After the invasion many of these Japanese donned Japanese Army officer insignia; others became local civil administrators.

<sup>30</sup>General Robert L. Eichelberger, who commanded the American Eighth Army, put the pre-war Japanese civilian population in Davao at 40,000. He believed many of these people entered the Japanese Army, which many did as American invasion forces neared the islands. Jay Luvaas, ed., Dear Miss Em: General Eichelberger's War in the Pacific, 1942 - 1945, 1972, contains valuable observations of the situation on Mindanao.

<sup>31</sup>The Ohta Company was established by Oda Kyosaburo, known to the Filipinos as "K.S. Ohta." He was the frontier tycoon of Davao Province. He died in 1917. Hemp, the famous "Manila rope," is made from abaca.

<sup>32</sup>Porter, Crisis, pp. 99, 102.

<sup>33</sup>Ibid., pp. 99-100; Teodoro A. Agoncillo, The Fateful Years: Japan's Adventure in the Philippines, 1941-1945, 1965, pp. 48-49; X Corps, History...Mindanao, p. 10. Japanese investors circumvented the Public Land Law by establishing dummy corporations. Women from the interior tribes were purchased as wives for Japanese investors, land purchased in their names, and then they were returned to the tribes in the mountains. Americans and Filipinos purchased land and sublet it to the Japanese, and Japanese nationals were adopted by Filipino families, thereby giving them the legal rights under Philippine law that any Filipino citizen would have. Another ploy was to bring in American-born and Hawaiian-born Japanese to form land-holding corporations with them. See Florence Horn, Orphans of the Pacific, 1941, p. 269; Robert Aura Smith, Philippine Freedom 1946-1958, p. 226.

<sup>34</sup>Porter, Crisis, p. 5. The Japanese in Davao Province represented a small minority of the 300,000 population (Davao City, one of three chartered cities on Mindanao, had 103,000 citizens). The Japanese paid one-half of the collected taxes and employed nearly 14,000 Filipinos. They were described as "thrifty, orderly, peaceful." Agoncillo, Fateful Years, p. 49. Davao City was also known as "Little Tokyo" among the Filipinos. General Headquarters, Far East Command, Military Intelligence Section, Operations of the Counter Intelligence Corps in the SWPA, July 29, 1948, p. 78.

<sup>35</sup>Agoncillo, Fateful Years, p. 647.

<sup>36</sup>"The Deisher-Couch Papers," no date, p. 31. Mr. Deisher claimed that there were as many as 35,000 Japanese farmers on Mindanao and said of them that "These Japanese are becoming real insolent, showing their teeth at the slightest provocation." See also Horn, Orphans, p. 284.

<sup>37</sup>Carlos P. Romulo, Mother America: A Living Story of Democracy, 1943, p. 66.

<sup>38</sup>Porter, Crisis, p. 97.

<sup>39</sup>Romulo, Mother America, p. 51. Actually, this was just the latest in a series of ripostes. The United States had passed the Oriental Exclusion Act in 1923, and the Japanese had excluded any foreigner from owning any land in Japan before that.

<sup>40</sup>Early in the occupation the Japanese considered Cebu City to be second in importance to Manila for controlling the garrisons among the islands. As the war progressed and the Americans invaded the Philippines, this Army headquarters was moved to Davao because the 15,000 Japanese residents in Davao needed safeguarding and Mindanao was considered to be the most defensible for the remainder of the Army. General Headquarters, Far East Command, "Philippines Operations Record, Phase III, Defense of Leyte by the 35th Army, 1944-1945," Japanese Monograph No. 6, October 1946, p. 127; U.S. Aerospace Studies Institute, Air University, The Role of Airpower in Guerrilla Warfare (World War II), December 1962, p. 106. The Japanese were concerned with the love lives of their soldiers and civilians in Davao "who are on the front lines of colonization." (That is a quote from a Japanese radio broadcast - the word "colonization" appears to show their true purpose in Mindanao.) The Japanese government made a direct plea to the people of Japan to go to Davao to "solve the problems of the matrimonial front." Found in Office of Strategic Services, "The Program of Japan in the Philippines," July 29, 1944, p. 263.

<sup>41</sup>Bernstein, Philippine Story, p. 162.

<sup>42</sup>General Headquarters, Far East Command, "Philippine Operations Record, Phase II" (December 1942 - June 1944), Japanese Monograph No. 5, October 1946, entire. It may have been "quiet" for the Japanese, but it was anything but that for the Filipinos.

<sup>43</sup>Patricia McDermott Clement, "The Philippine Archives," May 8, 1981, p. 13.

<sup>44</sup>Travis Ingham, Rendezvous by Submarine: The Story of Charles Parsons and the Guerrilla-Soldiers in the Philippines, 1945, pp. 133, 162.

<sup>45</sup>Jack Hawkins, Never Say Die, 1961, p. 166.

<sup>46</sup>Bernstein, Philippine Story, p. 7. Before the war there were an estimated three million carabaos in the Philippines. It was estimated that by the end of the Japanese occupation nearly 70% of these animals had been lost.

<sup>47</sup>Ingham, Rendezvous, p. 134.

<sup>48</sup>General Headquarters, Far East Command, Japanese Monograph No. 3, p. 12.

<sup>49</sup>Ibid., p. 10.

<sup>50</sup>William F. McCartney, The Jungleers: A History of the 41st Infantry Division, 1948, p. 154.

<sup>51</sup>Robert D. Powers, Jr., "Guerrillas and the Laws of War," Studies in Guerrilla Warfare, United States Naval Institute, 1963, p. 12.

<sup>52</sup>General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area, Allied Translator and Interpreter Section, "Guerrilla Warfare in the Philippines," Enemy Publications, No. 353 (Part I), April 28, 1945 (hereinafter ATIS, Part I), entire; and General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area, Allied Translator and Interpreter Section, "Guerrilla Warfare in the Philippines," Enemy Publications, No. 353 (Part II), April 28, 1945 (hereinafter ATIS Part II), entire.

<sup>53</sup>Office of Strategic Services, "The Programs of Japan in the Philippines," July 29, 1944, p. 74. This broadcast was made in February 1944 during a period when one of the largest punitive expeditions was combing Mindanao trying to staunch the flood of guerrilla radio broadcasts and submarine drops.

<sup>54</sup>Mellnik, Philippine Diary, p. 260. The Japanese propaganda was sometimes outrageously unbelievable. The Japanese commander on Mindanao once broadcast that the Japanese had invaded San Francisco, bombed Washington, D.C., seized Hawaii and captured five million Russians. The Filipinos, of course, knew that the Allied broadcasts came from San Francisco, the supply submarines from Australia, and that Japan and Russia were not yet at war.

<sup>55</sup>Ingham, Rendezvous, pp. 178-179.

<sup>56</sup>ATIS, Part I, pp. C, 2. General Headquarters, Far East Command, Japanese Monograph No. 3, pp. 41-42.

<sup>57</sup>Trevor Nevitt Dupuy, Asian and Axis Resistance Movements, 1965, p. 24.

<sup>58</sup>Department of the Army, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, "Counter Insurgency Operations: A Handbook for the Suppression of Communist Guerrilla/Terrorist Operations," December 1, 1960, p. 41.

<sup>59</sup>Hernando J. Abaya, Betrayal in the Philippines, 1946, p. 57.

<sup>60</sup>David Joel Steinberg, Philippine Collaboration in World War II, 1967, p. 94.

<sup>61</sup>Smith, Philippine Freedom, p. 108.

<sup>62</sup>Day, Shattered Showcase, p. 106.

<sup>63</sup>The Kempei Tai ("Military Police") was similar in purpose to the Nazi Gestapo and the Russian KGB (Ogpu, N.K.V.D.), except that as Beth Day put it, "The Gestapo, vicious as it was, was no match for the efficient Oriental terrorism practiced by the Japanese." Ibid., p. 105.

<sup>64</sup>Edward F.L. Russell, The Knights of Bushido: The Shocking History of Japanese War Atrocities, 1958, pp. 274-275.

<sup>65</sup>See especially Haggerty, Guerrilla Padre, pp. 185-191. For atrocities on Mindanao; and Jose Demandante Dormal, The War in Panay: A Documentary History of the Resistance Movement in Panay During World War II, 1952, entire; and Fourteenth Antiaircraft Wing, "Japanese Atrocities," August 20, 1945, entire.

<sup>66</sup>Beyond the scope of this paper, a lengthy discussion of the treatment of prisoners will not be attempted. It is recorded that 50,297 American and Filipino prisoners of war died in the internment camps. A selection of books about life in these camps is found in the bibliography.

<sup>67</sup>Haggerty, Guerrilla Padre, p. 116.

<sup>68</sup>Robert Ross Smith, "The Status of Members of Philippine Military Forces During World War II," 1973, p. 20.

<sup>69</sup>Haggerty, Guerrilla Padre, p. 157.

<sup>70</sup>Bushido translates as "the way of the warrior." A deep-rooted belief in the code led the Japanese to decide against signing the Geneva Convention on treatment of prisoners of war. Bushido equates compassion with weakness, a principle in contradiction with the Geneva Convention. For the Japanese soldier, surrender to the enemy was forbidden under the code, and a soldier was required to commit suicide or suffer eternal disgrace. Not surprisingly, prisoners seized by the Japanese were the objects of Japanese contempt, and therefore, abuse. For elaboration on the Bushido code see Russell, Knights of Bushido. A concise description is found in Arthur Zich, The Rising Sun, 1977, p. 150.

<sup>71</sup>Haggerty, Guerrilla Padre, p. 117.

<sup>72</sup>General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area, Allied Translator and Interpreter Service, "Trial Records of Filipino and Chinese Guerrillas and Civilians and Japanese Soldiers and Civilians," Enemy Publications, No. 398, September 22, 1945, p. 76.

<sup>73</sup>Sun Tzu, The Art of War, translated by Samuel B. Griffith, 1963, p. 76.

<sup>74</sup>Quoted in Courtney Whitney, MacArthur: His Rendezvous with History, 1956, p. 148.

<sup>75</sup>Ingham, Rendezvous, p. 170.

<sup>76</sup>Haggerty, Guerrilla Padre, p. 160.

<sup>77</sup>Louise Reid Spencer in her book Guerrilla Wife, 1945 details the frightening account of one of these patrols on the island of Panay. Well along in her pregnancy, Mrs. Spencer, her husband and Claude and Laverne Fertig with their two month old daughter stayed barely ahead of Japanese patrols as they fled through the mountains. The Americans and Filipinos who had been living with them in their mountain hideout did not escape. The Japanese slaughtered all in the small village. Major Claude Fertig was Colonel Wendell Fertig's brother. Also a mining engineer, he was the Chief Engineer of the 6th Military District and ran a radio net. The two families successfully escaped by submarine in March 1944, and the Spencer's baby was born in Brisbane in May 1944.

78. Forbes J. Monaghan, Under the Red Sun: A Letter From Manila, 1946, p. 142.

79. John Keats, They Fought Alone, 1963, p. 407. The Japanese themselves concluded that the "Evacuation was not handled in a satisfactory manner," for the evacuees suffered "huge casualties" from "enemy fire and air attack." From General Headquarters, Far East Command, Japanese Monograph No. 6, p. 138.

80. Dormal, The War in Panay, pp. 61-62.

81. There was some grisly logic to this. Until late 1944 bullets were a scarce, and therefore precious, commodity for the guerrillas. Beheading combined swiftness with efficient economy. It may also have been a response to the Japanese custom ("eye for an eye") or it may plausibly have reflected centuries of Moro custom. For the Japanese, the honor of beheading a prisoner was, literally speaking, something to write home to mother about. The honor was taken seriously, and young officers were judged on how cleanly they executed the coup de grace. See Ingham, Rendezvous, pp. 124-125, and Joseph E. St. John, Leyte Calling..., 1945, pp. 133-134.

82. This phase will be covered in detail in chapter five.

83. See Agoncillo, Fateful Years, p. 761; Ingham, Rendezvous, pp. 158-160; Allison Ind, Allied Intelligence Bureau: Our Secret Weapon in the War Against Japan, 1958, p. 102.

84. Smith, "Status of Members," p. 53.

85. Monaghan, Red Sun, throughout.

86. Ibid; and Rafael Steinberg, Return to the Philippines, 1979, p. 32.

87. This does not necessarily reflect earlier American experience in the Philippines during the Pacification when reprisals against Filipinos had been practiced by the Americans against the Moros on Mindanao and Sulu. John J. Pershing once wrote his old friend George Meiklejohn: "All the Moros have heard of this act [reprisals], and it is said to be current among them that the life of an American will cost them 10 Moros. It is fortunate that such ideas prevail among them." As the last sentence suggests, the threat of reprisals was most often just that - a threat. Donald Smythe, Guerrilla Warrior: The Early Life of John J. Pershing, 1973, pp. 61-62.

88. R. W. Volckmann, We Remained: Three Years Behind the Enemy Lines in the Philippines, 1954, pp. 125-126.



<sup>89</sup>Keats, They Fought Alone, p. 197. There was another instance where it is recorded that Geneva Convention precepts were violated. The Mindanao guerrillas, while they were headquartered in Misamis, had a prison camp for Japanese prisoners (few to none), collaborators and convicted criminals. The camp was guarded by Moros. One night a Japanese soldier and seven collaborators escaped. They were caught the same night, and at daybreak their heads were seen by the remaining prisoners mounted on stakes outside the wire, facing into the compound. The prison camp, called "Happy Valley," was away from Misamis in the mountains; it can be concluded that the method for handling escaped prisoners was a natural one for the Moros and not the response to any kind of established orders. Ibid., p. 206.

<sup>90</sup>Carlos P. Romulo, I See the Philippines Rise, 1946, p. 114.

<sup>91</sup>The American, Canadian and Dutch priests joined the guerrillas. The Irish Columbans did to some extent, but generally reflected Ireland's neutrality in the war. The American Jesuits were located in the northern part of Mindanao, the Dutch of the Sacred Heart were in the east, the Canadians of the Quebec Foreign Mission were in Davao and the southeast, and the Irish Columbans in the west. The American and Canadian Oblates of Mary were located in Cotabato in the southwest. Haggerty, Guerrilla Padre, pp. 3, 191.

<sup>92</sup>Ibid., p. 127. The one exception, Haggerty allowed, would be a "few Moros."

<sup>93</sup>Vreeland, Area Handbook, p. 114. Four principal values are the primary expression of this system of social values:

1. (Most important) utang na loob: devotes a primary debt, reciprocal obligations. This is the principal cohesive force in Philippine society.
2. Amor Proprio (amour propre): self-esteem.
3. Hiya: a sense of shame.
4. Pakikisama: a desire to avoid placing others in a stressful or unpleasant position.

See Vreeland, Area Handbook, pp. 114-118 and Romulo, The Philippines Rise, p. 113 for discussion.

<sup>94</sup>Vreeland, Area Handbook, pp. 107-114.

<sup>95</sup>See especially Zich, Rising Sun, p. 153 and Romulo, The Philippines Rise, p. 113.

<sup>96</sup>Ingham, Rendezvous, pp. 39-40.

<sup>97</sup>Agoncillo, Fateful Years, p. 648. An example of the Filipino reaction to this highhanded policy is found in an incident which occurred in Misamis City, Mindanao. A minor Japanese bureaucrat was left by the occupying army in the city to administer it for the Japanese. No longer willing to suffer his rebukes, the townspeople tethered him to a stake, stoned him beyond recognition, and left him to be eaten by dogs. Keats, They Fought Alone, p. 102.

<sup>98</sup>Haggerty, Guerrilla Padre, p. 40.

<sup>99</sup>Carlos P. Romulo, I Saw the Fall of the Philippines, 1942, pp. 251, 253.

<sup>100</sup>Sex in the Philippines at this time was very open and freely offered. Consequently, rape was commensurately a much greater crime, somewhat akin to robbing a man who will give you his money as a gift. Rape was a crime which bound the girl's family to a blood feud with the perpetrators. The Japanese became the object of a great many blood feuds. Keats, They Fought Alone, p. 73.

<sup>101</sup>Agoncillo, Fateful Years, p. 648.

<sup>102</sup>Keats, They Fought Alone, p. 73.

<sup>103</sup>The sham fooled no one, however, for the Japanese still ran the country and none of the freedoms associated with independence were permitted: free elections, free press, and so forth. The brutal treatment of the population by the Japanese occupiers continued as well.

<sup>104</sup>See Foreign Affairs Association of Japan, Japan Yearbook 1943-1944, December 1944, pp. 1031-1032.

<sup>105</sup>Gene Z. Hanrahan, Japanese Operations Against Guerrilla Forces, 1954, p. 17.

<sup>106</sup>Office of Strategic Services, "The Program of Japan in the Philippines," pp. 272-273.

<sup>107</sup>Smith, "Status of Members," p. 48; Steinberg, Philippine Collaboration, pp. 91-92; Alfonso Arellano, "Facts About Filipino Collaboration: An Analytical Study," 1947, p. 13.

<sup>108</sup>Steinberg, Philippine Collaboration, pp. 58-60. Office of Strategic Services, "Law Enforcement in the Philippine Islands," September 25, 1944, entire.

<sup>109</sup>The organization of the Mindanao guerrillas during this period will be discussed in Chapter Five.

<sup>110</sup>The discussion which follows on the Philippine Constabulary is detailed in the following references: General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area, Information Bulletin, "Report on Conditions in the Philippine Islands," June 1943, entire; Steinberg, Philippine Collaboration, pp. 58-60, 94; Office of Strategic Services, "Law Enforcement in the Philippines," general; Office of Strategic Services, "The Program of Japan in the Philippines," pp. 259-260, 282; ATIS, Part I, pp. 5, 33, 44, 55; "The Philippine Guerrilla Resistance Movement," undated manuscript, p. 225; Harold Hanne Elarth, The Story of the Philippine Constabulary, 1949, pp. 83-132; Office of Strategic Services, "The Government of the 'New Philippines': (A Study of the Present Puppet Government in the Philippines)," May 15, 1944, p. 44 (Contains a list of the governors of each province on

Mindanao, pp. 43-44); Adalia Marquez, Blood on the Rising Sun, 1957, describes the "Peace Army." The "Peace Army" of General Arsenio Ricarte was not under the Philippine Constabulary. An ardent Japanese sympathizer who had lived in Japan before the war, Ricarte returned to the Philippines to fight the guerrillas with his own private army. He had fought the Spanish and had left the Philippines while it was under the American flag.

<sup>111</sup>Shortened version of Kapisanan sa Paglilingkod sa Bagang Pilipinas.

<sup>112</sup>Office of Strategic Services, "Study of the Present Puppet Government," pp. 4-6.

<sup>113</sup>Ibid. Ingham, Rendezvous, pp. 163-164. The general view was that in belonging to the Kalibapi a Filipino automatically became a "spy for the Rising Sun." There was a humorous side to the Kalibapi. The Minister of Education tried to dispose of the Western-adopted handshake and substitute nationwide the "Kalibapi salute" -- the slight bow used by the Japanese. The handshake was dismissed as "inefficient, unhygienic, foreign." Abaya, Betrayal, p. 46.

<sup>114</sup>Filipinos collaborated with the Japanese for any number of reasons, but there were four principal reasons which can be listed: (1) the desire to shield the Filipino people from the harshness of Japanese rule (exiled President Quezon advocated this); (2) protection of family and personal interests (business owners, low-level bureaucrats); (3) sincere belief in Japanese goals, anti-Americanism; (4) personal gain - gave loyalty to highest bidder, often played both sides off against each other. Some Filipino youth were drawn to the Japanese cabarets, and many simply yearned for electric lights and running water. Many were sacadas, people captured for forced labor, who were ill-treated and were the first to cross over into American lines when Allied invasion forces returned to Mindanao.

<sup>115</sup>Bernstein, Philippine Story, pp. 170-171. See also Ira Wolfert, American Guerrilla in the Philippines, 1945, p. 84.

<sup>116</sup>The impending American invasion of the Philippines became something more than a matter of ridding the islands of the Japanese, for the nation now had to deal with its collaborators. General MacArthur initially "posited general culpability until the individual could establish his innocence; the Osmeña policy [Osmeña succeeded Quezon on his death] posited individual innocence until treasonable motivation could be assessed." D. Clayton James, The Years of MacArthur, 1941-1945, Volume II, 1975, p. 529.

<sup>117</sup>Keats, They Fought Alone, pp. 208-209. One of Fertig's links to Manila was with Manuel Roxas who played a central role in the post war collaboration debate. Fertig communicated with Roxas through Jose Ozamis, brother of dona Carmen (on whom more later) and prewar senator from Mindanao. Ozamis was Vice Commissioner of Sports in the puppet government. The Commissioner of Sports was a Japanese. One of Ozamis' jobs was to obtain girls for the Japanese Army brothels. Ozamis hired Filipina patriots who gathered intelligence information in the bedroom. Ozamis' link to Fertig was through Dr. Antonio Montalvon, a public health officer assigned to Mindanao, who travelled between Manila and Mindanao on Japanese travel passes.

<sup>118</sup>Dupuy, Resistance Movements, pp. 16-18.

<sup>119</sup>Declared April 29, 1942. See Steinberg, Philippine Collaboration, p. 57.

<sup>120</sup>Steinberg, Return to the Philippines, p. 25. A Japanese Army Press Bureau report put the "conservative" estimate of Filipinos remaining loyal to the U.S. at 50 percent. The pro-Japanese element was "average" for occupied areas, including 10 percent who were given special privileges by the Japanese or who still carried strong pre-war anti-American feelings. Another 30 percent, mostly in the outlying islands and in the mountains "does not know what is going on and does not care." Royal Arch Gunnison, So Sorry, No Peace, 1944, p. 127. By March 1944 an Imperial General Headquarters report identified "a strong undercurrent of pro-American sentiment...which cannot be destroyed" and which was "causing a yearning for the old life of freedom." Imperial General Headquarters, Army Section Report, Saikin Ni Okeru Hito Jijo ("Recent Situation in the Philippines"), March 31, 1944, p. 1.

<sup>121</sup>Romulo, Mother America, pp. 31. 33.

<sup>122</sup>The Filipinos knew that under the American flag an American national could be arrested by Filipino police, charged under Filipino law, tried by a Filipino judge, and imprisoned in a Filipino jail. Such an occurrence with a Japanese national was an impossibility under the Japanese flag, and the Filipinos knew what the difference meant for them. *Ibid.*, p. 34. Perhaps the classic statement of the Filipino understanding of freedom and their decision to resist the Japanese is the famous "Confesor Letter," a nine page long letter from Governor Tomas Confesor, Panay, to Dr. Fermin Caram of the City of Iloilo on Panay of February 20, 1943. See Appendix B of Agoncillo, Fateful Years.

<sup>123</sup>Romulo, Philippines Rise, p. 113. The American policy had not been accidental. An example of the instruction given to American military people going to serve in areas like the Philippines is found in United States Marine Corps, Small Wars Manual, 1940, which stresses knowledge of the local language and culture and demonstration of a fraternal spirit.

<sup>124</sup>There are many examples of this, but some of the better examples are found in Hawkins, Never Say Die, and Keats, They Fought Alone. Filipinos and American's would sing "God Bless America" and "God Bless the Philippines" at any opportunity. Morale was boosted when the Filipinos sang "God Bless America" to the Japanese and the Japanese applauded -- they did not understand the language or recognize the tune. James Dean Sanderson, Behind Enemy Lines, 1959, p. 173.

<sup>125</sup>The average citize was "Juan de la Cruz" ("John Doe") in the Philippines. This was the peasant, not the Manila elite.

<sup>126</sup>Zich, Rising Sun, pp. 148-149.

<sup>127</sup>See F. O. Miksche, Secret Forces: The Technique of Underground Movements, 1950, pp. 157, 163. The Japanese should have had a clue as to what their policies would produce, for they had their experience in China upon which to draw. See Chalmers A. Johnson, Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power: The Emergence of Revolutionary China 1937-1945, 1962. The U.S. military doctrine for stability operations gives a more enlightened approach to a study of this subject. See Department of the Army, Stability Operations: U.S. Army Doctrine, October 2, 1972, for a comparison with the policies described in this chapter.

<sup>128</sup>Keats, They Fought Alone, p. 196.

<sup>129</sup>Sun Tzu, The Art of War, p. 88.

## CHAPTER 5

### ESTABLISHMENT AND ORGANIZATION OF THE GUERRILLA RESISTANCE

#### Early Roots of the Mindanao Guerrillas

The idea of conducting guerrilla operations on Mindanao was conceived early in the war by United States officials. On the eve of General MacArthur's departure from Manila to Corregidor, he apprised General George C. Marshall of his decision to use the newly-established Visayan-Mindanao Force "to continue resistance operations by guerrilla methods" in order to ensure that a "loci of American resistance" would be maintained in the Philippines. On the same day MacArthur sent a letter by courier to Brigadier General William F. Sharp, commander of the Visayan-Mindanao Force, stating that should communication be broken between their two headquarters Sharp would have all the powers of a Theater of Operations Commander in order to lead the resistance.<sup>1</sup> By February 1942 MacArthur had formulated a general concept for guerrilla operations which called for guerrilla efforts to disrupt the Japanese lines of communication. In a preview of his "lie low" policy which he would issue a full year later, MacArthur wrote:

I believe that extensive guerrilla efforts prior to the arrival of reinforcements from the United States will be abortive and destructive. I have complete plans to launch the guerrilla movement to support the main effort upon arrival of reinforcements.<sup>2</sup>

Also in February, President Franklin D. Roosevelt was considering ordering MacArthur to Mindanao "to continue your command of the Philippines from that locality." This same message said Roosevelt was considering

sending Philippine President Manuel Quezon to Mindanao to effect the transfer of the Philippine government to the southern islands.<sup>3</sup>

The focus of attention on Mindanao was logical for several reasons. The largest concentration of American forces outside of Luzon was on Mindanao; at this time the island was lightly garrisoned by the Japanese, and military equipment to support a guerrilla movement could be stockpiled in caches in the island's interior. Mindanao was also the most distant island in the archipelago from the concentration of Japanese forces on Luzon, and was the nearest island to Australia, thereby providing the shortest logistic supply line. While enroute to Australia, MacArthur remained on Mindanao March 13-16, 1942 at the Del Monte Plantation, which was Brigadier General Sharp's headquarters for the Visayan-Mindanao Force.<sup>4</sup> Still unaware that there were no American ground forces available to the Pacific Theater, MacArthur boasted that "If the Jap does not take Mindanao by Easter [1942], all he will receive is bullets..."<sup>5</sup> Sharp assured MacArthur that "his plans for intensified guerrilla warfare were well-advanced."<sup>6</sup> Sharp had been nominated for his second star because MacArthur "believed that here was one commander who would carry on guerrilla warfare to the end."<sup>7</sup> Army historian Robert Ross Smith concludes that "In the southern islands, where the Japanese initially landed on light forces, preparations for guerrilla warfare were well along when the surrender came."<sup>8</sup>

On December 20, 1941, the Miura and Sakaguchi Detachments landed at Davao. The Sakaguchi Detachment redeployed soon afterward, leaving the Miura Detachment, consisting of one combat battalion and one "miscellaneous" battalion, in Davao.<sup>9</sup> The Miura Detachment was unable to penetrate into the interior beyond Davao, and the 101st Philippine

Army Division (PA) was unable to oust them from Davao.<sup>10</sup> The United States Forces in the Philippines (USFIP) defense plan for Mindanao had called for a defense at the waterline along the Cotabato coast (east), Davao coast (south), the Misamis coast (northwest) and the Agusan coast (northeast). Delaying actions would be conducted with a slow withdrawal to the central island region where foodstuffs and supplies had been stored. The force would defend a perimeter on the Bukidnon plateau until American forces ("The Aid") arrived.<sup>11</sup> On April 29, 1942 the Kuwaguchi Detachment landed near Cotabato and the Kawamura Detachment followed four days later at Cagayan Bay on May 3rd. Sharp put the strength of the opposing forces as follows: Philippine Army at 30,784 and the total Japanese forces on the island at 43,700.<sup>12</sup> By May 9th the fighting was over.<sup>13</sup>

The details of the surrender on Corregidor and General Jonathan M. Wainwright's dilemma in ordering the surrender of USFIP forces elsewhere in the Philippines will not be detailed here. But the surrender, and the manner in which it was effected, had a major influence upon the formation of a resistance movement on Mindanao. Before departing for Australia, MacArthur had divided the Philippines into four separate commands, all co-equal and subordinate to him: Moore's Harbor Defense Force, Wainwright's Luzon Force, Sharp's Mindanao Force, and Chynoweth's Visayan Force (MacArthur had divided the Visayan-Mindanao Force). He failed to inform the War Department of this reorganization, and later both General Marshall and the conquering General Masaharu Homma were to consider that all American forces in the Philippine Islands were effectively under Wainwright's command. MacArthur's idea was that if one command were destroyed or surrendered, the others (specifically the southern islands commands) could continue the resistance.<sup>14</sup> The period



May 6 through May 10 was one of great confusion, brought on in part by this misunderstanding over command relationships and greatly complicated by the difficulties of communicating by radio and fighting the pressing Japanese attacks. The texts of the final messages which emanated from the principal headquarters are summarized in the footnotes for the reader.<sup>15</sup>

Two major factors led to General Sharp's decision to capitulate: the Japanese were fully capable of massacring the 10,000 survivors of the Corregidor garrison, and it was now clear that United States reinforcements for the Mindanao Force would not be forthcoming as envisioned. Still, few commanders in the south were so hard pressed as to be incapable of further resistance, and none had any desire to surrender. Elements of Sharp's force were still undefeated, intact and capable of continuing an organized resistance. Plans had been made for withdrawal to the interior, and junior commanders awaited only the orders to execute the withdrawal.

The Mindanao Force was of questionable military effectiveness, but one may conclude that had the Mindanao guerrillas enjoyed the benefit of uninterrupted military organization and had been given continued access to the hidden arms and supplies of the Mindanao Force, the guerrilla movement would have taken a different course. To build an effective force out of the remnants of the Mindanao Force would be a difficult task, because the Force had not been very good in the beginning.

Commonwealth Act Number One of December 21, 1935, the Philippine National Defense Act, provided for the establishment of a Philippine Army, both Regular and Reserve.<sup>16</sup> Japanese activities in the Far East had become sufficiently threatening that by July 26, 1941 a Philippine Presidential Order transferred all organized military forces of the

Commonwealth into the armed forces of the United States. United States Army Forces in the Far East (USAFFE)<sup>17</sup> General Order 46 of December 18, 1941 inducted the Philippine Army into USAFFE.<sup>18</sup> The fighting quality of this force was in question. As Colonel Fertig sized-up the force:

The vain boast that the Philippine Army could resist a first-class enemy was empty. The land looked so different in colorful uniforms with much starch, but the hardships were met with excuses and not with the underlying strength that indicates fighting quality.

Fertig did not see this as a derogation of the fundamental goodness of the Filipino people but rather it was a reflection "on the land that mothered them."<sup>19</sup> This view was echoed in a Japanese intelligence assessment before the war:

The Americans have the makings of excellent soldiers, but due to the weather of the torrid zone, there is the tendency to physical and mental laxness and consequent lack of earnestness. The natives...lack endurance and responsibility. Therefore, their military ability is lower than the Americans.<sup>20</sup>

The Filipino force was handicapped by poor training, virtually non-existent supplies, obsolete weapons and military equipment, no artillery, and inadequate leadership, especially in the junior officer and noncommissioned officer ranks. Training centers had been established on Mindanao at Cotabato, Butuan, Surigao, Malaybalay, Davao, Cagayan and Zamboanga. But because mobilization orders had assigned the officers and NCO's by name, unit leaders were unable to replace ineffective political appointees or even first sergeants and company clerks who could neither read nor write.<sup>21</sup>

The USAFFE forces continued to train from December 20, 1941 to April 29, 1942 in central Mindanao. The soldiers were very proficient at close order drill, but little real training was accomplished beyond that. There were no adequate ranges, and no money to build them. Training ammunition was limited to 10 to 20 rounds per soldier for marksmanship

and familiarization training. Most soldiers on Mindanao had never fired a live round before they went into their first battle, and troops were trained to have three soldiers assigned to each rifle when they moved forward into battle. The artillery crews trained as infantry because they had no serviceable artillery pieces.<sup>22</sup> To compound the difficulties still further the Mindanao forces received no training in guerrilla doctrine. The Army had no doctrine, and consequently

too many potential guerrilla leaders either became virtually paralyzed or else attempted to employ doctrinaire solutions that defeated the most basic requirements of successful guerrilla operations. The USAFFE leaders who did succeed were those with the imagination necessary to permit them to work out their own salvation.<sup>23</sup>

The Philippine Army had fallen prey from its infancy to an unhappy set of circumstances -- circumstances which were nothing new in American history. The United States Congress authorized only \$10,000,000 to build an entire army which was to be charged with defending the Philippine Archipelago against a modern efficiently led Japanese army. The authorization barely built the training camps and induction centers. To further compound the problem, President Quezon deemphasized the defense program during the two years preceding the Japanese invasion.<sup>24</sup> Optimism was high, nevertheless, and MacArthur exuded great confidence in the abilities of himself, his staff and the untried Filipino soldiers.

The Philippine Army simply had no supplies to issue to the soldiers. What it did have was either old or did not fit. The soldiers were barefooted and lacked clothing, blankets and mosquito bars.<sup>25</sup> The basic infantry weapon was the old Enfield rifle which had defective extractors and a stock which was too long for most Filipino soldiers. The .50 calibre machine guns were obsolete and lacked necessary water cooling devices. The .30 calibre machine guns were unserviceable, and there were

no replacement parts for them or any of the other weapons. The army used the old World War I Stokes 3-inch mortar whose shells were almost all duds. There were only 48 old 75-mm artillery pieces in the entire archipelago. Each rifle company was issued one Browning Automatic Rifle ("BAR"), a few units had the Springfield '03 rifle, but none had the Garand M-1, the American mainstay of World War II.<sup>26</sup> There were no anti-tank guns, hand grenades, gas masks or steel helmets, and the signal equipment did not work.<sup>27</sup>

On February 27, 1942 the supply ship Coast Farmer made its last run with supplies to Mindanao. The Mindanao Force was now left with ammunition which averaged less than one unit of fire per weapon on the whole island. The artillery consisted of a five-gun 2.95 Gun Detachment. The detachment had no carriers or prime movers, no sights, no fuze setters, no range tables, and only 2,400 rounds. The Force Quartermaster had set up cottage industries to make extractors for the Enfields, grenades (made from bamboo tubes and glass bottles), mines (predictably unreliable), clothing, shoes, naversacks and belts. Also fashioned were motor parts, outboard motors for the river craft, bolos (large machete-type single-edged blade), and one armored car. On May 10th there was 12 months' supply of sugar and salt and six months' supply of rice stored in various warehouses along with a large amount of canned goods: fish, beef, beans, and dried fruit.<sup>28</sup>

When Major General Sharp had determined that further resistance would be fruitless, the subordinate commanders were ordered to surrender their men, weapons, and equipment to the Japanese. But whereas Sharp himself had little alternative to surrender, his subordinate commanders enjoyed somewhat more flexibility. The names of new Filipino recruits,

for example, were purposely omitted from the surrender rosters, and these men were ordered to return to their homes and bury their weapons.<sup>29</sup> In addition, a large proportion of officers, both American and Filipino, refused to surrender due to their belief that General Wainwright, being in the hands of the Japanese, had no authority to issue orders to General Sharp. Uldarico Bacalagon in his discussion of the surrender gives no figures but states that the Japanese were "exasperated by the few officers and men who went with General Sharp to the concentration camp" and that "an orgy of rape, mass murder, and other atrocities on helpless civilians soon followed."<sup>30</sup> The U. S. Army, while not giving any numbers, concluded that the "number of officers who refused to surrender and disappeared into the hills [of Mindanao] probably exceeded those of all the other major islands combined."<sup>31</sup>

The actual number of officers and men, American and Filipino, who surrendered or took flight to the hills is unknown for several reasons. Surrender documents were fabricated to mislead the Japanese. Many who in fact escaped only to be slaughtered on remote trails in the interior were never accounted for or were thought to have died at the hands of the Japanese. Many Filipino soldiers were from islands in the Visayas and left Mindanao entirely. The Japanese never provided the Red Cross or the United States government with a list of the casualties or survivors, so many names can be traced only through the personal accounts of those who survived their internment.<sup>32</sup>

Major Marcos G. Soliman in a letter dated June 5, 1943 to Lieutenant Colonel Macario Peralta, commander of the 6th Military District, states that "only 10% of the officers and enlisted personnel of my regiment surrendered or were caught by the Japs."<sup>33</sup> Soliman's unit was

the 81st Infantry Regiment which was located near Davao at the time of the surrender. Father Haggerty, who was with General Sharp at his headquarters in the final days before the surrender, puts the Mindanao Force at an estimated 35,000 Filipinos and 1,000 Americans, the Americans being mostly headquarters and Air Corps personnel. He states that of these an estimated 7,000 entered the internment camps. The number of Filipino privates who surrendered Haggerty called "negligible," for the reasons given earlier.<sup>34</sup> The Army also uses the 7,000 figure for the number of USAFFE troops who surrendered and were sent to Camp Casiang, Malaybalay, an old 101st Division (PA) camp.<sup>35</sup>

Father Haggerty estimated that approximately 200 Americans fled the Japanese rather than surrender.<sup>36</sup> Fertig put the number of unsurrendered Americans at "100 plus," presumably including civilian residents of Mindanao as well as officers and enlisted men.<sup>37</sup> Figure 1 contains personnel strength figures provided to Major General Sharp in a memorandum request made to his subordinate commanders on May 19, 1942 in order that he could create a historical record of the Visayan-Mindanao Force. As indicated in footnote 34 supra, the reports were made with the knowledge that the Japanese captors would see them; therefore, the figures cannot be wholly relied upon. The difference between the April 29 and May 10 figures is attributed to "missing in action," and no further explanation is given for the missing soldiers. Finally all units in the force are not accounted for in the reports, and some subordinate units are double accounted in division figures.<sup>38</sup> As a broad gauge, the chart gives an idea of the number of soldiers who would not surrender and what the potential for forming a guerrilla force from soldiers with some training might be.

FIGURE 1

## SAMPLE UNIT STRENGTHS: MINDANAO FORCE

Unit	<u>Pre-Surrender Strength</u>				<u>Number Surrendered</u>			
	(April 29, 1942)				(May 10, 1942)			
	<u>Americans</u>		<u>Filipinos</u>		<u>Americans</u>		<u>Filipinos</u>	
	<u>Off/Enl</u>		<u>Off/Enl</u>		<u>Off/Enl</u>		<u>Off/Enl</u>	
81st Division (PA (BG G.O. Fort))	No figures given. Fort claims 80% Filipino strength lost to KIA, MIA, desertion. Figure for U.S. troops is 76%.							
Cotabato-Davao Force (BG J.P. Yachon)	4	44	387	7908	3	42	264	3523
HQ + HQ Det, VMF	27	18	17	181	24	3	5	18
102d Division (includes 103d Inf)	19	67	268	4356	16	4	80	622
HQ 102d Div	3	0	4	5	2	0	3	0
HQ, Service Troops 102d Div	0	5	7	17	0	1	6	5
HQ Co, Serv Trps, 102d Div	0	0	1	50	0	0	1	8
103d Inf, 102d Div	6	0	105	1953	4	0	1	42
Engr Bn, 102d Div	0	0	1	43	0	0	0	9
102d Mt Co.	1	4	0	40	1	3	0	10
QM Serv Co, 102d Div	1	0	0	83	1	0	0	10
102d Div Hospital	1	0	6	24	1	0	3	3
43d Inf (PS)	2	0	0	180	2	0	0	0
C + E Co., 43d Inf (PS)	3	0	0	167	3	0	0	13
Air Base HQ.	34	864	0	0	64	1062	0	0
62d Inf	10	0	92	1952	3	0	7	166
61st FA	0	0	4	98	0	0	4	6

Chart Constructed from Figures in VMF, Historical Report, pp. 286, 294, 316-317, 349, 352-254, 356-358, 361-363, 367, 370, 377, 380-381, 514, 516.

After the surrender on May 10th, "A deep, black pall of silence settled over the whole archipelago."<sup>39</sup> There were no transmissions from unsundered forces, the Japanese would not acknowledge the casualties from the closing campaign, and even Japanese propaganda failed to give any hint to Allied intelligence of any resistance activity: "Information from the Philippines was as lacking as though the Islands had been physically blotted off the face of the map."<sup>40</sup> Still, MacArthur was certain that there would be resistance, although what form and organization it would take no one could know.<sup>41</sup> As Virgil Ney concluded in his two studies on guerrilla warfare: "The source of the guerrilla idea was essentially and traditionally Filipino. To take to the hills and from there resist the invader has always been normal procedure in the Philippines, since the earliest Spanish days."<sup>42</sup> This phenomenon which had been tradition for the Philippines was something of an historical imperative on the island of Mindanao.

The junior Filipino enlisted soldiers left the field in large numbers and did not surrender. Few could be expected to have acquired a loyalty to the American-commanded or Filipino-officered units to which they had so recently been assigned. Many decided to go home to wait and see what the new conqueror would do. Others did what historically the Mindanaons always did -- they took to the hills to fight. But for the American and Filipino officers who were sworn to obey their orders, and who had made a career of doing so, the decision to surrender or not was much more difficult. Brigadier General Guy O. Fort, commander of the 81st Division (PA), had vigorously contested Sharp's and Wainwright's orders to cease all resistance. Upon finally being persuaded that the surrender orders must be faithfully carried out, General Fort admonished



his troops: "As a soldier, I have no other alternative to follow but to obey orders. I expect you to do the same. No desertions will be tolerated."<sup>43</sup> This clear statement of the soldier's duty caused deep soul-searching for many, and most dutifully laid down their arms.<sup>44</sup>

The reasons some did not surrender are as varied as the circumstances and the number of men themselves. Captain Tom Jurika, brother-in-law of the famous Charles "Chick" Parsons, walked out the door as his commander held him at gunpoint to prevent his "desertion."<sup>45</sup> Many were ex-patriot Americans, like Jurika, whose adopted home was the Philippines; they held Reserve commissions, and they had been called to active duty for the war. They saw no alternative but to continue the fight. Many believed as Colonel Fertig did that both Wainwright and Sharp had surrendered under duress and that there was no valid authority for issuance of the surrender orders. Fertig also likened surrender to "castration."<sup>46</sup> In his opinion, the Americans appeared to follow generally discernible patterns in how they made their decisions. Fertig derived a general rule: it was chiefly the city-bred soldiers who surrendered; the corollary to this rule: farm boys from the American South and West thought more highly of personal liberty than those from the northeastern cities. A further sub-corollary of Fertig's rule had it that these same farm boys had a "far keener sense of racial pride," which translated to mean that no Japanese would lock them up in a pen.<sup>47</sup>

For those who did not surrender the first months were the hardest. Unlike the Americans who had lived in the Philippines for many years, the young soldiers had no knowledge of the customs, languages, the terrain and the many dangers which awaited them. A typical example was the 103rd Regiment which had defended the beach at Cagayan. They had disengaged

and marched towards the Del Monte plantation expecting to find Force Headquarters there. With the surrender they disbanded. Soon the individuals and small groups were without food, and many died of malnutrition and malaria. Still others were set upon by roaming Moro bands and slaughtered. Others, seeking refuge in the mountains, stumbled upon Moro villages or upon the pagan Magahats and were slaughtered.<sup>48</sup> Still others were made slaves of the Moros. Some, however, thought they had found nirvana, for they had been welcomed into tribal villages and were encouraged to impregnate all of the tribal chief's daughters so as to bring honor upon his house. This wondrous kiss of fate had its seamier side, however, for these tribal villagers lacked any appreciation for sanitation, and the daily table fare was monkey, dead horse, rats and locusts. Still, many saw no reason to leave to go fight the Japanese with the guerrillas.<sup>49</sup>

Some American soldiers joined with the few American residents of Mindanao and established camps in the rain forests in the mountains. One of these camps was presided over by Jacob Deisher, an American who had owned two sawmills and five mines near Illigan in Lanao Province. When escape from the island was closed to him (he had requested U. S. passports in February 1941, and they had still not arrived by December 1941) he took \$20,000, twenty trucks, fuel and provisions for two years and fled 40 miles into the mountains west of Illigan. With seven or eight Spanish War Veterans and his family he set up camp, eating wild hogs, deer, tree shoots, camotes, wild fruits and nuts (a garden could not be grown for it would be seen by Japanese air patrols).<sup>50</sup> Fertig, who visited the camp, described it as a "wet hole in the jungle." He also reported that there were about 30 soldiers and sailors who

wanted only to be left alone. They resented officers, would not take orders, and would do nothing but sit there, rotting in the jungle, living off the store of army rations which Deischer [sic] an old prospector and boar hunter, had somehow acquired.<sup>51</sup>

Deischer was happy to have the company and the extra hands to serve as sentries against Moro raiding parties and Japanese patrols.

The first months after the surrender saw a total breakdown of authority throughout the islands. Luzon was shaken by renewed political rivalries and the emergence of the Hukbalahaps (the Communist "Huks"), and the Visayas were beset with rival political factions -- Colonel Allison Ind writes that there were "at least six first-class wars going on not counting the official one" on Leyte.<sup>52</sup> Mindanao saw the re-emergence of the centuries-old feud between the Moros and the Christians, an especially bloody rivalry. After the surrender wild disorder prevailed as the Moros descended from the Lanao hills to plunder and pillage the lowland Christian settlements and to waylay the USAFFE soldiers making their way towards their homes. In the Malaybalay area American and Filipino refugees were lured into apparent safety offered by the Lanao Moros, only to be killed. Throughout the war the trails in the area remained littered with "hundreds of weather-whitened skeletons" of the unwary.<sup>53</sup>

F. O. Miksche in his early authoritative study of resistance movements concluded that "A [resistance] movement begins generally with passive underground activities, developing into a resistance movement which reaches its culminating point in open guerrilla warfare."<sup>54</sup> Whereas this may be true for most resistance movements, it is not true of the movement on Mindanao. For as the level of violence increased and the margin of security for virtually anyone outside of the few Japanese controlled areas plummeted to near zero, the island became an armed camp.

The Philippine Constabulary, which before the invasion had maintained the peace, was now demobilized and its 8,000 men were now placed in the same predicament as the Philippine Army soldiers. As the Moros raided and the pagans fell upon the unprotected, USAFFE soldiers now "roamed at will, using their weapons to support themselves."<sup>55</sup> The civilians -- the villagers, the farmers -- were caught in the middle. If they kept guns, the Japanese would learn of their possession, and the penalty was beheading. If they turned their guns into the Japanese as required to do, then they were at the mercy of the marauding bandits. Many moved to the coast to seek Japanese protection from their own countrymen. The Japanese were not altogether sympathetic or helpful, however.<sup>56</sup> Others slowly began to draw together the USAFFE soldiers, American and Filipino, to form independent bands to provide local security. This was for many the genesis of the Mindanao guerrilla movement -- the need to protect families and barrios from Filipinos. The reorienting of the thrust of the movement to resist the Japanese followed this initial phase.

It was easy enough to start one of these early guerrilla bands, apart from the demonstrated need for local security. The economic and social dislocation caused by the Japanese left many jobless: among them were public servants, school teachers, taxi, bus and truck drivers, boatmen, and former soldiers. "If these men were not guerrillas, they were bums. As guerrillas that had a respectable and even advantageous position in their communities."<sup>57</sup> Unfortunately, the chaotic conditions did not permit the early rise of responsible leaders, so the first leaders of these small guerrilla bands were the "adventurers and desperadoes," the strong men and the "passionate talkers."<sup>58</sup> Good, well-meaning men as well as brigands would follow these early leaders.

and the reasons they did so were many. Many joined to avoid starvation (an armed band could always acquire food), and others were outlaws driven by avarice. Many joined to settle old grudges and feuds, and still others saw political gain in association with a particular leader. Social conflict drove many into the ranks of the guerrillas. On Mindanao the ancient social conflict pitted the Christians against the Moros, and to a far lesser degree (unlike on Luzon with the Huks) the guerrillas offered a chance to even the score with the wealthy landowners. Finally, many joined for purely patriotic reasons out of allegiance to President Quezon, MacArthur, the Philippine Commonwealth or America. As Colonel Marcos Agustin ("Marking" of Markings Guerrillas on Luzon) so eloquently put it: "If the least we do is fertilize the soil where we fall, then we grow a richer grain for tomorrow's stronger nation."<sup>59</sup>

These early groups were separated by terrain and poor communications, and it would have been difficult to establish one cohesive group even had they so wanted. For "although the majority of the guerrillas shared a common antipathy for the Japanese, they were often divided among themselves, separated into intractable rival factions engaged in a bitter struggle for power."<sup>60</sup> Internecine strife and the struggle for power were "part and parcel of the guerrilla struggle -- the survival of the fittest -- a distinct evolutionary process to which all guerrilla units were subjected."<sup>61</sup> The Japanese were content to let this local political drama play itself out, for as Miksche observes, "When several political parties are represented in a resistance movement it is of course easier to set them quarreling and fighting with each other..."<sup>62</sup>

To propose that politics did not play a major role in this early jockeying for leadership is to disregard the post-war evidence which saw

the Philippine national legislature become a "forum for bitter recrimination between collaborators and those purporting to have led anti-Japanese guerrillas."<sup>63</sup> Some groups were bitterly opposed to the Quezon-Osmeña leadership in exile in America while others were ardent nationalists who were opposed to both Japanese and American hegemony in the Philippines.<sup>64</sup> The post-war government was perhaps noted most for its leaders who had been collaborators during the war. Few of the guerrilla leaders were of the Philippine political elite, and many were uneducated Constabulary or Philippine Army officers who had no link to the post-war power structure, which itself was a continuation of the pre-war power structure. The few notable successes for the veterans of the guerrilla resistance were President Raymond Magsaysay who led guerrillas in the Zambales near the Bataan Peninsula and President Ferdinand Marcos who led the 8,000 man Maharlika Guerrillas in Northern Luzon. Colonel Ruperto Kangleon, 9th Military District Commander, became the Secretary of Defense in the first post-war cabinet, and Colonel Macario Peralta, Commander of the 6th Military District, became Chairman of the Philippine Veterans Board, a powerful and influential position, and Deputy Chief of Staff of the reorganized Philippine Army. David Bernstein concluded of Kangleon that "He is not a politician, and was probably appointed as a concession to the guerrillas."<sup>65</sup>

As one observer of the Mindanao resistance movement observed, "As the guerrilla business grew down there [Mindanao], you had all sorts of people that were more interested in seeing who was going to be the boss of the island than in helping us."<sup>66</sup> This was to become a problem for Colonel Fertig and his American leaders, for it was perceived that "After the war a successful guerrillero would be an obvious choice for

public office, and the less he owed to the Americans the more obvious a choice he would be."<sup>67</sup> This was certainly true of the attitude of Major Salipada Pendatun, who was to become a senator in the post-war legislature. Although most of the American and Filipino leaders felt that political agitation, other than to promote loyalty to the Philippine and American governments, had no place in the resistance movement, the suggestion of its importance was used as a tool when needed.<sup>68</sup> Fertig held out the possibilities to some of his subordinates, and the commanding officer of the 106th Division, Lieutenant Colonel McGee wrote a letter to Datu Sinsuat in which he denounced Sinsuat as a traitor and urged him to join the anti-Japanese resistance if he wanted any post-war leadership position.<sup>69</sup> Some Filipinos resented the intimation that they were jockeying for political power after the war. Captain Gumbay Piang, commanding officer of the 119th Regiment, wrote a searing, emotional declaration disavowing any political ambitions, asserting that his motives in fighting the Japanese were purely patriotic.<sup>70</sup>

The Americans were able to lead effectively because they were known not to have any post-war political ambitions in what all knew would be an independent all-Filipino government. The Americans acted as neutrals and helped arbitrate the disputes among the Filipinos. The Mindanao guerrillas did provide the civil leadership on Mindanao after the war. And, as mentioned, Major Pendatun became a senator of the Philippine Republic, and Manalao Mindalano, commanding officer of the Maranao Militia Force, became a Congressman.<sup>71</sup> John Keats wrote in 1963 that "Fertig's Filipino officers are largely the officeholders in Mindanao today."<sup>72</sup>

The development of the guerrilla movement on Mindanao mirrored that of the other Philippine islands in several respects. Initially, the guerrilla groups were formed under loose collections of individuals

having common short range goals. With the arrival of the second and third rate Japanese garrison troops and the rise in banditry, the Filipinos joined together to restore civil order. By mid-August 1942 the various groups had consolidated under legitimate leaders and the spread of lawlessness was staunch. As the guerrilla bands consolidated, three general categories of groups emerged. One type of group formed around a nucleus of unsundered USAFFE soldiers. Perhaps as high as 50 percent of these units were unsundered USAFFE troops who found the association a natural one.<sup>73</sup> Other groups, a second category, were derived from local pre-invasion leaders, prominent civic leaders or local Constabulary leaders. The purpose of groups in this category initially was to provide security against bandits. A third category of guerrilla groups were those with a pre-war social or political group identification which was translated into anti-Japanese or counterguerrilla purposes. The Moros on Mindanao and the Hukbalahaps on Luzon both fit into this category.<sup>74</sup>

It now became apparent to the leaders of these guerrilla groups as they turned their attention to the Japanese that the multiplicity of groups was ineffective and counterproductive to the resistance movement as a whole. As Fertig put it, the confident attacks by these groups made upon Japanese garrisons "failed miserably" and "brought the guerrilla dreamers off their high perch."<sup>75</sup> They got in each other's way for their efforts were not coordinated, the multitude of separate groups exceeded the ability of the local populations to support all of them logistically, and their multiplicity greatly increased their security problems. It was becoming apparent that to lead a guerrilla unit required some skills in justice, supply, logistics, tactics, diplomacy and arbitration. Few leaders had enough of these skills to be effective.



### The Guerrillas Have a Leader

Major General Charles Willoughby, MacArthur's Chief of Staff for Intelligence, pointed out the difficult problems confronting the guerrilla leaders and said "some emerged as really strong men, as leaders will always emerge in time of stress and disaster."<sup>76</sup> Colonel Fertig was one of these men, and it was due primarily to his personal leadership qualities that the Mindanao resistance movement was unified under one leader and became the most successful of all of the guerrilla units in the Philippines.

Wendell Fertig had come to the Philippines five years before the invasion during the mining boom of the 1930's with many other American engineers who had heard of great untapped gold and coal resources. Tall, sandy-haired with an athletic build, Fertig is described as being calm, genial, deliberate and possessing a remarkable memory and a great facility for remembering names. Keats describes Fertig as embodying the "qualities of utter honesty, practicality, courage, patriotism, and an absolute faith in his nation and in eventual victory." Eichelberger records his impression: "He was a slim man with a pleasing manner, but he was fearless and there was iron in his soul." An aloof man, some said cold and formal, Fertig carefully nurtured his image as a commander by calculating the impact his various actions would have on those around him. He knew the local customs, and as Father Haggerty observed, "knew how to treat Filipinos." His civilian occupation and methods of attacking problems would serve him well in the challenges he would face as the leader of the Mindanao guerrillas.<sup>77</sup>

Early in 1941 Fertig had been on leave in Manila from his engineering job on Samar.<sup>78</sup> Like most engineers who had connections with the Colorado School of Mines, Fertig held a Reserve commission in the

Army Engineer Corps. On his trip to Manila, Fertig visited the Department of Engineers, Philippine Department, U. S. Army. The mining business was slow, the prospects for war with Japan were growing daily, and the Army needed engineers. Fertig went on active duty on June 1, 1941 with the rank of major, and his family left for the United States on the President Taft with the last of the Army families in July. His first assignment was as Assistant Engineer, Bataan Field Area, then Engineer, North Luzon Area, and by November he was the Chief of the Construction Section, General Headquarters. He spent most of his time before the invasion overseeing the preparation and improvement of airfields throughout the archipelago. Hugh Casey, MacArthur's Chief of Engineers, arranged for the assignment of Fertig to Mindanao to supervise the construction of airfields. On April 29th he left Corregidor on the last aircraft to make it out of the island. The aircraft, a PBY, was to have taken General Wainwright to Mindanao, but instead it brought the Chief of Chaplains of the Philippine Army and nurses. The PBY landed on Lake Lanao April 30th, and Fertig proceeded to Dansalan to meet General Sharp. After conferring at Sharp's headquarters at Del Monte, Fertig returned to the Dansalan-Illigan area to supervise the demolition of the main roads and bridges, for the Japanese had landed that day at Parang and Malabang and were pushing toward Lake Lanao. That day Fertig met Charles Hedges, an engineer friend whom he had not seen in years. Hedges had been commissioned by General Fort and placed in command of the Motor Transport Company of the 81st Division (PA). On May 1 he was joined by Captain Charles Smith, another civilian engineer. May 10th Fertig learned of Sharp's surrender and heard that General Fort was still resisting. He continued his search for Fort until June 1 when he learned that Fort had

surrendered on May 27th. Fertig believed that neither Wainwright nor Sharp was competent to order his surrender. He had been functioning as Casey's assistant, and therefore he was not assigned to any command in the Philippines.

From May through August Fertig remained in the vicinity of Abaga and Mumungan in Lanao Province, living within 10 kilometers of the Japanese. He became a kainginero, a gardener, and grew mongo beans. He also grew a red goatee on the theory that he would look older, and therefore wiser, among a people who believed age implied wisdom. He gardened in a fresh uniform; and with his sun helmet, red goatee and lieutenant colonel insignia (he had been promoted on Bataan), he fostered the image of the strange unsundered American colonel. He appeared to be too proud to hide and too proud to surrender, so he cast the image of subtle yet open defiance. The Japanese commander in Mumungan, Captain Yamato, was aware of his presence and had sent him a personal letter guaranteeing his safety if he would capitulate. At this point the roving bandit gangs were more of a threat to Fertig than they were to the Japanese, and Yamato probably felt no compulsion to go pursuing this strange American.

On July 4th Fertig and Hedges from hiding witnessed a parade of prisoners along the National Road from Dansalan to Illigan. The Japanese had placed General Fort in a truck bed at the head of the column of prisoners who were mostly barefooted and shackled together with wire. The "Independence Day Parade" had the sordid character of the Bataan Death March. Fertig dates his firm resolution to fight the Japanese from this day. Throughout July and August Fertig remained in Abaga and Mumungan and continued his gardening, waiting for the chaotic conditions on Mindanao to subside. He was to write in his diary:

During the months in the forest, I have become acquainted with myself and developed a feeling that I do not walk alone...Never have I lost the feeling that my actions have followed a course plotted by some Power, greater than any human agency.

Fertig felt himself destined for victory and part of a master plan. He was not recklessly Messianic, however, for he counselled Hedges, who wanted to fight every Japanese he saw, that they must wait until the Filipinos came to them seeking their leadership. The time would be right, and the chances for successful leadership improved, if the Americans did not try to force their leadership upon the Filipinos. This opinion not only demonstrated an understanding of the ways of the Filipino culture, but it also was a recognition of the obvious truth -- the Americans had been beaten by the Japanese, their leaders had surrendered or left the islands, and the return of American fighting forces to the Philippines in the foreseeable future was not evidenced in any way. President Roosevelt had promised "The Aid," but the Filipino people unhappily understood who owned the skies and seas around the archipelago. So Fertig awaited his opportunity. In late August he moved to Kolambugan and then on to Panguil Bay.

#### The Fertig-Morgan Rivalry for Leadership

"On Mindanao, as elsewhere in the Philippines, the initial guerrilla organization centered around leaders' personality qualifications,"<sup>79</sup> and Fertig had recognized this inherent truth in the situation on Mindanao. By September 1942 a former Constabulary junior lieutenant, Luis Morgan, had consolidated all small bandit groups in Misamis Occidental under his command. An American Mestizo, Morgan had designated himself a captain and had joined forces with Lieutenant William "Nigger" Tait, a Mestizo son of a black Army veterinarian who had served with the old

Negro Cavalry regiments in the Moro Pacification Campaign. Tait was "as purely Negro as his father, but proved to be as wildly harum-scarum as any Moro" -- Tait's mother was a Mora.<sup>80</sup> Tait's exploits against the Japanese are legendary, but cannot be recounted here. His immediate superior, Morgan, was a natural leader with a great deal of charisma. He was described by Fertig as a virile, handsome, hard-drinking, absolutely fearless man who compelled the loyalty of men and the passion of women. It had been said among the Filipinos that "If a man is brave, and has a gun, he joins Morgan."<sup>81</sup>

Morgan could not provide the leadership necessary to consolidate a large number of guerrillas into a functional organization which had the necessary degree of logistical and community support to make it effective. In addition, Morgan, a Christian, was locked in a continuing war with the Moros. Soon after the American surrender he had attacked Baroy, massacred the Moro population, and had subsequently acquired the reputation of being a "Moro killer, not a Jap killer." The cause for this feud is not important (an official history records that Morgan was pacifying marauding Moro bandits) but the resolution of the feud was, for there would be no unified effective guerrilla movement on Mindanao without either support from the Moros or their neutrality.<sup>82</sup>

The simplest explanation for Morgan's overtures to Fertig is that "To relieve himself of administrative problems, Morgan offered the command to Fertig on condition that he be made his chief of staff with authority to remain in the field."<sup>83</sup> The courtship was not so simple as the telling, for a drama matching a Filipino fighter's pride against an American engineer's organizational instincts was played out under the unwritten rules of Filipino custom. In fact, Tait had played off Fertig

against Morgan, and once the question of "face" -- a serious Oriental phenomenon in which the entire community participates -- had become the centerpiece of the drama, the confrontation had to be played out to the end. Ultimately, Morgan personally came to Fertig for the first time on September 12, 1942, and perhaps the real beginnings of the guerrilla unification can be dated from then.<sup>84</sup> Fertig, in a letter to Casey, summarized the negotiations this way: on October 1, 1942 Morgan and Tait returned to Lanao and Morgan asked Fertig to take command of the guerrilla forces than under Morgan. Morgan

found that he could not control the ambition of the various sector and area commanders. Any officer who had 12 rifles immediately appointed himself Major or Colonel. I realized that should this condition continue, interline [sic] strife will [sic] result and the entire uprising result in a reign of terror for which the USAFFE would bear the stigma. It was decided that, in order to control these elements, I should assume the title of Brigadier General: this was done.<sup>85</sup>

The issue of Fertig's brigadier general stars, fashioned from coins by a Moro silversmith, was almost his undoing. The agreement with Morgan (allegedly conceived by Tait) was that Fertig would pose as a general sent by MacArthur to the Philippines to train a guerrilla army. This would give him immediate and absolute seniority over any contenders to the leadership for there had been no grade in the Philippine Army equal to a brigadier general of the U. S. Army. Morgan saw in Fertig a solution to the seniority issue which would still leave him, Morgan, in charge. The play with the general stars would, in Morgan's opinion, still leave him as the de facto leader, and he would use Fertig to his own purposes. This attitude was explicit in Morgan's insistence that Fertig must first visit Morgan at his headquarters -- i.e., Fertig, the general, would "lose face" with the Filipinos for appearing to report to Morgan, a self-appointed captain.

Colonel Fertig recognized the ploy for what it was, for he appreciated the Filipino code. And while he found in the general's stars some practical value, MacArthur did not. Fertig saw in the stars the Filipino idea of "The One" or the "Incharge," and he thought that MacArthur did not fully appreciate this.<sup>86</sup> Presumably, MacArthur not only understood the concept, but he mastered it. In any case, for the Filipinos MacArthur was to be the "Incharge." Fertig would come to be known as Tai Tai -- "The Old."<sup>87</sup> The issue of rank is a common one within guerrilla organizations, for there is no fixed table of organization to serve as authority in assigning ranks. Lieutenant Colonel McLish noted this when he said to an American guerrilla: "The first thing we'll do is promote you. Here with the guerrillas you need the prestige of higher rank."<sup>88</sup> MacArthur himself recognized the principle, at least for grades below general, as indicated in the celebrated incident on Sulu when Lieutenant Frank Young was promoted to captain to forestall his execution by Moros who claimed to have a leader of higher rank.<sup>89</sup> Fertig continued to wear the stars, although directed not to do so by MacArthur's headquarters. Japanese intelligence referred to Fertig as "Major General Fertig, Commander in Chief in the Philippines" throughout the occupation period and used Japanese military notation in referring to the 10th Military District as the "10 Army Group."<sup>90</sup>

Soon after Fertig and Morgan came to an agreement Fertig promptly ordered Morgan to travel to areas immediately bordering Misamis Occidental to encourage unification with neighboring guerrilla groups. Meanwhile, Fertig remained in the new headquarters in Misamis to confront the difficult administrative and logistical problems of organizing the resistance movement. Morgan was successful in Zamboanga and Sulu and

returned to Misamis in December 1942. In January 1943, Fertig sent Morgan off the island to establish communication with guerrilla groups in the Visayan Islands. During Morgan's absence Fertig had made a truce with Moro Datu Umpa who represented the Moros at war with Morgan, thereby neutralizing the Moro threat in the Misamis area.<sup>91</sup> He had also appointed Robert V. Bowler his second in command. On his return to Misamis in June, Morgan expressed his strong dissatisfaction with this new command arrangement and with Fertig's orders to his guerrillas to avoid contact with the Japanese. In July he resigned as chief of staff, pulled the men loyal to him out of Fertig's organization, assumed the rank of brigadier general and formed a new command called the Mindanao and Dutch Indies Command. In the meantime, Major Angeles Limena, commanding officer of the 109th Regiment, had led a mutiny which lasted four months. He revolted and then attacked the headquarters of his successor Major Manuel Jaldon. Jaldon, in turn, made a truce with the Japanese. The upshot of all of this was that Bowler broke Limena's revolt, and Fertig united the Moros against Morgan. Limena helped persuade Morgan to give up his revolt, and for his help Limena was rewarded with the return of his command. Unable to gather an effective force under his control, and unwilling to submit to Fertig's command, Morgan reluctantly boarded the submarine Bowfin bound for Australia in September 1943. Fertig had seen this alternative as the only viable one open to him -- Hedges had wanted Morgan shot. Morgan's departure, which Fertig directed over MacArthur's orders to the contrary, marked the end of Fertig's internal problems and enabled him to concentrate on consolidating his force, carrying out his instructions from MacArthur, and fighting the Japanese.<sup>92</sup>



### Birth of the Guerrilla Organization

Colonel Fertig wrote the initial proclamation announcing his assumption of command on September 12th on the back of an old court blank which read "Notice of Delinquency in Payment of Real Property Tax." A copy of the proclamation of September 18, 1942 which re-established civil government under the "Philippine Commonwealth Government" is contained in Figure 2. As the proclamation letterhead indicates, Colonel Fertig considered his guerrilla organization to be a regular part of the American Army. At the time the proclamation was signed, Fertig had but 200 guerrillas in a province of 250,000 people.<sup>93</sup> By runner and bamboo telegraph the word of Fertig's assumption of command was communicated throughout Mindanao. Many guerrilla chiefs greeted Fertig's messengers with skepticism or open scorn. Guerrilla leaders rarely knew each other personally, and reputations were communicated through the limited capabilities of the bamboo telegraph. Still, many soldiers, disillusioned after months in the jungle and sick from malaria, hunger and exposure, were drawn to the beacon. Many figured that to die fighting the Japanese made more sense than to die from malnutrition.<sup>94</sup>

Chief Petty Officer Elwood Offret, a sailor who was a wizard with engines, and who had been believed dead from malaria, came out of the jungle. Fertig's old friend Sam Wilson, who had been sent from Corregidor to Mindanao in February 1942 on a Naval intelligence mission, came stumbling out of the hills, half-starved and still accompanied by a cargadore (porter) carrying his mattress. In civilian life Wilson was the owner of the Wilson Building in Manila. A millionaire, he had made his fortune speculating in mining stocks and real estate. A middle-aged man who knew nothing of the jungle, he had been commissioned a lieutenant

UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN THE PHILIPPINES  
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL  
IN THE FIELD OF MINDANAO & SULU

18 September 1942

P R O C L A M A T I O N

On September 18, 1942, our forces under Maj. L.L. MORGAN completed the occupation of Misamis Occidental Province and Northern Zamboanga from the hands of the Japanese Military Government, and raised the American and Filipino flags therein.

In behalf of the United States of America, the Philippine Commonwealth Government is re-established in those regions under the Military Authorities. All Civil Laws and regulations will be followed except in those cases where they conflict with Military Laws. In such cases Military Laws will prevail.

This procedure shall continue to be enforced until such a time when it shall be declared suspended, or terminated.

/s/ W. W. FERTIG  
Brigadier General, USA.  
Commanding Mindanao & Sulu Force.

Figure 2

in the Navy just before Manila fell. His wife and boys were interned by the Japanese in Santo Tomas on Luzon, and he feared for their lives should the Japanese learn of his guerrilla activities. The only man Fertig pleaded with to join the resistance, Wilson ran the money printing press and handled the guerrilla finances -- a comptroller and secretary of the treasury combined. By joining the resistance he believed that he had condemned his family to death. With failing eyesight and hearing, Wilson was later to accompany the First Cavalry Division into Manila and was with the lead elements as Santo Tomas was liberated. His family was still barely alive, and he gave his son a flag presented to Wilson by MacArthur to be raised over Santo Tomas.<sup>95</sup>

Fertig soon came to realize in these early weeks that he was not recruiting the people needed to sustain the resistance movement. He was enlisting "generally masterless men, adventurous youths, men who wished to get away from their wives, and the kind of men who seemed to have nothing better to do."<sup>96</sup> The average guerrilla soldier was between 17 and 23 years of age, and these were not the people with experience and influence in the society.<sup>97</sup> The ilustrados (community leaders, land owners), merchants and the majority of the peasantry had held aloof. Morgan, Fertig's chief of staff during this time, was in part the cause for this aloofness. The Church held Morgan to be bigamous and amoral, the ilustrados did not trust him, and the merchants and fishermen complained that Morgan stole from them. Fertig sought to tap the source of influence in Misamis Occidental, and he focused on wooing the Church and Doña Carmen, wife of former Senator Ozamis and the lady of Casa Ozamis. Doña Carmen was patroness of Misamis Occidental Province and the "unofficial owner" of Misamis. Her word carried the weight of law,

and if she supported Fertig's organization, the province would as well. Fertig managed a dinner invitation with Doña Carmen, her priest Father Calanan and her close adviser, Doctor Comareras. Fertig was persuasive at the dinner, and he would later personally date the real birth of a unified guerrilla movement from this supper party. He also ordered all of the guerrillas in the Misamis headquarters to attend Mass on the theory that this demonstration of religious faith would be in stark contrast to the Japanese suppression of religious expression, and he calculated that the best way to convince the men to join his organization was through their wives, who were devout churchgoers. An ancillary benefit was that the wives would then work in the cottage arms industry to supply bullets and clothes for their men, whom they had in turn urged to join the guerrillas.<sup>98</sup>

By late September 1942 Colonel Fertig had established goals for his organization and defined its mission. His foremost aim was to obtain the unqualified support of the civilians and establish a working civil government. He had to collect all weapons from civilians, which meant that he had to effectively eliminate the bandit groups in order to persuade the civilians to give up their arms, and then he had to ensure the efficient use of every available weapon by guerrilla units. He would then harass and confuse the Japanese through guerrilla tactics. Ira Wolfert claims that Fertig's plan called for securing the mountains, controlling the road nexuses, engaging Japanese main force units, and then seizing the Japanese General Headquarters. Fertig states that his tactical objective was limited to keeping his units dispersed and viable until U. S. forces returned to Mindanao.<sup>99</sup>

The guerrilla faced a dilemma in fighting the Japanese at this

time. In order to gain civilian support and recruit new guerrillas Fertig had to demonstrate that he could, and would, fight the Japanese. On the other hand, he needed to preserve his forces and consolidate his administrative control in order to be effective. All too often the guerrilla attacks were inconclusive, as when Major Ernest McLish's guerrillas had trapped 100 Japanese in a stone schoolhouse and were reduced to trying to starve them out. Or, the guerrilla attacks resulted in swift and severe retaliation by the Japanese.<sup>100</sup> This was also a time of great mistrust, for any stranger who happened upon the guerrilla defenses was in peril. White men were suspected of being German or Italian agents, and individuals without acceptable explanations or passes were interned and sent inland to work on farms tending cattle and raising crops.<sup>101</sup>

In establishing a structure for his guerrilla organization Fertig first attempted to use the old Philippine Constabulary system of sectors, subsectors and districts. But he found that "Every subsector commander immediately assumed dictatorial powers," and he decided to use the old Philippine Army Reserve Division structure instead.<sup>102</sup> By March 1943 he had established the 105th Division under his direct control and the 108th Division in Lanao under Hedges. Ultimately within the 10th Military District, Fertig established six infantry divisions. Appendix A contains a condensed chronology of the development of these six divisions. The reader should be aware also "that there was an understandable tendency on the part of their [guerrillas] leaders to use the rather ambitious military nomenclatures of corps and divisions based on the pre-war District mobilization pattern."<sup>103</sup>

Because of the concentration of USAFFE forces on Mindanao and the

number of officers and NCO's who did not surrender, Fertig had more talent from which to choose for his leadership. As it ultimately turned out, the commanders of all six divisions were at one time Americans, a fact which distinguishes the Mindanao resistance movement from those on the other islands. Fertig himself was finally asked by Morgan to lead the movement, and Frank McGee had been asked by the Cotabato Moros to lead the 106th Division in that area. Four guerrilla organizations had been founded by the Americans Bowler, Grinstead, Childress and McClish, and the sixth division was led by Hedges as a power broker for Fertig with the Moros.

Colonel Fertig saw obvious political weaknesses in having all American senior commanders. But he was dealing with a curious phenomenon by which a qualified experienced Filipino officer would ask Fertig for an American to lead the Filipino officer's unit. One legacy of the American rule in the Philippines had been that the Filipino soldier still believed, even after the defeat of American arms, that Americans possessed superior wisdom. Despite the tremendous "loss of face" for America, many Filipinos still felt uncomfortable seeing Americans working for any but the most gifted Filipino. Fertig found it necessary to commission junior enlisted men who had no leadership experience, no tactical training, and no experience in the jungle in order to attract the Filipino leaders he needed for his companies. The Americans were a kind of anting-anting, a magic charm, for the Filipino officers who could continue to lead in fact. Many of these young Americans, it should be said, acquitted themselves with very high marks.<sup>104</sup>

The infusion of young Americans into the guerrilla organization was not without its problems. The young Americans referred to the older former civilians as the Old-Timers Club. Fertig, Hedges and Wilson have

already been mentioned. James Grinstead was an old lieutenant colonel and former member of the Philippine Constabulary turned planter; Major Herbert C. Page was well into his sixties, also a former planter; Cecil Walter was in his fifties, and Fred Varney, who had been a tough old mine operator, was in his fifties as well. Frank McGee was a retired officer who was decorated for action in World War I and who had lived on Mindanao for many years. Bowler and McLish were young officers and, therefore, presumably not lumped in with the "old-timers." The young Americans apparently believed that the Old-Timers Club ran the guerrilla movement for their own benefit and at the expense of Regular service personnel. Others complained that the "Old Filipinos," as the old hands referred to themselves, treated the Filipinos themselves "inhumanly."<sup>105</sup> The historical evidence does not address the validity of these assertions either way, so no conclusions on the matter can be drawn.

The influx of USAFFE soldiers into Mindanao before the surrender raised yet another problem for Colonel Fertig, and that was the large variety of languages and dialects spoken. Soldiers from the Visayas and Luzon were on Mindanao as well as young English-speaking Americans.<sup>106</sup> The units themselves were sometimes all-Christian or all-Moro, but some were amazingly heterogeneous. The 110th Division in Surigao Province was comprised of Christians, Mohammedans and Americans. They came from the Philippine Army, Philippine Scouts, Philippine Constabulary, U. S. Army, U. S. Navy, U. S. Army Air Corps, U. S. Merchant Marine, former civilians, and perhaps even an Australian or two. The commanding officer of the 113th Independent Regiment of the 110th Division was Major Khalil Khodr, a Syrian mining engineer.<sup>107</sup>

To successfully deal with this situation on Mindanao Colonel

Fertig had to "exercise caution, diplomacy and....firmness in dealing with such problems as command assignments." Fertig's talent for understanding the Filipino was to a great extent responsible for the welding of the resources of the Island into an effective military unit. MacArthur further observed that "By perseverance and diplomacy Colonel Fertig gradually won the respect of the other guerrilla leaders, and by October 1942 he had built up a fair cohesive guerrilla organization."<sup>108</sup> Fertig had implemented the "ideal" of American doctrine of the time without being aware that such a doctrine for the treatment of "natives" existed. The doctrine called for tact, enlightened disciplinary measures, knowledge of the local customs, language and religion and strict avoidance of political favoritism.<sup>109</sup> In many respects, Fertig's leadership in these circumstances serves as a model.

#### Fertig Communicates with GHQ, SWPA

After establishing the nucleus of the guerrilla organization, Fertig was confronted with the problem of communicating with General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area (GHQ, SWPA), MacArthur's headquarters, to tell them of his group's existence. On December 4, 1942 at their own instigation and over the skepticism voiced by Fertig, Captains J. A. Hamner and Charles Smith left Mindanao by small sailboat with a Moro crew for Australia. Both Smith and Hamner had been mining engineers before the war, both knew Fertig, both had been at Jacob Deisher's mountain camp when it was attacked by Moros, and both thought the guerrilla effort a fruitless exercise without help from outside the island. Their odyssey was successful, and all the more so because neither was an accomplished blue water sailor.<sup>110</sup>



In the meantime, Fertig had initiated attempts to communicate with Australia by radio. Too lengthy to relate in detail here, the story of how Fertig made radio contact with MacArthur is a fascinating one. A member of Fertig's headquarters, Gerardo Almendres, a high school boy, had books he had received before the war from the International Correspondence School, Scranton, Pennsylvania. With no experience whatsoever, Almendres took bits and pieces from old radio receivers and sound equipment parts from an old motion picture projector that had been buried in a swamp and tried to duplicate the diagrams in his books. The resulting configuration covered four walls of a nipa shack (grass hut). Robert Ball, an Air Corps radio operator, and Roy Bell, a school teacher and ham radio operator from the island of Negros, solved the problem of the aerial and the crystal, which Almendres' radio lacked, by using wire coiled erratically around a joint of bamboo. The radio was tried every day, taken completely apart and tried again the next, looking for the right combination of parts. The signal transmitted did not keep to one frequency but slid across the kilocycle band interrupting traffic on all frequencies. When the signal was first picked up by the Station KFS at Half Moon Bay, San Francisco, the Navy signalman thought the Japanese were trying to jam the radio waves. In January 1943, Fertig (Station KZOM) had made contact with Station KFS. It was many weeks after this before KFS would acknowledge Fertig's legitimacy as a free American in the Philippines. His cylindrical encoding devices were outdated and therefore thought to be in the hands of a Japanese counterintelligence agent posing as Fertig. FBI and Naval Intelligence agents visited Fertig's wife in Golden, Colorado and reviewed his military files. A break came when KFS called using "MSF" as the call letters. Smith had

taken this code to Australia with him: it stood for "Mindanao Smith Fertig." So now the War Department and GHQ, SWPA were involved, and Smith was there to vouch for Fertig's existence. Still, it was not until February 14, 1943 that KFS was satisfied with Fertig's authenticity and radioed procedural instructions for contacting Station KAZ, MacArthur's headquarters in Australia. Contact was formally established with KAZ on February 20, 1943.<sup>111</sup>

Fertig's first report to MacArthur read:

Have strong force in being with comp'ce civilian support... Large number of enemy motor vehicles and bridges have been destroyed. Many telephone poles have been torn down, food dumps burned, and considerable enemy arms and ammunition captured. Thousands young Filipinos eager to join when arms available. Ready and eager to engage the enemy on your orders.<sup>112</sup>

Father Haggerty recalls that MacArthur's first message read:<sup>113</sup>

FERTIG XXX YOU ARE NAMED GUERRILLA CHIEF XXX YOUR MEN  
ARE NOT DESERTERS BUT FIGHTERS XXX IN SOME WAY I WILL  
GET AID TO YOU XXX FOR THE FUTURE I REITERATE MY  
PLEDGE XXX I SHALL RETURN XXX MACARTHUR

This message brought relief to the USAFFE soldiers who were still unsure of their status under military law, and it held out the prospect for help. A following message appointing Fertig to command was still more specific:<sup>114</sup>

LTCOL W W FERTIG IS DESIGNATED TO COMMAND THE  
TENTH MILITARY DISTRICT (ISLANDS OF MINDANAO  
AND SULU) XXX HE WILL PERFECT INTELLIGENCE NET  
COVERING NINTH MILITARY DISTRICT (SAMAR-LEYTE)  
XXX NO OFFICER OF RANK OF GENERAL WILL BE  
DESIGNATED AT PRESENT XXX

The designated boundaries for the ten military districts are shown in Figure 3. The districts matched with the pre-war Philippine Army districts.

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS MILITARY DISTRICTS

102

(Directed by GHQ, SWPA, WN II)




Figure 3

MacArthur Takes Control

MacArthur sent a message to both Colonel Fertig and Colonel Peralta on February 13, 1943 which specified several things. He limited Fertig's command to the 10th Military District (Mindanao including Zamboanga, the four islands in the Province Surigao del Norte, and Basilan Island off the tip of Zamboanga) and Peralta's to the 6th Military District (Panay and Romblon). Fertig was ordered to establish an intelligence net in the 9th Military District (Leyte and Samar) and Peralta was to do the same in the 7th and 8th Districts (Negros-Siquijor and Cebu-Bohol Islands).<sup>115</sup> The February 13th message declared MacArthur's intention to develop the guerrilla territorial command area based on pre-war military districts. Command assignments would be made on a tentative basis and the retention of appointments would be based upon performance of duty. All district commanders would function under the control of GHQ, SWPA. MacArthur had not forgotten that a single commander for all of the islands if captured could surrender all of the forces, although the effectiveness of such a surrender would be very much in doubt. But more important, he wanted no contest among the district commanders for overall command of all the guerrilla forces. In the February 13th message he spelled this out very clearly: "It is directed that there will be maximum co-operation, mutual support and the avoidance of friction between Commanding Officers of Military Districts operating in a common cause."<sup>116</sup>

General MacArthur had with good reason emphasized the need to eliminate competition. He knew that strong personalities would rise to leadership and would begin jockeying for power in the post-war regime. The result would be that guerrilla strength would dissipate in a power struggle and the guerrillas would be much less effective in fighting the

Japanese. The contest for power in the southern islands is referred to in several sources, for example: [guerrilla] "organizations developed..., merged, consolidated, and broadened out to extend control over adjacent islands. The aspirations of some guerrilla commanders were suppressed by GHQ." Colonel Fertig is specifically cited later in this same history which relates that upon receiving MacArthur's February 13th message Fertig had reduced himself to colonel and "dropped his aspiration for control of the Visayas which had incurred the wrath" of Peralta on Panay, Villamor on Negros and Cushing on Cebu.<sup>117</sup> There is good evidence that the message was, in good part, directed at Fertig.

In a message to his own units after having received initial recognition, Fertig declared:

The recognition of our organization by SWPA is beyond dispute, and at present we stand at the top of the list of military organizations in the Philippine Islands, and do not have a single rival among other military districts. It is my desire to maintain this reputation unblemished, and should we do that, it is glory for all. Our reputation has reached so far that emissaries from guerrilla groups in Luzon have approached this Headquarters for recognition and aid in the organization of their areas.<sup>118</sup>

Any military commander will recognize this message as a pep talk to the troops, but it may have been more than that, or at least the people whom it would affect thought it was.

When Commander "Chick" Parsons, USNR, first arrived in Mindanao on February 1, 1943, he had expressed the concern of GHQ, SWPA that Fertig had been audacious enough to establish a Free Philippine Government. Fertig argued that the civil government was subordinate to the Commonwealth Government in exile, and he thought he saw politics behind the GHQ interest, to wit: those who had deserted the island were concerned for their political support on their return.<sup>119</sup> In one of the accounts of Parson's activities in the Philippines, the following

observation is made:<sup>120</sup>

Fertig was pleasant enough but Parsons was disturbed by the impression that the colonel was more interested in extending his jurisdiction to other islands than in regular guerrilla operations. He seemed to regard his recognition by MacArthur as a hunting permit to expand his area of command and was actually less interested in improving his organization than in enlarging it. That this was true was eventually substantiated when Parsons later discovered that Peralta...Cushing...and Kangleon...were aroused against Fertig.

Colonel Fertig wrote to his friend General Casey at GHQ, SWPA:<sup>121</sup>

Both Parsons and [Charles] Smith mentioned the fact that it was felt that I was attempting to grab the control of all units in the archipelago. This was not the case. Lt. Col. Peralta wrote me under date of 27 November, 1942, placing his entire organization under my command...As previously stated my whole interest in the matter has been to attempt to coordinate our efforts and to preserve the good name of USAFFE.

Before Fertig had established communication with MacArthur, Peralta had radioed MacArthur and complained that "certain officers, including one Wendell Fertig, were trying to usurp his command" and had requested that MacArthur recognize him, Peralta, as the sole commander of the Philippine forces. That bad blood existed between the two is suggested by Keat's description of Fertig's reaction when upon later hearing of Peralta's message Fertig went into "a black fury that brought forth all the brutality of which he was so unexpectedly capable. If Macario Peralta had been in Fertig's office at the moment Fertig would have drawn his pistol and shot Peralta down where he stood."<sup>122</sup>

In January 1943 Captain Jesus Villamor had arrived in Negros from GHQ, SWPA, having gone on to Negros after having failed to penetrate the Japanese defenses around Mindanao. He left Negros for Panay, and he concluded after talking with Peralta on Panay that Peralta had a grandiose scheme for control of the Visayan Islands under his IV Philippine Corps. Villamor concluded that Fertig also had such a plan, though less ambitious, and that bloodshed between Peralta and Fertig was probable.

He radioed his recommendation to MacArthur that neither commander be permitted to control anything but his own district, primarily because effective control beyond one island was impossible because of insurmountable communication and transportation problems.<sup>123</sup> Of course, the view from Panay was different, and a history of the Panay guerrilla organization observes that Fertig had a "scheme to organize the different guerrilla movements in the islands on a much more ambitious plan than that of the IV Philippine Corps." This account goes on to refer to Morgan's visit with his company-sized "General Headquarters Expeditionary Force" to "Leyte, Samar and other islands in the Visayas to undertake the organization of a 'unified command.'"<sup>124</sup> The question, of course, is how much of this activity was Morgan's doing of his own accord and how much free rein Fertig had given Morgan when he left. Did Fertig intend for Morgan to be a liaison officer to encourage coordination, or did he in fact intend for Morgan to explore the possibilities for unification under his command? What Morgan actually did, and what he was perceived as doing by Peralta, may also be two different things.

Peralta was 30 years of age, and he later attracted this observation from General Eichelberger: "He looks like a number one cutthroat to me, and I may have to cut his before I get through."<sup>125</sup> Peralta was no favorite with other guerrilla commanders. He complained to MacArthur that the guerrillas on Luzon were not carrying their share of the fight against the Japanese; Colonel Cushing ordered Peralta's agents to stay off Cebu on pain of death; and the commander on Bohol never recognized Peralta's authority.<sup>126</sup> Perhaps the clearest example of the inter-island infighting was the struggle for power on Negros. Peralta backed Colonel Abcede and Lieutenant Colonel Ernesto Mata for leadership. Lieutenant

Colonel Gabriel Gador remained neutral, and Major Placido Ausejo wanted to put his command and Negros Oriental under Fertig's command. Abcede wrote to Fertig on January 20, 1943 and appealed to him to relinquish his support of Ausejo: "Your laying claims to control Oriental Negros without controlling the whole island has [resulted in] unpleasant incidents." When GHQ, SWPA recognized the 7th Military District and appointed Villamor as its commander on May 14, 1943, Fertig released Ausejo from the 10th Military District and ceased all activities on Negros.<sup>127</sup>

Fertig and Peralta were opposed elsewhere, also. Fertig backed Lieutenant Colonel Juan Causing for leadership on Samar, while Peralta backed Captain Pedro V. Merritt in a bruising fight for power. Fertig and Peralta supported different aspirants on Leyte, too. Peralta backed Blas Miranda, and Fertig supported Colonel Ruperto Kangleon. Fertig had discussed unification with Lieutenant Hal Richardson, U. S. Navy, Kangleon's emissary, and Morgan had appointed Kangleon commanding officer of the 9th Military District on April 20, 1943, which presumably violated MacArthur's February 13th message forbidding such actions. Fertig would not have communication with Morgan between February 14th and April 20th, however, for he lacked the radios. MacArthur recognized Kangleon on November 28, 1943.<sup>128</sup> Things were not all bad between Peralta and Fertig, however. In February 1943 Peralta sent liaison and intelligence officers to Fertig's headquarters with a courteous offer to share intelligence information. How the two officers fared is not given in the account, however.<sup>129</sup>

Japanese intelligence made an effort to follow these power struggles. Intelligence reports had both Morgan and Fertig on Bohol



Island on March 25, 1944. Morgan was in Australia, of course, and Fertig was fending for his life against Japanese patrols in the Agusan River Valley on Mindanao. The Japanese assessed the Fertig-Kangleon relationship as a close one, and they credited Fertig with bringing the guerrilla internecine warfare in the Visayas to a close.<sup>130</sup>

The issue of GHQ, SWPA recognition was an extremely important one to the guerrilla leaders, and Fertig and Peralta were fortunate to have received recognition early. It enabled them to quickly consolidate their forces with the respectability and authority derived from their appointments. Early recognition was advantageous to GHQ also because it could then pursue within that command what came to be known as the "lie low" policy. What MacArthur needed most from the guerrillas in the Philippines was information. As intelligence information gatherers, the guerrillas could give the American forces a tremendous advantage in planning military operations in and around the Philippines. The most that was expected of the guerrillas operationally was sabotage of the Japanese lines of communication. In return for recognition a guerrilla leader would receive aid, but only upon his meeting four conditions. The guerrillas were to remain united under one command within the military district; the guerrillas must not usurp but must support the local civil government; combat activity against the Japanese was to be limited to protection of guerrilla facilities; and the leader was to faithfully carry out his responsibility to strengthen his organization and gather intelligence.<sup>131</sup>

The "lie low" policy was implemented in part to reduce the likelihood of reprisals from the Japanese. The guerrillas, given their level of training and sophistication in weapons, could not hope to cope with a Japanese attack in force. Guerrilla strength would be reduced and the

ability to collect intelligence lessened. Most certainly, the Japanese would take out their wrath on the civilian population. Any guerrilla unit, once fixed and pursued by a counter guerrilla force, must focus on the destruction of the pursuing force or must abandon the area to survive.<sup>132</sup>

During Commander Parson's first visit to Colonel Fertig, he made it clear that MacArthur was serious about the "lie low" policy. Fertig's units were to make no more attacks on Japanese strongpoints and were to hold only that territory already under guerrilla control. Emphasis for security was to extend to the coastwatcher stations being put in on the island. In addition, the guerrillas were not to try to free the prisoners interned in Davao Penal Colony. They were already considered "expended" by GHQ, and failure to free all of the prisoners would likely result in the execution of the remaining prisoners. In any event, Fertig had no idea what he would do with several hundred ill and weakened prisoners if he was able to free them.<sup>133</sup>

Colonel Fertig did not fully agree with the orders to avoid combat with the Japanese. The Filipinos had suffered at the hands of the Japanese, and the quiet gathering of intelligence did not satisfy the Filipinos, of which there were many, who now had a blood feud with the Japanese. If the guerrillas did not demonstrate an offensive posture against the Japanese, the people would no longer support the guerrilla effort, which they had been willing to do at considerable danger to themselves. In the fall of 1943, Fertig published the organization's mission to his guerrillas. Their first priority was to gather intelligence for GHQ. Their second priority was to defeat the Japanese on Mindanao. He knew this mission did not fully comply with MacArthur's directive, but Fertig reasoned that without continued public support,

which meant continued if limited offensive action, the sources of intelligence would dry up.<sup>134</sup> As Colonel Fertig was to write to General Casey, "Instructions were to undertake no offensive action against the enemy. This has been followed, but the enemy did not receive the same orders."<sup>135</sup>

The visit by Commander Parsons to Mindanao marked an important turning point in the resistance movement. Parsons had embarked on a heroic saga which would catch the imagination of the Filipino people. His story is a remarkable one which cannot be condensed here. There are several books which detail his exploits as MacArthur's agent to the Philippine resistance movement, and these are annotated in the bibliography.

Parsons arrived in Mindanao aboard the submarine Tambor with Captain Charles Smith who had left Mindanao four months earlier in a sailboat. His mission was to learn the extent of the resistance movement in the Philippines, gauge the ability and trustworthiness of the leaders, and identify those who were capable and willing to accept orders from MacArthur. Those who could meet the standards would receive official recognition, which Parsons had the authority to offer, and the assurance of supplies. Parsons would then integrate these units into an archipelago-wide intelligence network.<sup>136</sup> Parsons was a friend of Fertig, and Smith had given MacArthur the first account of the Mindanao guerrilla organization. Fertig knew that the two had been sent to determine if he was competent to command, and he was told outright that he had not done himself any favors at GHQ by declaring himself a brigadier general. The issue of Fertig's competence was probably never in doubt. Parsons knew McLish, Bowler and Hedges personally, and he had confidence in their

abilities. He concluded that the Mindanao resistance movement was stronger than GHQ had contemplated. He also concluded that Fertig needed small arms, ammunition and radio equipment for intra-island communication. He confirmed Fertig as the commander of the 10th Military District and produced a set of silver eagles to confirm his promotion to colonel. Bowler, McLish, Hedges, Grinstead and McGee were soon to receive promotions signed by MacArthur, and Fertig would receive the Distinguished Silver Cross on August 20, 1943. Richardson was to characterize the Fertig-Parsons relationship like this: "Fertig and Parsons were a wonderful team. They were the Nimitz and MacArthur of our little frog-filled pond."<sup>137</sup>

#### The Rivalry of Salipada K. Pendatun

One of the most important accomplishments of Parsons' stay on Mindanao was the assistance he provided in unifying the Mindanao guerrillas. In a letter to Frank McGee, Robert Bowler wrote of Salipada K. Pendatun, a guerrilla leader in the Cotabato Province:

From all of this you can readily see that Pendatun is the Number One trouble-maker as far as Colonel Fertig is concerned. He is undoubtedly the only person on the island of Mindanao who is holding up Fertig's report to SWPA that all is clear.<sup>138</sup>

Parsons travelled to Cotabato to meet with Pendatun, and his help was instrumental in ultimately persuading Pendatun to submit to Fertig's authority.

In December 1942 Pendatun had offered Fertig a job on Pendatun's staff.<sup>139</sup> Pendatun was a lawyer and an influential adviser to the Governor of Mindanao before the Japanese invasion.<sup>140</sup> A Cotabato Moro, Magindanao son of an old line of datus, Pendatun was reared in the house of Edward Kuder, superintendent of schools in the province. He perhaps grew up more exposed to American thought and speech than to Moro culture. A promising political figure, he had been a Moro adviser to the Philippine

Army during the invasion. His wife, Matabay, was a graduate of the Philippine Normal School in Manila, and like her husband had been educated by Kuder. Raised a Christian in Zamboanga, she had converted to Islam when she married Pendatun. The couple was childless, and they had adopted an orphaned American girl with blue eyes and blond hair and pale skin. Salipada Pendatun was not a typical Moro.

A wealthy landowner (rice land in the Cotabato swamps), Pendatun had gathered guns and volunteers together to protect his property. As the Japanese cruelty began to reach his people he formed a guerrilla organization from the remnants of General Fort's Moro Bolo Battalions. The force became a large one comprised of both Christians and Moros, and Pendatun's men acknowledged him as "brigadier general." Colonel Ind described Pendatun as "brainy, proud, and unquestionably as good an organizer as he was a man of action." Pendatun had a competent staff, "better than Fertig himself" according to Ingham, which included Americans, a former senator, a former governor of Cotabato, the former chief of staff of the Philippine Air Corps, and Major Frank McGee.

Fertig thought that Pendatun's group was very effective but found Pendatun "headstrong, brave, glittering" and "overly occupied with the pleasures of women." He also found him to be "short, stocky," and "brutally handsome." Fertig was wary of Major Edwin Andrews, the former Chief of the Philippine Army Air Corps, and the influence he allegedly had upon Pendatun. Andrews was an American Mestizo and American citizen, but his well-known hatred of America had led to his "preaching the most rampant anti-Americanism." Apparently, Andrews had suffered a racial insult while training in the American South, and he complained often that he could not sleep at night for his disgust at having American blood flowing

in his veins. From this Fertig concluded that Pendatun himself was anti-American. Father Haggerty drew the opposite conclusion, that Pendatun was loyal to the United States.

Bowler had been negotiating with Pendatun to join Fertig's command with no success. Parsons visited Pendatun and travelled with him. He was impressed with his several thousand men and his staff and the manner in which the guerrillas grew their own produce and livestock. In an apochryphal tale, Parsons was with Pendatun when he trapped a Japanese patrol inside a schoolhouse. Unable to reduce the building with small arms, Pendatun resorted to strapping two bombs on a carabao, lighting its tail and pointing the terrified animal at the building. The method enjoyed some small degree of success, but Parsons was now able to make it clear to Pendatun that the only way he would ever get heavier weapons would be by acknowledging Fertig as the leader of the Mindanao guerrillas and joining MacArthur's team. Pendatun gave up his dream of commanding General Vachon's former Bukidnon-Cotabato Force, and Ingham and Wise relate, perhaps with some poetic license, that Pendatun on the spot removed his gold stars and replaced them with gold oak leaves that Parsons had brought with him.<sup>141</sup>

The transformation was not quite so smooth, however, as Bowler's letter to McGee of October 5, 1943 demonstrates. In June 1943 Fertig had written to McGee:

As you undoubtedly know, Pendatun's assumption of rank is illegal and without precedent, inasmuch as he had knowledge of the organization at the time he assumed the rank. Following the visit of Commander Parsons to that area, it is hoped that this is water under the bridge.<sup>142</sup>

It was not until Fertig was moving his headquarters to Agusan in the fall of 1943 that Pendatun capitulated. A delegation from Cotabato had asked

Fertig to replace Pendatun with Major Frank McGee. McGee was assigned as commanding officer of the newly-organized 106th Division on October 7, 1943, and Pendatun stepped down to take command of the 117th Infantry Regiment, "with a show of extremely bad grace," according to Dissette.<sup>143</sup>

Frank McGee, Pendatun's new superior officer, was a West Point graduate. Fifty-four years old in 1943, he still possessed "great physical stamina." He was "highly principled, had a quick mind, an excellent memory, and great tenacity of purpose." He had been awarded the Distinguished Service Cross for Action in World War I, and had retired as a captain on permanent disability. He had a silver plate in his head from shrapnel wounds, was subjected to excruciating headaches, and his speech was slurred. He had been a planter on Mindanao for 20 years, returning to the U. S. every two years to have the silver plate in his head adjusted. Before the invasion he had sent intelligence reports on the Japanese activities on Mindanao to the War Department. When war broke out he volunteered for active duty, and when the surrender came he went to the hills. He accepted command of the 106th Division and later was to succeed Lieutenant Colonel Laureta as commander of the 107th Division. When the invasion force came to Mindanao McGee was attached to the 24th Infantry Division as officer in charge of all guerrillas in the division's sector. Sadly, the story of this courageous patriotic man does not have a happy ending, for he was killed by a Japanese sniper on August 7, 1945, just eight days before the ceasefire. McGee's story, as much as that of any of the guerrillas, is a testament to the real human strength of the resistance movement.<sup>144</sup>

The example of Pendatun is the most important one for demonstrating the gloved fist used by Fertig to persuade guerrilla leaders to join his

command. Pendatun led a powerful organization, and he had the capability to spoil Fertig's efforts on Mindanao. But there were others to whom Fertig held out the subtle threat of no aid. For example, he wrote this to another leader in Cotabato just after Pendatun had ceded his authority:

We are interested in the unification of all guerrilla bands in the province of Cotabato and such unification is to your distinct advantage. Without it you cannot pay your troops, your receipts for food will not be honored by the Army of the United States, your men and your commission will not be recognized. In other words, you will simply be classified as a group of bandits...It is believed that you are an intelligent man, and consequently will make the proper decision.<sup>145</sup>

As the SWPA submarine supply deliveries increased and Fertig's units received much needed ammunition and weapons, this argument became all the more persuasive, especially as it became increasingly apparent as the months passed that the Americans were coming back. The effect of the submarine operations is covered in detail in Chapter 7.

#### Establishment of the Headquarters in Misamis

Crucial to the development of the Mindanao guerrilla organization was the location in the early months of the guerrilla headquarters and the relationship established with the civilians. The provincial government of Mindanao, it has been noted, continued to function for the seven months after the fall of Manila. This factor coupled with the Japanese garrisoning plan for the island and the concentration of USAFFE soldiers at the time of the surrender provided the "incubator" in which the guerrillas could gain their strength in infancy.

After the surrender in May 1942 the Japanese had concentrated their garrison forces in Davao, Lake Lanao and the Cagayan-Iligan-Kolambugan area with garrisons in 12 towns. They had sent a small guard detachment to Misamis Occidental Province, but it had been withdrawn. Misamis



Occidental was of no strategic value to the Japanese, and neither had it been viewed as such by the American island defenders. But USAFFE soldiers had drifted into the area to avoid the Japanese, and this was the province that Luis Morgan and William Tait had so easily secured under their control. In eastern Misamis Occidental was Misamis City, a small town situated on Panguil Bay. Lying just east of Mount Malindang, this town was the original site of the guerrilla headquarters.

Misamis had been important as a port and business center for the area's agricultural concerns. It was a trade center and shipping point for the Koliambugan Lumber Company, and there was an old Spanish fort still standing in the town.<sup>146</sup> Fertig made the fort his headquarters and flew the American and Filipino flags at equal height from the fort. The province had 250,000 people living in it, and the civil government had continued to function after the surrender because the Japanese had not bothered with the area.

For those guerrillas who came down out of the mountains diseaseridden and half-starved, the business as usual attitude in Misamis City must have made it seem as though they had gone through a time warp to a time before the war. Schools were open, priests held mass, shops were open and food was plentiful. There was even a BOQ for couriers and visitors with beds, hot showers, and dinner -- Bowler had one at Talakag as well. Money was being printed, banca boats loaded with trade goods filled the bay, factories were humming, and the lights were on. Inter-island trade was flourishing and an estimated 50 percent of the manufactured goods in the Visayas were exported among the southern islands. The telephone system worked: soda pop bottles were used for insulators, fencing wire replaced copper wire, and telephone batteries were recharged

overnight by being soaked in tuba (coconut beer). The telegraph system was also working, and the trucks from Hedges' old 81st Infantry Division motor pool had been retrieved from their hiding places in the jungle. Fertig was communicating by courier with the islands to the north, and one American family hiding deep in the mountains of southern Negros took hope when told of a General Fertig who had been sent by MacArthur to Mindanao to train a guerrilla army.

When Parsons arrived on the Tambor in March 1943 he had no expectation that he would encounter anything like Misamis thriving under the two conquered flags, and this situation went far in convincing him that Fertig could lead and that the resistance movement had a chance. The crew of the Tambor was met by an orchestra dressed in white playing "Anchors Aweigh" and by two truckloads of fresh vegetables and fruits: onions, tomatoes, pineapples, bananas, guabane, coconuts, and fresh beans. One sailor was heard to remark that the submarine's skipper had taken a wrong turn and ended up in Hollywood. The purpose of this on Fertig's part was multifold: he wanted to impress GHQ, SWPA that he had a viable organization; he wanted to drive home to the Filipinos on Mindanao and elsewhere that American aid was coming to his headquarters; and, probably least important, there was the goodwill welcome to the crew of the submarine.<sup>147</sup>

The situation at Misamis was not all rosy of course. The beaches were laced with barbed wire, a continuing sign that the Japanese could come at any time. Indeed, every morning a Japanese reconnaissance plane arrived at exactly eight o'clock, took pictures, and dropped a bomb or two on the old fort. The people would simply leave the fort area at that time every day to run errands elsewhere. Many of the bombs dropped were duds and these became a reliable and predictable source of gun powder.

Fertig had revived the Home Guard, an old Spanish system of voluntarios which required each man to devote so many days of labor per month to the government in lieu of taxes. The voluntarios were not part of the regular guerrilla force, and they were used to guard trails and roads and to provide early warning of Japanese patrols, which passed through the area about once a month. At this time Fertig claimed a guerrilla force of 15,000 men with 5,000 rifles. He had established schools for his guerrillas variously described as Officer Candidates School, Training Schools, and a commando course. He even reported to GHQ in February 1943 the guerrilla possession of two airfields in Bukidnon Province with 2,000 troops available to protect the fields, but he added that no gasoline or trained ground crews were available.<sup>148</sup>

Further evidence that there was a war going on was the lack of imported items like cotton and silk cloth, tea, spices and gasoline. People were scantily dressed and the children played naked. Men worked in their skivvies or G-strings and the women wore coarse fiber brassieres and burlap skirts. Eleven percent pure alcohol distilled from tuba was used to fuel gasoline engines and refined coconut oil served as fuel to run diesel engines. Some items once consumed or broken were irreplaceable: medicine, batteries and radio tubes are examples.<sup>149</sup>

Fertig very early on established the tenor for the command's administration by making copies of regulations, troop lists, finance records, orders, and records of guerrilla operations. He saw the obvious need for documentation to support post-war claims on the American and Filipino governments. But he also appeared to believe that the show of administrative activity gave some kind of mystic legitimacy to his command. The stamp "file copy" somehow created the image of organization and

stability. Fertig was apparently convinced that Filipinos are "impressed by the flood of official-seeming documents." As time went on, of course, the few typewriters fell into disrepair, typewriter ribbons shredded, and paper of any kind was at a premium. As head of the administrative staff, Fertig also found himself involved in a multitude of seemingly trivial routine matters. As Fertig saw it: "Filipinos believe it is useless to look for any kind of decision from anyone who is not The One. Centuries had taught them that all subordinate functionaries are either thieves or incompetent relatives, or both." It should be said that Fertig did not treat the unending requests and appeals for arbitration lightly, for he realized that without the support of the peasant or merchant making the request, his guerrilla force could not function. In some ways, the flurry of administration was much like leaving the lights in Misamis on at night. Like the lights, the file copy was symbolic for it showed that the guerrilla force was there to stay and would not desert the people. In this case substance followed form: the concept was to look and act like an organized force.<sup>150</sup>

Colonel Fertig was under no illusions that the location of his headquarters would be permanent. He was equipped for instant mobility, and he kept his maps, codes, sensitive intelligence information, and current business in a briefcase which he could grab and thus leave quickly. The briefcase, which was brought by Parsons from Australia, was a trick briefcase which was designed to explode into a magnesium fire upon being opened unless a hidden switch was properly activated. Other records of his command were buried in camouflaged holes in the ground in sealed tin cans.<sup>151</sup>

### Civil Government is Established

The establishment of civil government in Mindanao under guerrilla auspices did much to further strengthen the resistance movement. In October and November 1942 Fertig ordered the screening of all former government officials for the purpose of filling positions in the newly-established civil government of the Free Philippines. Using as his authority the instructions given to the resistance leaders by Manuel Roxas for reestablishing the Commonwealth Government in the liberated areas, Fertig ordered the pre-war Mindanao government officials back to work in their former positions. Fertig was assisted in this work principally by Edward Kuder and Hedges, both of whom had been long-time Mindanao residents. The Province of Free Lanao was officially established on December 1, 1942 under Governor Marcelo T. Paise at Causwagan near Kolanbugan, and Paise commenced the reorganization of the municipal governments in the unoccupied territories. The Free Lanao government was so successful that Fertig sought to achieve the same success in other provinces using the same procedures. In the areas where the Japanese were strong and the establishment of a free civil government deemed impractical, Fertig established martial law under the 10th Military District. This was done in Bukidnon and a portion of Misamis Oriental. Therefore, in some areas the government officials had to serve two masters, but Fertig considered the gains were worth the risk. The question of who served the resistance movement would be raised at a later time, and everyone knew that. It came as no surprise then, when President Sergio Osmeña and General MacArthur announced the following policy for the reestablishment of the Philippine government on liberation of occupied areas by the American forces: "So far as possible, provincial and municipal

officers last serving under the authority of recognized guerrilla leaders or in recognized free governments will occupy positions of equal or better rank as temporary officials."<sup>152</sup>

The early bandit groups had given the guerrillas a poor image among the civilian populace. These groups expropriated property and food from the civilians, and the new word coined for taking something without payment was "USAFFED" -- as in "the guerrilla USAFFED my carabao." In Visayan the new word was "Tulisaffe," which meant USAFFE thief.<sup>153</sup> Colonel Fertig very early in the establishment of his headquarters abandoned forced requisitions in kind and relied upon a system where the guerrilla organization would pay its own way. Many guerrillas paid their own way with personal promissory notes during the occupation. Fertig relied upon funds gained through taxation by the civil government and the creation of money making projects run by the guerrillas. Lieutenant Colonel McLish's 110th Division in Agusan had a guerrilla dance band which raised money by playing for weddings and fiestas and by charging 50 centavos for admission to its nightly dances. The band was called the "Best Band West of Ford Island, Pearl Harbor." Colonel Kangleon on Leyte was to become renowned for his famous guerrilla soap factory which sold soap throughout the southern islands for 40 centavos (20¢) a pound. These guerrilla money-making projects undoubtedly violated countless U. S. Army regulations and Federal Statutes for procurement of goods and ethical conduct.<sup>154</sup>

Fertig ran the guerrilla organization like a business, and the form some of its functions took reflected this phenomenon. Fertig was fortunate to be on Mindanao, however, for the problems of food supply were less acute here than they were on the other islands, and many of the

the better food producing areas were in guerrilla controlled areas. Fertig's problem was one of distribution, because for food to be delivered to the guerrillas and civilians in the areas which were barren of agriculture the supply trains had to traverse miles of mountains and pass through Japanese-held territory. Fertig created the Food Supply Administration and the Trading Post Administration to monitor the growing of food, see to the payment of the workers, and coordinate the movement and security of the supply columns as they moved off through the mountains. The problem was not an easy one, for a cargadore would often consume more than he could carry for a three week journey through the mountains. And, of course, he still had to return. Caravans of 100 or more heavily-laden carabaos were not uncommon. Many of the cargadores hired were Atas, nomadic aborigines who hunted and fished, constantly staying just ahead of civilization and areas exhausted of game. The Atas stood four feet tall and weighed 90 pounds, but they could carry a 75 pound load with little effort, and they navigated in the jungle quite easily. They made ideal cargo bearers for they could hunt their own meals as well.

A Women's Auxiliary Service was formed by Josefa Capistrano, a Chinese Mestiza. Her husband, Nick Capistrano, a Mestizo and wealthy engineer, ran the labor groups, cargadores, oversaw the mechanical equipment, and scheduled the collection and distribution of food to the guerrilla force. After the war there were problems with compensation for those people who had assisted the guerrillas before the GHQ, SWPA official recognition date of February 13, 1943. Fertig had, of course, been issuing IOU's on the U. S. government before this date.<sup>155</sup>

Fertig established a Civilian Relief Administration which decentralized its powers to the Directors of the Provincial and Municipal

Civilian Relief Committees. The Provincial Relief Committee provided assistance to the families of the guerrilla fighters. In addition, each province had its own Director of Civil Affairs who dealt with any unusual problems caused by guerrilla units in the province.<sup>156</sup>

Hoarding and black-market profiteering were not widespread problems, but they could have a major impact on a small village. The penalty for hoarding was a jail sentence. The Provincial Emergency Control Boards created by Fertig fixed the prices on prime commodities, but concentrated primarily on the prices of corn and rice because the prices of all other goods appeared to fluctuate in proportion to the price on these two commodities. Early in 1943, exiled President Quezon authorized the creation of the Mindanao Emergency Currency Board which had the authority to issue its own monetary notes for use as the medium of exchange among the guerrillas. With wooden plates and paper supplied by submarine, the guerrillas printed their own currency. All bills were carefully numbered and recorded in two separate ledgers, and they were to be redeemable against the U. S. Government at war's end. The penalty for counterfeiting was "severe."<sup>157</sup>

The issue of pay scales for guerrillas was a confusing and difficult problem. Through Executive Orders Numbered 21 and 22 exiled President Osmeña confirmed that the service of the guerrillas would be rewarded with recognition and that recognition would bring them pay, allowances and benefits of soldiers belonging to the Philippine Army, which was the same as the pay for the American soldier because the Philippine Army was a part of the U. S. Armed Forces. GHQ, SWPA inadvertently officially confirmed this in Circular Number 100 on November 17, 1943. This was never the intent of either government, for the U. S.



pay scales would be highly inflationary in the post-war Philippine economy and would put the common soldier in the highest pay brackets of the government.

To avoid profiteering among the guerrillas their leaders gave them only partial pay: 10 pesos per month for privates and up to 150 pesos per month for field grade officers. In any case, there was little to buy in the guerrilla-controlled areas, and the guerrilla currency was no good in the Japanese-occupied areas, so the guerrillas called their script "tinghoy," meaning counterfeit or useless. MacArthur through Osmeña authorized 50 pesos pay per month for each guerrilla to be claimed on the U. S. Government after the war, but the U. S. Government finally allowed only eight pesos per month when the final decisions were made after the cessation of hostilities. The effects of this were several. Colonel Fertig's official troop lists for claims purposes were altered after the war by Philippine Army and Philippine Government officials in Manila. Names were deleted, and others were added, usually the names of relatives of the officials. The great promise of the United States to its guerrilla forces and the people who supported them was broken. The hard-won scraps of paper did not mean what they had been promised to mean.<sup>158</sup>

General MacArthur had ordered his guerrilla leaders to assist in maintaining civil order but to avoid interference which might cause resentment among the Filipinos.<sup>159</sup> If one were to graph a continuum of civil-military relations in the resistance movement environment it might look something like this:

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
<hr/>				

- Where: (1) Guerrilla leader rules entirely by decree.
- (2) A joint civilian-guerrilla council exists but a guerrilla majority governs.
- (3) Issues receive a full hearing by both guerrilla and civil leaders but the guerrillas retain veto power to protect the movement.
- (4) Balanced; democratic; joint or unanimous decisions among guerrillas and civilians required.
- (5) Civil authorities appoint and control guerrilla leaders.

Using this scheme the Mindanao resistance movement would seem to fall somewhere around number (3) for the majority of the period.

#### The Japanese Seek to Destroy the Guerrilla Organization

Between May 10, 1942 and June 26, 1943, the guerrillas had had a honeymoon away from the Japanese. The Japanese initially left only the three battalions of the 10th Independent Garrison plus one air squadron based at Davao after May 22, 1942.<sup>160</sup> When American submarines were reported to be in the waters around Mindanao, and reports that they were unloading supplies reached the Japanese, it was only a matter of time before the Japanese commander of Mindanao and Sulu, General Morimoto, and his subordinate commander of Central Mindanao, Colonel Yashinari Tanaka, were forced to take action. They knew of "Major General Fertig," whom they believed to be the commander of all guerrilla forces in the Philippines, and they had plenty of aerial photographs taken of what they thought to be his headquarters in Misamis City, the old fort. The signals from the new radios brought to Fertig from Australia, the increase in radio traffic caused by the escape of the ten Americans from Davao Penal Colony, and Parsons' reports to GHQ and Task Force 77 had given additional evidence of Fertig's location. Two Japanese boats with radio direction finders,

one boat located in the Mindanao Sea below Bohol and the other in the Surigao Sea south of Leyte, had fixed the location of Fertig's transmitter.<sup>161</sup>

The ability of General Morimoto to launch an attack upon Misamis was, in his view, limited. It was difficult for him to ask his superiors for reinforcements because Mindanao had long since been declared conquered and pacified. To admit to problems on Mindanao now would prove him to be either an incompetent commander or of having been untruthful in his reports. He believed that Fertig's force numbered as many as 20,000 men, and if they burned their lights at night, then they must indeed be powerful. Morimoto had fought guerrillas in China and had presumably believed that he did not have the forces available to deliver a crushing blow nor to adequately pursue, isolate, surround and destroy individual units as he had attempted to do tactically in China. So Morimoto made thorough plans, requested and received reinforcements in May, and prepared beach defenses occupied by a division-sized unit. The plan for Operation Big Voice, which the Japanese named it, was designed to silence the radios, capture or kill Fertig, and destroy as many guerrillas as possible.<sup>162</sup>

Colonel Fertig's intelligence had indicated that the Japanese attack would come on June 19th. He knew that he did not have the forces to successfully engage any kind of serious attack, but he believed that it was necessary to put up token resistance and evacuate only when under some pressure in order to allow the guerrilla force to "save face" with the Filipinos. The Japanese had already launched a series of attacks along the coast in Cotabato, Agusan, Surigao, Misamis Oriental and Lanao. The invading forces had brought along Filipino labor gangs to harvest the

crops of rice, corn, coconuts and bananas and to confiscate the fishermen's catches to provide food for the army and to deny food sources to the guerrillas. Reports came into Fertig by runner, days after the events, and the invading force was rumored to be 20,000 strong with an additional 150,000 soldiers on the way, gross exaggerations of course.<sup>163</sup>

On June 26, 1943, during the lowlands rainy season, the Japanese struck Misamis with an invasion force of three troop transports, three launches, one destroyer, and five airplanes.<sup>164</sup> Travis Ingham puts the size of the Japanese force at 4,000 landing troops which is probably accurate.<sup>165</sup> Dissette and Adamson put the force at 150-200, hardly enough to conduct the kinds of operations Morimoto had in mind.<sup>166</sup> The guerrillas broke and ran, having put up almost no resistance whatever. The capital of the Free Philippines, Oroquieta, had fallen without a fight. All along the coast towns were deserted, the electricity was out, schools and churches locked, and the banca fleets gone from the bays. The civil governments with their relief projects, trading posts, and voluntarios had fled to the hills. As Father Haggerty wrote:

But they were wearing us down, pushing us back from fertile land, closing up our lines of communication, blocking us off from the coast, frightening our bancas off the seas. They are killing our work animals, burning all homes, destroying crops. We cannot last if this continues.<sup>167</sup>

The Japanese landing was not without its quirk of Fate, for among the Japanese who landed at Misamis was a Japanese captain who had once been a high school classmate of Fertig's in La Junta, Colorado. The Japanese officer talked to Father Healy in Tangub and told him that the officer's mission was to find Fertig and kill him. He told the priest of how he had picked cantaloupes with his American classmate and described Fertig's performance in high school as a scholar and athlete. He concluded

by telling Father Healy that he really had no desire to successfully complete his mission and asked him to pass word to Fertig so that he would be aware of the price put upon his head by the Japanese.<sup>168</sup>

Fertig, gripped by a case of dysentery, withdrew northwest into the hills. Like Father Haggerty, he saw the house-of-cards coming down around him, and he thought that the guerrillas' only hope lay with Parsons' early return to Australia to plead their cause at GHQ. As it was, Parsons did make a drama-packed forced march across Mindanao to meet the submarine Thresher in Pagadian Bay and made his escape to Australia to report on the Philippine resistance movement.

In the meantime, Fertig had a more practical problem, which was to relocate his headquarters. He could not go to Cotabato, for Salipada Pendatun had still not submitted to his authority, and Fertig would be placed in a very weak position politically by seeking Pendatun's protection. In addition, the Moros were unpredictable and some were known to be working for the Japanese in this province. He could not go to Baroy in Occidental Misamis because Morgan had returned from his trip to the Visayas and was in full revolt there. Zamboanga, though safe, was too far removed for command and control purposes. Davao was controlled by the Japanese, as was Bukidnon. Agusan had little food, bandit groups still roamed the eastern coast, and the Agusan River Valley offered few advantages to a guerrilla force. But Agusan was under an American commander, Ernest McLish, whom Fertig had yet to meet, and the area offered some advantages for rendezvous' with submarines. In the spring of 1943 an expedition under McLish had cleared Agusan Province of Japanese, although at a heavy price in men and ammunition. They had, however, captured some launches and diesel fuel. At this time of decision, Fertig

now estimated that he had some 8,000 guerrillas under his command.<sup>169</sup>

When Fertig left Misamis he first went to Liangan in Lanao Province with his close friend Hodges to be among some trusted Moros. He remained here until the problem with Morgan was resolved by sending him to Australia and the issue between Pendatun and him was somewhat alleviated. In September he left Liangan and visited Bowler near Iligan. Bowler was officially made chief of staff to Fertig, and the groundwork was laid for establishment of "A" Corps which occurred January 1, 1944.<sup>170</sup> Fertig had realized that he needed an alternate command post should he be killed or his communications with GHQ be destroyed. By November 1943 Fertig had moved to Esperanza at the junction of the Agusan and Wawa Rivers. He remained here until January 1944 when the "jungle telegraph" alerted him that the Japanese had become wise to his new location. He pushed farther up-river to Namot Talacogon in the interior Agusan Valley.<sup>171</sup>

From early 1944 on conditions began to change rapidly on Mindanao. Coastal towns such as Cagayan in Oriental Misamis were subjected to frequent Japanese patrols and air raids, and the mayor of Cagayan was captured. The fertile lowlands were abandoned and the small barrios along the coast were deserted. Influenza and malaria were killing many, and starvation was becoming acute, especially among the malnourished children. Medical supplies were totally lacking, and amputations had to be done without drugs or anesthetic. One guerrilla, Australian Jock McLaren, performed an appendectomy on himself with only a mirror and a razor blade. The self-conducted operation took five hours to perform, and five days later McLaren took to the jungle just minutes ahead of a Japanese patrol, his appendix in a bottle. Tropical ulcers were treated

with picric acid powder removed from the detonators of Japanese mines -- it turned the skin yellow.

Malaria was the big killer, with deaths on Mindanao estimated at anywhere from 100 to 500 per day. Half of every guerrilla company was down from malaria at any time. Most types of malaria on Mindanao could be treated with quinine or atabrine, and Fertig believed that if every submarine was filled with this medicine it still would not be enough. Benign tertiary malaria was the less virulent strain and was the most common. But by October 1944 there was a full-scale malaria epidemic and cerebral malaria, carried by the anopheles mosquito with its notably distinguishable bite (it stood on its head) was killing its victims within 48 hours. The Japanese sold a "quinine" pill in the occupied areas which was really a useless placebo made of flour. Lacking sulphuric acid (which could only be imported) needed to jar the quinine crystals from the bark of the cinchona tree, the guerrillas boiled the bark, ground the residue into a powder, and mixed it with corn flour into a pasty pill. The result was a primitive and not very effective medicine. The one positive aspect was that the guerrillas controlled the Del Monte plantation region in Bukidnon Province where Colonel Arthur Fisher, the former director of Forestry, had planted a forest of 11 million cinchona trees before the war. The Japanese were suffering from the epidemic as well, for when Davao City was later captured by American forces an Army nurse concluded that 20 percent of the Japanese had malaria.<sup>172</sup>

Two-thirds of the guerrillas were with their families searching for food or they were incapacitated from illness. A sack of corn cost 150 pesos and a sack of rice 250 pesos. A guerrilla earned only 10 pesos a month, and they had not been paid for months because Sam Wilson with

his printing presses had been cut off by the Japanese. As it became clearer to the Japanese that an American invasion was imminent they began to move reinforcements to Mindanao. Japanese patrols no longer numbered only 50 to 100 soldiers. Now the combat formations were much larger, and they began to move away from the coastal areas and onto the back trails to establish inland garrisons. These soldiers were not the well-disciplined troops that had carried the fight in 1942. These soldiers "raped, tortured, bayoneted, burned houses and crops, drove off animals, carried away clothing and even plows."<sup>173</sup> The Japanese command believed that these patrols, which were meant to seal off Fertig and to gain control of the known submarine rendezvous points, had "created much confusion."<sup>174</sup> They had assessed the situation correctly.

Namot Talacogon had been a relatively secure if environmentally inhospitable location for Fertig and his headquarters. The civil government continued to function out of Agusan, for the governor and mayors met there; and Father Joseph Lucas, Superior of the Jesuits in Mindanao, conducted his business from there, also. The food administration, relief projects, banca coordination and price control board continued to work out of Misamis Occidental under the direction of "A" Corps, Western Mindanao. Food was not plentiful, but the headquarters location was secure enough that a library was established from which reading material, mostly magazines from the submarine deliveries, could be checked out. With administrative efficiency, the "library rules" required that the materials be returned to code "CPZ" via runner within three days of receipt. In this way the guerrillas managed to keep abreast of the progress of the war in Europe and in the Pacific.<sup>175</sup> As the news of American victories spread throughout the island, the Constabulary soldiers began to defect and the



ranks of the guerrillas grew increasingly larger.<sup>176</sup> The Japanese increased their effort and pressed their attack on Fertig's headquarters, an interesting course of action since the Japanese IGHQ in Manila had already declared him captured and dead. One of the air raids on the guerrilla headquarters was very successful, destroying every radio but one 3BZ which had been buried. Communication was greatly affected, and the "A" Corps headquarters stood ready to assume responsibility for communication with GHQ, SWPA. It appeared that between 15,000 and 18,000 Japanese soldiers were actively pressing the attacks throughout the area and Lieutenant Colonel McLish and his 110th Division were under severe pressure.<sup>177</sup> The attack on Fertig was being spearheaded by the Japanese 41st Infantry Regiment of the 30th Division.<sup>178</sup> By mid-May Fertig had begun his withdrawal farther still up-river to Waloe.<sup>179</sup>

Waloe did not represent a significant improvement, for the Japanese continued their advance up the river and conducted aerial attacks daily in the area. By Fertig's estimate he had a small screening force of 300 guerrillas delaying a Japanese force of approximately 11,000.<sup>180</sup> His guerrillas now also had to patrol against the pagans in the area, the Magahats. Waloe was in a jungle surrounded by a swamp much like the Florida Everglades, and it had been home to Magahat bandits and Christian outlaws for over a decade. The local populace for the first time was not friendly to the guerrillas, nor was the surrounding environment.<sup>181</sup> Hunger was the big enemy now. Cargadores brought food to the headquarters all the way from Misamis. The journey took one month and covered approximately 320 miles: 120 miles through Japanese controlled territory and another 200 over the mountains. From the Waloe area the guerrillas gathered fern greens (tankong), coconuts, bamboo and caught mud fish.

The cargadores packed in rice, corn and camotes from Misamis, and to prevent malnutrition they ate polyvitamin pills brought by the submarines. Waloe was deeper into the bush, and to communicate with Australia Fertig had to employ heavy V-beam antennas. This made triangulation easier for the Japanese, and when the bombers arrived on target they could spot the antennas.<sup>182</sup> By late August the situation on Mindanao and at Fertig's headquarters seemed grim indeed. But just when things seemed to be at their darkest, the first American bombers to appear over the Philippines in two and one-half years unloosed their bombs over Davao City.<sup>183</sup> The effect was dramatic and immediate. The Japanese troops withdrew from the interior and hastened their preparations of the beach defenses.

It is difficult to conclude what size force the Mindanao guerrillas numbered at this time because even though there is an abundant quantity of personnel strength reports available, it must be assumed that the number of guerrillas was still fluctuating considerably as many recently freed from Japanese occupied areas hastened to join the guerrillas before the war was over. Keats claims a strength of 40,000 guerrillas, which is undoubtedly on the high side. He also claims that the Mindanao guerrillas killed 7,000 Japanese (he does not say what the wounded and non-combat casualties might have been); and he further claims the 10th Military District guerrillas kept 150,000 Japanese tied down on Mindanao trying to break the resistance.<sup>184</sup> These figures are wildly inaccurate for the Japanese complement of 13 divisions and five brigades deployed in the entire Philippines numbered only 288,028 on October 1, 1944.<sup>185</sup> The number of Japanese troops on Mindanao on October 1, 1944 at the time the Japanese expected the American main invasion to take place on Mindanao was estimated to be at just over 60,000.<sup>186</sup> After the American attacks

on Leyte and Luzon this figure was reduced to between 22,000 and 25,000 Japanese by February 1945.<sup>187</sup> The redeployment of the Japanese forces had resulted in this estimated Japanese strength distribution on Mindanao as of January 31, 1945:<sup>188</sup>

Agusan	200	Misamis Occidental	0
Bukidnon	1,400	Misamis Oriental	4,500
Cotabato	5,250	Surigao	50
Davao	10,150	Zamboanga	2,000
Lanao	300		
<u>TOTAL = 23,850</u>			

GHQ, SWPA estimated that the total effective Japanese ground combat forces in the Philippines on September 30, 1944 was 224,000 (a figure nearly 64,000 short of the Japanese figures).<sup>189</sup> Of these, approximately 30 percent were on Mindanao (approximately 61,400). The Japanese 30th Division was a Triangular Division with a table of organization strength of 15,566. The 100th Division was a Brigaded Type B Division with an organizational strength of 11,000.<sup>190</sup>

Official sources put the Mindanao guerrilla strength at 37,000 to 38,000 with nearly 20,000 assorted weapons distributed among the force:<sup>191</sup>

- 11,000 rifles
- 6,000 carbines
- 500 automatic rifles
- 700 Thompson sub-machine guns
- 60 .30/.50 calibre machine guns
- 10 field pieces
- 144 mortars
- 1,200 pistols
- 19,614 weapons

The comparable Japanese weapons summary (a sample) for the 30th and 100th Divisions based upon their tables of equipment would put the mix of weapons for the 30th Division at 7,578 weapons and for the 100th Division 5,656 weapons.<sup>192</sup> Simple ratios versus the guerrillas' weapons inventory cannot be established, however, because independent units of the Japanese military forces were located in Mindanao from time to time, little is known of how many weapons were stored in the Davao port facilities, and some of the line units for the two Japanese divisions on Mindanao were sent north to assist in fighting the invading American forces. The number of small arms between the opposing forces was probably comparable in quantity, although the diversity in types of weapons and limited repair capabilities of the guerrilla force would certainly give the edge to the Japanese. The big difference between the weapons capabilities of the two forces was the heavy weapons category, for the Japanese had a number of mountain artillery pieces, tanks and anti-tank guns. These were of limited use against the guerrillas, however.

Samuel Eliot Morison differs in his figures for the Mindanao guerrillas, and he puts the strength at 25,000.<sup>193</sup> Dissette and Adamson give no source for their figure of 35,150 guerrillas but conclude the figure is "decidedly high" and then, oddly, state that GHQ, SWPA took Fertig's claim of 35,150 men "with a grain of salt."<sup>194</sup> The figures 25,000 to 40,000 are the minimum and maximum figures found for the Mindanao guerrillas which probably indicates as well as any other factor two things: first, the administration and control of a guerrilla movement is not a precise administrative undertaking, and second, the movement did attract a large number of men who were willing to undertake the hardships and dangers of guerrilla warfare in the jungles of Mindanao.

The skills required in the leaders, and the demands placed daily upon them, equate to those encountered in the most difficult and complex of combat environments. Luck certainly played its role, but it may be presumed that a strong personality, an unwavering sense of duty and mission, and an uncompromising tenacity were the attributes which made a guerrilla leader successful. The Mindanao organization itself could be judged a success had it done nothing more than become unified and survived. It did more than that, of course, for it served the Filipino people from which the resistance movement sprang. Its successes, and they were many, will be reviewed in succeeding chapters.

## CHAPTER 5

### ENDNOTES

<sup>1</sup> Radiogram, MacArthur to Marshall, 24 December 1941, AG 381 (11-27-41 GEN) Far East, MMRDNA found in John Jacob Beck, MacArthur and Wainwright: Sacrifice of the Philippines, 1974, p. 37. See also U.S. Army, Visayan-Mindanao Force (1941-1942), Historical Report Visayan-Mindanao Force: Defense of the Philippines 1 September 1941 - 10 May 1942, p. 26, (Hereinafter cited as VMF, Historical Report).

<sup>2</sup> Radiogram, MacArthur to Marshall, No. 178, 1 Feb 1942, AG 381 (21 Dec 1941) Far East Situation MMRDNA found in Beck, MacArthur and Wainwright, pp. 86-87. MacArthur further reported to Marshall in the same message that "Guerrilla activity in Mindanao...is now organized and directed by this HQ using various agencies both Filipino and American. It is not deemed feasible nor practical to introduce any outside agents for use in this type of work." This was an overstatement of some magnitude in this first instance, for there was no guerrilla activity per se on Mindanao at this time. His thinking on the agents was to experience a complete reversal, however, for he was later to send agents to Mindanao over the strong protestations of Colonel Fertig. The only known authorized and directed guerrilla movement in the Philippines prior to May 30, 1942 was that authorized on January 20, 1942 by HQ, USAFFE. LtCol Claude Thorp was directed to infiltrate Japanese lines, gather intelligence, and possibly destroy Japanese airplanes at Clark Field. See U.S. Army Headquarters Philippines Command, "U.S. Army Recognition Program of Philippine Guerrillas," no date, (hereinafter HQ, Philippines Command, "Recognition Program").

<sup>3</sup> Radiogram, Marshall to MacArthur, 21 Feb 1942, Chief of Staff Super Secret File: MacArthur's move to Australia, MMRDNA in Beck, MacArthur and Wainwright, pp. 117-118. An earlier message had stated that the length of MacArthur's stay in Mindanao "would depend on the good you might do toward stimulating guerrilla operations in the Visayas and Mindanao." Radiogram, Marshall to MacArthur, 4 Feb 1942, Quezon File, MMRDNA. Ibid., p. 91. Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson thought that plans for initiating guerrilla fighting in the Philippines was "mostly wind" and lacked "substantial practical value" but nevertheless gave Colonel William J. Donovan permission to proceed with the plans realizing that "some vigorous guerrilla work under American leadership in Mindanao" would give the Japanese trouble and perhaps save valuable time in the long run. Eisenhower, who had the War Plans Division at this time, Marshall and Stimson were agreed that resistance could be continued on Mindanao "after the fall of Corregidor" until sufficient forces could be moved into the Southwest Pacific to launch a counteroffensive. Ibid., p. 117. The plan to send MacArthur to Mindanao to lead the resistance from there was dropped for a request by Australian Prime Minister John Curtin to have MacArthur head up the newly-formed Southwest Pacific Area Command. Douglas MacArthur, Reminiscences, 1964, p. 140.

<sup>4</sup>The Visayan-Mindanao Force had been given the "impossible task" of defending Military Districts 6 through 10: Panay, Negros, Cebu/Bohol, Leyte/Samar and Mindanao/Jolo. The combined shorelines of these islands totalled several thousand miles, most of the potential landing areas were inaccessible by road, and there was very little inter-island shipping available to the VMF. D. Clayton James, The Years of MacArthur, Volume I, 1880-1941, 1970, p. 604, and VMF, Historical Record. There appears to be no record which documents the date of activation and formation of the VMF. A HQ, USAFFE General Order #24 dated November 7, 1941 does provide for "acceptance" and "induction" of units in the 6-10 Military District area. Details on the formation of this force can be found in Philippine Archives, File Number 25, "Visayan-Mindanao Forces."

<sup>5</sup>MacArthur to Father Haggerty, quoted in Edward Haggerty, Guerrilla Padre in Mindanao, 1946, p. 8.

<sup>6</sup>MacArthur, Reminiscences, pp. 144-145.

<sup>7</sup>General Chynoweth quoted in D. Clayton James, The Years of MacArthur, Volume II, 1941-1945, 1975, p. 105. Chynoweth is further quoted as saying: "General Sharp, at the age of fifty-five, had lost physical agility and, even more important, the mental agility to adjust himself to unforeseen conditions. He was simply unfit for that job. It was pathetic to give him the responsibility of commanding combat or guerrilla operations on Mindanao." Ibid. General Sharp had been a staff officer before the war began, and he once confided to Colonel Fertig that he did not want command and had never wanted to be a general in the first place. John Keats, They Fought Alone, 1963, p. 15. This is confirmed by Father Haggerty, to whom Sharp confided: "Padre, I have the stars of a general; but I wish I were only a colonel." Haggerty, Guerrilla Padre, p. 15. Sharp had been a colonel when the war began. He was promoted to brigadier general while on Cebu and promoted to major general shortly before the surrender. By his own assessment General Sharp's own staff was unknown to him when he assumed command. The Mindanao leaders had been "appointed arbitrarily," and his makeshift staff had to contend with poor intelligence, untrained units, and untried, newly-arrived officers. The irony is that Sharp is the one who had to give the surrender. VMF, Historical Report, p. 15.

<sup>8</sup>Robert Ross Smith, "The Status of Members of Philippine Military Forces During World War II," June 1973, p. 48.

<sup>9</sup>Originally the Japanese had planned for the landing of two battalions at Davao and later revised their estimate up to a requirement for four battalions. They actually used just the one, the Miura Detachment, under the command of the 16th Army ("the Sixteenth Imperial Guards, conquerors of Singapore and Pride of the Japanese Army"). General Headquarters, Far East Command, "Philippine Operations Record, Phase I, November 1941 to July 1942, Japanese Monograph Number 1, circa October 1946, pp. 26-27, 43.

<sup>10</sup>Louis Morton, The Fall of the Philippines, 1953, p. 508.

<sup>11</sup>Uldarico S. Baclagon, Philippine Campaigns, 1952, p. 221; and Haggerty, Guerrilla Padre, p. 12.

<sup>12</sup>VMF, Historical Record, pp. 72-73, 82-83.

<sup>13</sup>Little sustained fighting took place in the southern islands except on Mindanao, and then only during the period April 29th-May 9th. One measure of the generally low level of conflict is the fact that between the invasion and the surrender the U.S. forces never did declare martial law. Except for necessary restrictions on the use of radio, telegraph, public utilities and the controlled sale of food and gasoline, the civil government continued to function normally. According to General Sharp: "It is an extraordinary fact that the fiction of civil government was maintained even after the Japanese had landed." *Ibid.*, p. 48.

<sup>14</sup>James, Years of MacArthur, Volume II, pp. 141-142; and Courtney Whitney, MacArthur: His Rendezvous With History, 1956, p. 58.

<sup>15</sup>Texts of messages capsulized:

May 6 - Wainwright to Sharp: Sharp to report to MacArthur. Wainwright relinquishing command of VMF.

May 6 - MacArthur to Sharp: Wainwright surrendered, Sharp now in charge with full authority; keep fighting; initiate guerrilla operations.

May 7 - Wainwright to Sharp: Wainwright re-assuming command of VMF. Letter orders to follow directing unconditional surrender.

May 8 - Sharp to MacArthur: Need guidance.

May 9 - MacArthur to Sharp: Wainwright orders have no validity. Release your subordinate commanders, commence guerrilla activity; expect no immediate aid.

May 9 - MacArthur to Marshall: Ignore Wainwright's resumption of command. Wainwright is "unbalanced."

May 9 - Sharp to subordinates: You are released from VMF; commence guerrilla operations.

May 9 - Wainwright to Sharp: Conference my rep. and General Homma's rep. desired with you, your position on May 10th.

May 9 - Sharp to MacArthur: North front in full retreat, enemy comes through right flank. Nothing further can be done. May sign off any time now.

May 10 - Col. Jesse T. Traywick and LtCol Haba meet with Sharp at Impasugong. Wainwright to Sharp: "There must be on your part no thought of disregarding these instructions [unconditional surrender]. Failure to fully and honestly carry them out can have only the most disastrous results."



May 10 - Sharp to commanders southern islands: My release order hereby rescinded. Cease operations, stack arms, raise white flag. Orders "imperative and must be carried out in order to save further bloodshed."

May 10 - Sharp to MacArthur: Decision to surrender VMF unconditionally is final.

The full text of these messages is found in VMF, Historical Report, pp. 88-114. Also see Morton, Fall of the Philippines, pp. 519, 576-577; Whitney, MacArthur: Rendezvous, pp. 57-58; Teodoro A. Agoncillo, The Fateful Years: Japan's Adventure in the Philippines, 1941-1945, 1965, pp. 742-743; Hagge, Guerrilla Padre, p. 20.

<sup>16</sup>Under the Act, all male citizens were obligated for military service. The United States itself did not yet have legislation providing for the draft in America.

<sup>17</sup>USAFFE (United States Army Forces in the Far East) and USFIP (United States Forces in the Philippines) are both used throughout this paper. Their chronology is as follows:


December 8, 1941 to March 21, 1942: USAFFE

March 22, 1942 to May 6, 1942: USFIP

February 26, 1943 to June 10, 1945: USAFFE

June 7, 1945 to August 15, 1945: AFWESPAC

Or, roughly, USAFFE prior to MacArthur's departure, USFIP after MacArthur's departure. The dates after May 6, 1942 are confusing, and the USAFFE command over guerrilla units was very fuzzy. USAFFE command and staff line charts show no military districts, and the Army order of battle does not list districts. The USAFFE chart shows USFIP February 26, 1943 to an undetermined date along with other commands. The Philippine Army is listed as a special staff section November 27, 1944 to April 20, 1945. The military districts fell under the G-2 (Intelligence Section):



\*FEAF, USASO, AFWESPAC, USAF NORSOLS, MP Cmd, USAFFE

At the time of the American invasion of Mindanao, the 10th Military District was OPCON to 8th Army and was so reflected on some organizational charts. Taken from: Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Military

History, Order of Battle of the United States Army Ground Forces in World War II: Pacific Theater of Operations, 1959, pp. 40, 41 especially.

18 The strength of the Philippine Army (PA), (which included the Philippine Constabulary, Philippine Air Corps and Offshore Patrol) was approximately 120,000 officers and enlisted (76,750 on Luzon and 43,250 on the southern islands). General MacArthur as a Field Marshall of the Philippine Commonwealth commanded the Philippine Army. As USAFFE commander, he commanded U.S. Army and Philippine Army units as well as the Philippine Scouts (PS). Of the 13 PA divisions formed in 1941-1942, nine were commanded by American Army officers and only four by Filipinos. The United States exercised effective command down to battalion level with U.S. Army advisors assigned to the Philippine Army units. See also Ross, "Status of Members," and Letter, Department of the Army, Chief Histories Division, to Judge Advocate General, Department of the Army, of June 20, 1973, over Mr. Smith/J.d./30861, Subject: "Status of Members of Philippine Military Forces during World War II," (hereinafter OCMH, June 20 letter).

19 Wendell W. Fertig, "Guerrillero," Part I, no date, p. 1. See also Haggerty, Guerrilla Padre, pp. 23-24.

20 General Headquarters, Far East Command, Japanese Monograph, No. 1, p. 13.

21 VMF, Historical Report, pp. 14-15; James Dean Sanderson, Behind Enemy Lines, 1959, p. 162; OCMH, June 20 letter; Ward Rutherford, Fall of the Philippines, 1971.

22 Common sense did not necessarily prevail in the field training either. Platoons would set up their shelters in defensive positions between their firing positions and the likely enemy avenues of approach within the area cleared for fields of fire. Or an entire platoon would man a company observation post - and compound the error by all sleeping at once with no watch posted. VMF, Historical Report, pp. 19, 168; See also Carlos P. Romulo, I Saw the Fall of the Philippines, 1942, p. 304; Morton, Fall of the Philippines, p. 508.

23 Robert Ross Smith, "The Hukbalahap Insurgency: Economic, Political, and Military Factors," 1963, p. 31.

24 James, Years of MacArthur, Volume I, pp. 508-609; VMF, Historical Report, p. 20.

25 Term for "mosquito net." The Mosquito bar was not a luxury on Mindanao but a necessary piece of survival equipment.

26 That the Filipinos did not have the M-1 was no surprise, of course. At the outbreak of World War II the U.S. Congress had still not authorized their production in any quantity for United States forces which were soon to be in combat with the Germans and Japanese.

<sup>27</sup>VMF, Historical Report, pp. 18-19, 26; Ross, "Status of Members," pp. 8-9.

<sup>28</sup>VMF, Historical Report, pp. 49, 71, 173, 540.

<sup>29</sup>William Wise, Secret Mission to the Philippines: The Story of "Spyron" and the American-Filipino Guerrillas of World War II, pp. 71-73.

<sup>30</sup>Baclagon, Philippine Campaigns, p. 281.

<sup>31</sup>HQ, Philippines Command, "Recognition Program" p. 40.

<sup>32</sup>Steve Mellnik, Philippine Diary 1939-1945, 1969, p. 281. This was true throughout the Islands and was especially problematical in determining who had survived Bataan and Corregidor.

<sup>33</sup>Elmer Lear, The Japanese Occupation of the Philippines, Leyte, 1941-1945, June 1961, p. 57 f.n. Colonel Ruperto Kangleon, Commander of the 9th Military District on Leyte, was also with the 81st Infantry. He was later freed and joined the guerrillas on Leyte, his home.

<sup>34</sup>Dissette in his account puts the USAFFE strength on Mindanao at 30,000 before the surrender. Edward Dissette and H. C. Adamson, Guerrilla Submarines, 1972, p. 36. The account given by General Sharp was written from accounts submitted to him by his officers while they were in captivity. The official records of the Visayan-Mindanao Force were lost during the surrender. Because of the fluid nature of events during the December 1941 to May 1942 period, truly accurate records were not possible in any case. The 30,000 to 36,000 figure is probably the best available, although Haggerty's version would appear to carry the weight of first-hand knowledge. Haggerty, Guerrilla Padre, pp. 15, 23.

<sup>35</sup>Headquarters, Army Forces Western Pacific, Triumph in the Philippines 1941-1946, Volume III Enemy Occupation, Japanese, no date, pp. 25-26. Camp Casing was designed to house 10,000 troops. Most of the USAFFE troops were later transferred to Davao Penal Colony. One-half of the Americans were sent to labor camps in Japan. By October 1942 the American population in Davao Penal Colony was approximately 2,000 prisoners. This number of Americans reflects the large number of prisoners transferred from prison camps on Luzon to Davao. Melvyn McCoy and S. M. Mellnik, Ten Escape from Tojo, 1944, p. 75.

<sup>36</sup>Haggerty, Guerrilla Padre, p. 23.

<sup>37</sup>Letter LtCol W. W. Fertig (CO, 10th MD, USFIP) to Gen. Hugh J. Casey, APO 500, San Francisco (GHQ, SWPA) of July 1, 1943, (hereinafter Ltr Fertig to Casey). Fertig put the enlisted men at 90 "who were abandoned by the Navy and Air Corps when the officers left [he is speaking of their reassignment off the island before the surrender]. These boys have attempted to fit in and help as much as possible." Many lacked any combat training or command experience, and Fertig alluded to "serious psychiatric cases" which had developed among some. Ibid.

38 The principal USAFFE units on Mindanao at the time of the surrender were all Philippine Army units (except where noted):  
 HQ, Visayan-Mindanao Force  
 81st Division (-)  
 101st Division  
 102d Division  
 62d Infantry Regiment  
 81st Infantry Regiment  
 93rd Infantry Regiment  
 61st Field Artillery Regiment  
 102d Engineer Battalion  
 203d Engineer Battalion  
 (600 Air Corps personnel from Corregidor - used as infantry)  
 Taken from VMF, Historical Report, pp. 29-32.

39 MacArthur, Reminiscences, p. 202.

40 Whitney, MacArthur: Rendezvous, p. 128.

41 See Ibid., p. 128; MacArthur, Reminiscences, pp. 202-203; Rafael Steinberg, Return to the Philippines, p. 22.

42 Virgil Ney, Notes on Guerrilla Warfare: Principles and Practices, 1961, p. 83; and Virgil Ney, "Guerrilla Warfare and Propaganda," March 1968 which contains a chapter on the Philippine resistance movement in World War II.

43 Bacalagon, Philippine Campaigns, p. 224. General Fort was executed by the Japanese on November 11, 1942. Fort had the distinction of being the American officer with the longest continuous service in the Philippine Constabulary. Lieutenant Colonel Tanaka, the officer who ordered Fort's execution, was himself hanged at Sugano Prison on April 9, 1949 for his war crimes. Harold Hanne Elarth, The Story of the Philippine Constabulary, 1949, p. 154. Colonel Fertig later claimed that "the best disciplined" of the American and Filipino officers surrendered. Ltr Fertig to Casey.

44 The classification of the legal status of those who did not surrender later by MacArthur was a great boost to the guerrilla recruiting effort, for the soldiers could now join the guerrillas knowing that they had not been declared deserters. Ira Wolfert, American Guerrilla in the Philippines, 1945, p. 142.

45 Dissette, Guerrilla Submarines, p. 74.

46 Keats, They Fought Alone, p. 10.

47 Ibid., pp. 163-164. The attitude of many of the Americans who refused to surrender was thinly disguised. For example, Colonel Volckmann's guerrillas on North Luzon had a motto which was emblazoned on a patch they wore. It trumpeted "We Remained," a guerrilla response presumably to MacArthur's "I Shall Return." See frontispiece of R. W. Volckmann, We Remained: Three Years Behind the Enemy Lines in the Philippines, 1954.

- 48 Haggerty, Guerrilla Padre, pp. 15-17.
- 49 Keats, They Fought Alone, p. 167.
- 50 The Deisher-Couch Papers, no date.
- 51 Keats, They Fought Alone, p. 77.
- 52 Allison Ind, Allied Intelligence Bureau: Our Secret Weapon in the War Against Japan, 1958, p. 171 (hereinafter Ind, AIB).
- 53 Hal Richardson, One-Man War: The Jock McLaren Story, 1957, p. 132.
- 54 F. O. Miksche, Secret Forces: The Technique of Underground Movements, 1950, p. 14.
- 55 HQ, Philippines Command, "Recognition Program," p. 40.
- 56 Haggerty, Guerrilla Padre, p. 34; Keats, They Fought Alone, p. 74.
- 57 Wolfert, American Guerrilla, p. 87.
- 58 Ibid.
- 59 Quote from Steinberg, Return to the Philippines, p. 18; See also David Joel Steinberg, Philippine Collaboration in World War II, 1967, pp. 93-94.
- 60 Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Reports of General MacArthur: The Campaigns of MacArthur in the Pacific, Volume I, 1966, pp. 298, 302 (hereinafter SCAP, Reports I); see also Agoncillo, Fateful Years, p. 761.
- 61 Ney, Notes, p. 99.
- 62 Miksche, Secret Forces, p. 158.
- 63 Theodore Friend, Between Two Empires: The Ordeal of the Philippines 1929-1946, 1965, p. 252.
- 64 Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Military History, "The Philippine Guerrilla Resistance Movement," in "The Philippine Campaign, 1944-1945," Supplement B, no date, p. 228, (hereinafter OCMH, "Resistance Movement").
- 65 David Bernstein, The Philippine Story, 1947, p. 248; Manuel Roxas, who claimed to be an underground guerrilla leader was a member of the puppet government when it declared war on the United States. Many observers of Philippine politics believed that had the Japanese won the war, Roxas would have been installed as president. The Americans won, and he was made president in any case. As late as 1969 collaboration was still an issue in Philippine politics. Marcos' opponent in 1969 was tainted by accusations of collaborating with the Japanese in World War II. See Nena Vreeland and others, Area Handbook for the Philippines, 1976, p. 66.

<sup>66</sup>"Reminiscences of Rear Admiral Arthur H. McCollum," U.S. Navy (Retired), Tape 13, p. 598.

<sup>67</sup>Keats, They Fought Alone, p. 124.

<sup>68</sup>Robert Smith Ross, "The Hukbalahap Insurgency: Economic, Political, and Military Factors," 1963, p. 40.

<sup>69</sup>CO, 106th Div. to Datu Sinsuat, Senior, letter of December 1, 1943, in "Correspondence Re: Guerrilla Activities 10th Military District," August 4, 1942 - September 11, 1944 (hereinafter 10 MD Correspondence File).

<sup>70</sup>Captain Gumbay Piang to LtCol F. D. McGee of December 15, 1943 in 10 MD Correspondence File.

<sup>71</sup>Lear, Leyte, 1941-1945, p. xiii.

<sup>72</sup>Keats, They Fought Alone, p. 418.

<sup>73</sup>HQ, Philippines Command, "Recognition Program," pp. 84-85.

<sup>74</sup>The Hukbalahaps are mentioned occasionally in this paper. Many references to the Philippine resistance movement allude only to the Huks, and the reader is misled into believing that only the Huks fought the Japanese. Arthur Campbell's Guerrillas: A History and Analysis is an example of this type of account. The majority of Huks were on Luzon with a few on Negros and Panay. By 1950 Mindanao was the home of a large number of Huks because of a government relocation program. Philippine government counter-guerrilla operations in Mindanao are described in recent literature, for the Huk insurgency continues in 1982 in the Philippines.

<sup>75</sup>Dissette, Guerrilla Submarines, p. 29.

<sup>76</sup>Charles A. Willoughby and John Chamberlain, MacArthur 1941-1951, 1954, p. 215.

<sup>77</sup>For descriptions of Fertig see: Robert L. Eichelberger, Our Jungle Road to Tokyo, 1950, p. 217; Mellnik, Philippine Diary, pp. 262-265; Haggerty, Guerrilla Padre, pp. 11, 76; Jack Hawkins, Never Say Die, 1961, p. 186; Keats, They Fought Alone, throughout.

<sup>78</sup>The accounts and quotations detailing the events of Fertig's activities during the July 1941 - September 1942 period are taken from these sources: Keats, They Fought Alone, especially pp. 76, 81, 104-105; Ltr Fertig to Casey; Wendell W. Fertig, "Notes Written from Memory in August 1942 on the Mindanao Invasion," no date, pp. 14-19; Wendell W. Fertig, "Guerrillero," Part I, no date, especially pp. 1-7, 15, 53, 94-95; Haggerty, Guerrilla Padre, p. 12; Beck, MacArthur and Wainwright, p. 269 f.n. No. 67. Most accounts of these months gloss over the details and cast Fertig's activities in somewhat heroic proportions. One of MacArthur's official histories tells us, for example, that Fertig "had fought on Bataan

and then, upon its surrender, escaped to Mindanao to serve with General Sharp...When Mindanao, in turn, fell to the Japanese, Colonel Fertig took a group of officers and men into the hills to form the nucleus of a responsible guerrilla resistance movement." Quoted from SCAP, Reports, I, p. 308. It did not happen in quite this way, of course.

<sup>79</sup>Ney, Notes, p. 99.

<sup>80</sup>Keats, They Fought Alone, pp. 83-84.

<sup>81</sup>Ibid., pp. 84-85, 96-97.

<sup>82</sup>Ibid., pp. 84-85; HQ, Philippines Command, "Recognition Program," p. 41; Bacalagon, Philippine Campaigns, p. 293.

<sup>83</sup>Quoted in Bacalagon, Philippine Campaigns, p. 281; See also HQ, Philippines Command, "Recognition Program," p. 41; and OCMH, "Resistance Movement," p. 216.

<sup>84</sup>Keats, They Fought Alone, pp. 96-97. The give and take in the negotiations between Morgan and Fertig fills an entire chapter entitled "Morgan" in Keats' book, pp. 249-298. Details on this stand-off are interesting, but would be a paper in themselves. Colonel Robert V. Bowler corroborates the idea that Morgan and Fertig used each other in Headquarters, "A" Corps Western Mindanao, USFIP, Tenth Military District, History of the "A" Corps Western Mindanao Tenth Military District, 1945, p. 369.

<sup>85</sup>Ltr Fertig to Casey.

<sup>86</sup>Keats, They Fought Alone, p. 195.

<sup>87</sup>Ibid., p. 187.

<sup>88</sup>Hawkins, Never Say Die, p. 163.

<sup>89</sup>James, Years of MacArthur, Vol. II, p. 508.

<sup>90</sup>Keats, They Fought Alone, p. 390. General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area, Allied Translator and Interpreter Section, "Guerrilla Warfare in the Philippines," Enemy Publications, No. 359 (Part I), pp. 5-6, (hereinafter ATIS Part I or II).

<sup>91</sup>Keats, They Fought Alone, p. 103.

<sup>92</sup>The following sources discuss this phase of the Fertig-Morgan confrontation. Ibid., Chapter 5; HQ, Philippines Command, "Recognition Program," p. 45; Hagerty, Guerrilla Padre, pp. 58, 93-94; Dissette, Guerrilla Submarines, pp. 67, 78; Agoncillo, Fateful Years, p. 746; Bacalagon, Philippine Campaigns, pp. 282, 284-285.

<sup>93</sup>By Fertig's own estimate. Keat's They Fought Alone, p. 108.

<sup>94</sup>Haggerty, Guerrilla Padre, p. 54.

<sup>95</sup>Keats, They Fought Alone, pp. 6-7, 124-125, 163, 418-419; Ind, AIB, p. 212; Haggerty, Guerrilla Padre, p. 54; U.S. Navy, Citation for Legion of Merit, ICO Commander Samuel Joseph Wilson, USNR, April 12, 1947.

<sup>96</sup>Keats, They Fought Alone, p. 134.

<sup>97</sup>Travis Ingham, Rendezvous By Submarine: The Story of Charles Parsons and the Guerrilla-Soldiers in the Philippines, 1945, pp. 108-109. As a side note, the average Filipino was small in physical stature, standing between 5'2" and 5'6" tall and weighing 110 to 120 pounds.

<sup>98</sup>Keats, They Fought Alone, pp. 133-137, 140-142.

<sup>99</sup>Baclagon, Philippine Campaigns, p. 282. Wolfert, American Guerrilla, p. 128. Fertig's goals were very similar to that of the guerrilla chiefs on the other islands. See Lear, Leyte, 1941-1945, p. 79.

<sup>100</sup>SCAP, Reports, I, p. 298; Mellnik, Philippine Diary, p. 251; Smith, "Status of Members," pp. 48-49.

<sup>101</sup>Hawkins, Never Say Die, p. 134; Ingham, Rendezvous, p. 167.

<sup>102</sup>Baclagon, Philippine Campaigns, p. 282; Ltr Fertig to Casey; HQ, Philippines Command, "Recognition Program," p. 41.

<sup>103</sup>SCAP, Reports, I, p. 309, f.n.

<sup>104</sup>Keats, They Fought Alone, pp. 161-162, 169. These commissions granted by Fertig to enlisted personnel caused a curious response from GHQ, SWPA. Asked by Fertig to guarantee that the commissions would remain effective at war's end, Colonel Courtney Whitney replied that once these men left the island they would be reverted to enlisted grade. Whitney apparently saw this policy as stemming a mass exodus from Mindanao before war's end of these young officers by submarine to Australia. In what has to be a classic "higher headquarters" assessment of the situation, Whitney wrote: "such knowledge had done much to bolster morale in Fertig's area, and create a desire to remain there for the duration." Keats, They Fought Alone, p. 347. MacArthur, to his credit, overruled Whitney.

<sup>105</sup>Ibid., p. 319. All of this seems pretty tame when compared to a proposal being considered in the United States by President Roosevelt, Secretary of the Interior Harold L. Ickes and the War Department to send Associate Justice Frank Murphy of the U.S. Supreme Court to assist the guerrillas in Mindanao. Murphy had been Philippine High Commissioner in the 1930's and was close to exiled President Sergio Osmeña. MacArthur replied to the War Department that Murphy's life would be in jeopardy not only from the Japanese "but by the guerrilla elements." Apparently, both Murphy and Osmeña had opposed MacArthur's pre-war defense program and had even succeeded in getting defense funds cut. James, Years of MacArthur, Vol. II, p. 516.



106 VMF, Historical Report, p. 17.

107 Baclagon, Philippine Campaigns, pp. 295-296.

108 The assessments quoted are from (in order): Ibid., p. 303; Ney, Notes, p. 100; SCAP, Reports, I, p. 308.

109 For example, see U.S. Marine Corps, Small Wars Manual, 1940, pp. 34, 38.

110 SCAP, Reports, I, p. 308; Keats, They Fought Alone, p. 91.

111 Mindanao was the fourth station in the Philippines to make contact with KFS, the Signal Intelligence Division station of the Western Defense Command. Colonel Peralta on Panay had succeeded on December 12, 1942; the other two were on Luzon in Dagupan and the Cagayan Valley. The KAZ-KFS net expanded to over 150 stations sending 50 messages daily. KFS often had to serve as a relay station between Australia and the Philippines because of peculiarities of atmospherics and equipment. Unknown to Fertig, there was another transmitter and receiver on Mindanao in guerrilla hands which was powerful enough to reach Australia. It had belonged to the Anakan Lumber Company, and Hawkins and Baclagon record that McLish made contact with Australia before Fertig did. Dissette claims that Fertig got his first radio from the island of Bohol. So it was all very confusing, and Fertig's frustrated, cynical first acknowledgement to GHQ, SWPA (KAZ) was: "Urgently request via first available transportation necessary drugs to treat venereal disease recently contracted by key personnel XXX Fertig." For story on the first radio contact see: Keats, They Fought Alone, pp. 153, 171-175, 186, 188; Western Defense Command, The History of the Western Defense Command, 17 March 1941 - 30 September 1945, Volume III, no date, p. 16; Steinberg, Return to the Philippines, p. 24; Wolfert, American Guerrilla, pp. 134-135; Eichelberger, Jungle Road, p. 218; Dissette, Guerrilla Submarines, p. 33; Baclagon, Philippine Campaigns, p. 296; Hawkins, Never Say Die, pp. 150-151; Whitney, MacArthur: Rendezvous, p. 131; HQ, Philippines Command, "Recognition Program", p. 94.

112 MacArthur, Reminiscences, p. 204.

113 Haggerty, Guerrilla Padre, p. 77.

114 Steinberg, Return to the Philippines, p. 24.

115 SCAP, Reports, I, p. 302 states that Fertig and Peralta were given "temporary command" of the 7-9 Military Districts. The actual text of the message does not bear this out, however.

116 HQ, Philippines Command, "Recognition Program", p. 81 and Appendix 10, contains the complete text of the February 13, 1943 message. It should be noted that guerrilla divisions were numbered according to military district, e.g. 71st, 72d, and 73d divisions were in the 7th District. The same was true for regiments. See also U.S. Army, Headquarters, Eighth Army, Report of the Commanding General, Eighth Army, on the Mindanao Operation, Victor V, no date, p. 44.

117 Quotations are from: HQ, Philippines Command, "Recognition Program," pp. 38-39, 43.

118 HQ, "A Corps," History, pp. 9-10.

119 Keats, They Fought Alone, p. 199.

120 Dissette, Guerrilla Submarines, p. 36.

121 Ltr, Fertig to Casey.

122 Keats, They Fought Alone, pp. 184-185.

123 HQ, Philippine Command, "Recognition Program," pp. 94-95.

124 Jose Demandante Doromal, The War in Panay: A Documentary History of the Resistance Movement in Panay During World War II, 1952, p. 41.

125 Jay Luvaas, ed., Dear Miss Em: General Eichelberger's War in the Pacific, 1941-1945, 1972, from a February 28, 1945 diary entry.

126 Western Defense Command, History, p. 8; HQ, Philippines Command, "Recognition Program," pp. 49-50.

127 Quote from Uldarico S. Bacalagon, They Chose to Fight: The Story of the Resistance Movement in Negros and Siquijor Islands, 1962, p. 62. Also see pages 19, 26, 31, 34, 55-56, 59-62.

128 HQ, Philippines Command, "Recognition Program," pp. 44, 55-56; Wolfert, American Guerrilla, p. 136; Lear, Leyte, 1941-1945, p. 44.

129 Doromal, War in Panay, pp. 67-68.

130 ATIS, Part I, pp. 4-5.

131 Dissette, Guerrilla Submarines, p. 31; Smith, "The Hukbalahap Insurgency," p. 43. GHQ on February 13, 1943 established a standard format and priority for reporting information. The guerrilla leaders, especially Peralta, had a tendency to send copious, flowery intelligence reports. The priority was established as follows: enemy strength and dispositions; occupied seaports, cities, towns, villages, enemy unit identifications, captured documents; operational airfields, type of aircraft, facilities; location of antiaircraft defenses; enemy troop movements; treatment of civilians; naval dispositions; civil administration. See Doromal, War in Panay, pp. 44-45.

132 For discussion see Whitney, MacArthur: Rendezvous, p. 133; Smith, "The Hukbalahap Insurgency," pp. 44-45; Department of the Army, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, "Counter Insurgency Operations: A Handbook for the Suppression of Communist Guerrilla/Terrorist Operations," 1960, p. 80.

133. Haggerty, Guerrilla Padre, pp. 97-98. Ten prisoners did escape from Davao Penal Colony and were assisted by the Mindanao guerrillas after their escape. The account of their escape has been the subject of several books which are annotated in the bibliography.

134. Keats, They Fought Alone, pp. 199, 307. The Japanese had devined MacArthur's "lie low" policy and believed that their punitive expeditions had made the guerrillas less active. They saw the guerrillas as planning for a general uprising on the return of U.S. forces, conserving their forces and building strength, directing efforts towards reconnaissance, and destruction of the lines of communication. In addition, the Japanese had captured intelligence reports prepared by guerrillas for GHQ, and thus knew the information GHQ was interested in, and in what priority. ATIS, Part I, pp. 3, 19.

135. Ltr Fertig to Casey.

136. Wise, Secret Mission, p. 76.

137. Quotation from Wolfert, American Guerrilla, p. 136. See also Wise, Secret Mission, pp. 86-89, 111-112; Ingham, Rendezvous, p. 61; Steinberg, Return to the Philippines, p. 27; Haggerty, Guerrilla Padre, pp. 97-98.

138. Ltr LtCol R. V. Bowler, CO 109th Div to LtCol F. D. McGee of October 5, 1943 in 10 MD Correspondence File.

139. Keats, They Fought Alone, p. 174.

140. The following assessment of Salipada Pendatun's character and effectiveness is taken from these sources: Haggerty, Guerrilla Padre, pp. 86-87, 109, 147; Ltr Fertig to Casey; Keats, They Fought Alone, pp. 124-125, 174; Wise, Secret Mission, p. 87; Bacalagon, Philippine Campaigns, p. 288; Ind, A18, p. 173; John Toland, But Not in Shame: The Six Months After Pearl Harbor, 1961, p. 400.

141. Wise, Secret Mission, p. 104; Ingham, Rendezvous, pp. 84-86.

142. Ltr Colonel Fertig to Maj Frank D. McGee re: Cotabato - Bukidnon of June 1, 1943 in 10 MD Correspondence File.

143. Dissette, Guerrilla Submarines, p. 37. See also Haggerty, Guerrilla Padre, p. 153; Ingham, Rendezvous, p. 81; Keats, They Fought Alone, p. 306; Wise, Secret Mission, p. 105.

144. Haggerty, Guerrilla Padre, p. 131; Keats, They Fought Alone, pp. 306-307; 644 f.n. Robert Ross Smith, Triumph in the Philippines, 1963, p. 637 f.n.

145. Ltr Colonel Fertig to Major Frnilan Matas of October 28, 1943 in 10 MD Correspondence File.

<sup>146</sup>Office of Strategic Services, "Philippine Interview Summary: Misamis, Misamis Occidental Province, Mindanao Island," 1943, p. 13. The fort was of no use against artillery according to the OSS report. The report was filed, ironically, just days after a Japanese landing force drove Fertig and his troops from the town. Taken from interviews with seven people who had lived in Misamis, the report said: "Few Americans have lived in Misamis."

<sup>147</sup>Misamis City is described in: Haggerty, Guerrilla Padre, pp. 59, 73, 107-108; Lear, Leyte, 1941-1945, p. 141; Mellnik, Philippine Diary, pp. 258, 262, 267-268; Ltr Fertig to Casey; Wolfert, American Guerrilla, pp. 172-173; Keats, They Fought Alone, especially pp. 113-114; the American family on Negros is described in James and Ethel Chapman, Escape to the Hills, 147. On current maps, Misamis City no longer exists. The name for the town today is Ozamis, presumably named after the Ozamis family.

<sup>148</sup>Haggerty, Guerrilla Padre, p. 73; Keats, They Fought Alone, pp. 128-129; Western Defense Command, History, p. 16; Ingham, Rendezvous, pp. 58, 122; Bacalagon, Philippine Campaigns, p. 284; OCMH, "Resistance Movement," p. 217.

<sup>149</sup>Mellnik, Philippine Diary, pp. 267-268.

<sup>150</sup>Keats, They Fought Alone, pp. 107, 115, 134-135, 290. See also OCMH, "Resistance Movement," p. 217. Fertig's bureaucratic bent was not so unusual for a guerrilla movement. General Alberto Bayo, Fidel Castro's mentor, states that one of the first things a new guerrilla recruit must do is to "fill out a detailed questionnaire." The guerrilla units maintain "service records" on each guerrilla, and under "skills that a perfect guerrilla fighter should have" General Bayo lists "typewrite." From Alberto Bayo, 150 Questions for a Guerrilla, 1963, pp. 19, 35, 67.

<sup>151</sup>Wolfert, American Guerrilla, p. 133; Keats, They Fought Alone, p. 235; Steinberg, Return to the Philippines, p. 28.

<sup>152</sup>Quote is from General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area, "Civil Administration and Relief of the Philippines," Standing Operating Procedure Instructions Number 27, November 15, 1944, p. 8. See also Bacalagon, Philippine Campaigns, pp. 284, 288-290; OCMH, "Resistance Movement," p. 217; Agoncillo, Fateful Years, pp. 746-747.

<sup>153</sup>Ltr Fertig to Casey.

<sup>154</sup>Sanderson, Behind Enemy Lines, p. 170; Wolfert, American Guerrilla, pp. 125, 128.

<sup>155</sup>Agoncillo, Fateful Years, pp. 746-747; Ingham, Rendezvous, p. 171; OCMH, "Resistance Movement," p. 217; Keats, They Fought Alone, pp. 203, 210; Mellnik, Philippine Diary, pp. 248-249; HQ, Philippines Command, "Recognition Program," p. 134.

<sup>156</sup>Bacalagon, Philippine Campaigns, pp. 289-290.

<sup>157</sup>Keats, They Fought Alone, pp. 152, 205; Hawkins, Never Say Die, pp. 168-169; Agoncillo, Fateful Years, pp. 746-747; SCAP, Reports, I, p. 309.

<sup>158</sup>Ingham, Rendezvous, p. 169; Smith, "Status of Members," pp. 40-41; HQ, Philippines Command, "Recognition Program" p. 98. See especially Appendix 13; Friend, Between Two Empires, p. 255; Keats, They Fought Alone, p. 413. The benefits available to the guerrillas after the war through the U.S. Veterans Administration are contained in Dormal, War in Panay, pp. 276-178.

<sup>159</sup>SCAP, Reports, I, p. 304.

<sup>160</sup>The Reminiscences of Captain Stephen Jurika, Jr., U.S. Navy (Retired), Volume II, no date, p. 9; and Headquarters, Army Forces Far East, "Philippines Air Operations Record: Phase One," Japanese Monograph No. 11, 1952.

<sup>161</sup>Ind, AIB, p. 175. The Japanese order of battle for the 10th Military District also carried Fertig as a Brigadier General at times. See Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Reports of General MacArthur: Japanese Operations in the Southwest Pacific Area, 1966, p. 311. The Japanese intelligence on the guerrillas is sometimes difficult to follow because the ATIS translations use a Japanese pronunciation for the English translation of the names. As a best guess guide, the 10th Military District looked like this:

Fertig "Fertig"  
Hedges "Hejisu"  
Mortera "Moratera"  
Grinstead "Guresuten" or "Guresutetto"  
Childress "Chiudoresu"  
Page "Peji"  
McGee "Maggi"  
Bowler "Borrer"  
McLish "Makurissu"  
Lecouvre "Rapuraru"

See for example ATIS, Part II, p. 36.

<sup>162</sup>Keats does not show a source for this information, but taken in context with other known facts, it would appear to be accurate enough. See Keats, They Fought Alone, pp. 119-121, 127-128, 224-225, 308.

<sup>163</sup>Ibid., pp. 213, 231.

<sup>164</sup>Ltr, Fertig to Casey.

<sup>165</sup>See Ingham, Rendezvous.

<sup>166</sup>Dissette, Guerrilla Submarines, p. 66.

167 Haggerty, Guerrilla Padre, p. 129. See Also Keats, They Fought Alone, pp. 224-225, 258-259; Wise, Secret Mission, pp. 113-114; HQ, Philippines Command, "Recognition Program," p. 45. The coastal population had "bucweed," something they would be forced to do often. The term was to become slang usage for Americans. The Filipinos pronounced the English word "evacuate" as "e-bac-whit" which soon became "buckwheat" and finally "bucweed." The word in Visayan was "balikuate."

168 Keats, They Fought Alone, pp. 240-241.

169 See Ibid., pp. 225, 256-257, 281-282, 302-304; Haggerty, Guerrilla Padre, p. 119.

170 Haggerty, Guerrilla Padre, p. 159; Bacalagon, Philippine Campaigns, pp. 284, 290-291; HQ, "A" Corps, History, entire.

171 Ind, AIB, p. 207; Haggerty, Guerrilla Padre, p. 169.

172 For general discussion see Marco J. Caraccia, "Guerrilla Logistics," U.S. Army War College Student Thesis, 1966, p. 43. For comparison, the malaria rate for U.S. soldiers in SWPA ran as high as 361 per 1000. William F. McCartney, The Jungleers: A History of the 41st Infantry Division, 1948, p. 154. For general discussion on the medical problems on Mindanao see: Haggerty, Guerrilla Padre, pp. 65, 153, 232; Ltr Fertig to Casey; Hawkins. Never Say Die, pp. 147, 167-168; General Headquarters, Allied Translator and Interpreter Section, "69 Brigade Combat Report on Philippines Operation," Enemy Publications No. 289, January 19, 1945; Richardson, One-Man War contains the story on Jock McLaren; Ind, AIB, p. 169; Ingham, Rendezvous, pp. 138-139; Luvaas, Dear Miss Em, p. 261; VMF, Historical Report.

173 Quote from Haggerty, Guerrilla Padre, p. 212; see also pages 204-205, 207.

174 ATIS, Part I, p. 23.

175 Bacalagon, Philippine Campaigns, pp. 285-286; Haggerty, Guerrilla Padre, p. 118; HQ, "A" Corps, History, p. 12.

176 ATIS, Part II, p. 40.

177 Ind, AIB, pp. 212-215.

178 ATIS, Part II, p. 3, 8. The Japanese used names to specify units conducting operations in a specific area. Among the various groups conducting operations on Mindanao were the Kyo Group (also known as the Harada group) and the Hyo, Hagi, Kan and Heidan groups. See ATIS, Parts I, II.

179 Smith, Triumph in the Philippines, p. 643 f.n. Waloe was named after Colonel Ole C. Waloe, USA, who fought in the Moro Pacification Campaigns. Waloe later became a cattle rancher near Malabang, Bukidnon and finally returned to the United States in 1931 and became the President of the Philippine Constabulary Association. Elarth, Philippine Constabulary, p. 182.

180 Keats, They Fought Alone, pp. 362-363, 387.

181 The Agusan River Valley was described as being the "home of 40,000 tree dwelling headhunters; thousands of man-eating crocodiles, tropical diseases; insects and not a place for a white man to even attempt to live." Quote from a book by Martin Johnson in Thirty-first Infantry Division, History of the 31st Infantry Division in Training and Combat, 1940-1945, 1946, p. 70.

182 Keats, They Fought Alone, pp. 316-317, 367-368.

183 One aircraft bombed Davao City each night 6-10 August. 22 attacks were made August 6-22, with 32 planes dropping 41 bombs. On September 1, 1944 Liberators and Lightnings dropped 130 tons of explosives on Davao, and on September 8th, B-24's struck Davao. One day later, 245 bombers hit Davao in four separate bombing runs. ATIS, Part II, pp. 39, 48, 51, 55, 67, 69; Keats, They Fought Alone, p. 402; Whitney, MacArthur: Rendezvous, p. 127. Whitney states the first attacks hit Davao September 1, as does Fertig. Japanese accounts would be correct in this case because they include the first exploratory and harassment strikes.

184 Keats, They Fought Alone, p. 389.

185 This figure comes from the Japanese First and Second Demobilization Bureau Reports, "Strength of Japanese Forces in the Philippines 1944-1945" found in SCAP, Reports, I.

186 Ibid., Plate Number 55, p. 192; Mellnik, Philippine Diary, p. 300.

187 General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area, "Basic Plan for Montclair Operations," February 25, 1945, Enclosure 10, Chart 21.

188 Ibid., Enclosure 13, p. 1.

189 SCAP, Reports, I, p. 192.

190 The chronology of the 30th and 100th Divisions can be found in W. Victor Madej, ed., Japanese Armed Forces Order of Battle 1937-1945, Volume I, 1981, pp. 58-59, 101-102, 154. The book also contains a Table of Equipment for each division.

191 HQ, AFWESPAC, Triumph in the Philippines, p. 72; OCMH, "Resistance Movement," p. 218; James, Years of MacArthur, Vol. II, p. 506; SCAP, Reports, I, p. 309.

192 MADEJ, Order of Battle, Vol. I, pp. 9, 10, 15, 19, 21.

193 Samuel Eliot Morison, The Liberation of the Philippines: Luzon, Mindanao, The Visayas, 1944-1945, 1959, p. 240.

194 Dissette, Guerrilla Submarines, pp. 134-136.

## CHAPTER 6

### THE MOROS OF MINDANAO

A separate chapter is presented on the Filipino Mohammedans -- the Moros -- because they were unique to the resistance movement on Mindanao compared to the resistance movements elsewhere. The Moros had it within their ability to shift the balance of power to the Japanese or to cause an entirely different relationship among the antagonists by siding with neither. Sufficient numbers of the Moros actively supported the guerrillas or remained neutral, however, for them to have positively affected the power equation in favor of the guerrillas. To have persuaded them to do so was no small accomplishment for the leaders of the Mindanao guerrillas.

In 1941 when war came to the Philippines the Moros represented only five percent of the population of the entire Commonwealth. On Central Mindanao, however, the Moros represented 20 percent of the population and on the Zamboanga Peninsula the Moros were fully 90 percent of the population. Clearly the Moros, as a group, represented a key segment of the island's population, and their influence was compounded by their naturally war-like bent.<sup>1</sup>

As a distinct cultural group, the Moros constitute perhaps the single most important exception to the cultural homogeneity of the Philippine population. Within the Moro cultural group itself, there are at least 10 distinct groups differing in language and degree of Muslim religious orthodoxy. The four most prominent Moro groups are the Magindanao (or Maguindanao) and the Maranao of the Illara Bay area in the



central and southwestern section of Central Mindanao; the Tausug and the Samal populate the Zamboanga Peninsula and the Sulu Archipelago. Moro Gulf is bordered on all sides by these geographical areas. Lesser tribes include the Ilanon and Sangir of Central Mindanao and the Yakan and Bajau of Zamboanga and Sulu. The Tausug are the most religiously orthodox, and they consider the major groups on Mindanao, the Magindanao and the Maranao, to be "uncouth."<sup>2</sup> These disparate groups, though known for their constant aggression against each other, will nevertheless close ranks when confronted with a threat from outside the Moro community. They feel a special spiritual orientation to the Islamic peoples throughout Southeast Asia, and they fear any group or invader who they perceive intends to deprive them of their religion and way of life. They have a political heritage and organization that predates the Spanish presence in the Philippines, and they are antagonistic and aggressive towards the Cebuanos and Ilokanos of Mindanao for they fear their expansion into Moro areas.<sup>3</sup> The Moros have preached separatism from well before the Spanish occupation of Mindanao, and that separatism carries through to today.<sup>4</sup>

In approximately 100 B.C. the Indonesian pagans, a Malayan-Mongoloid branch of the true Oceanic Malays, conquered the south Philippine islands. The Moro ancestry can be traced from these early conquerors. There was early Hindu influence on Mindanao-Sulu, and Moro legends speak of a visit to Mindanao by Sinbad the Sailor, and the Sulu Moros tell the legend of Alexander the Great holding court on Jolo Island in 320 B.C. Many Moros trace their descent from the great Macedonian prince.<sup>5</sup> The Moslem influence came to Mindanao from Java and antedated the Spanish arrival in the Philippines in the 15th Century. The Spanish friars with their accompanying conquistadores tried unsuccessfully for

four centuries to dislodge the Moro's deep-seated Islamic faith.<sup>6</sup>

At the close of the 19th Century the Americans supplanted the Spanish, but with a fundamentally different policy. The Americans were not particularly interested in converting the Moros from Islam but they were intent upon ending the violence on Mindanao and Sulu perpetrated by the Moros. The Americans employed tactics in their field operations and introduced firepower to the battle that the Moros had never experienced from the Spanish. The test was now between the "Krag and the kris" -- the American Krag rifle and the Moro's curved bladed kris. "The American soldiers themselves were incomprehensible to the Moros, who had been accustomed to the religious solemnity of the Spaniard. The Moros found in the American an antagonist who made a game of war." The Americans would slay Moros on the weekdays and play baseball on Sunday. "What could it profit a man if he shaved his head and his eyebrows and slew these people?"<sup>7</sup> A vicious deadly guerrilla war was to last between the two enemies until 1913 when the military campaign ended. On March 22, 1915 the Sultan of the Moros recognized without reservation the sovereignty of the United States over the Moro people. In return, the U. S. had promised the security for the Moros to practice absolute religious freedom.<sup>8</sup>

Out of the Moro Pacification Campaign had come the .45 calibre pistol as the standard sidearm for the American Army. The .38 calibre pistol, which had been a satisfactory weapon in Cuba, did not pack the wallop necessary to stop a determined fanatical charge by a Moro warrior. The histories of the campaigns against the Moros are filled with stories of the nearly superhuman feats of Moros locked in mortal combat, and it is easy to understand why the Moro was so widely feared and their

ferocity so legendary. No less legendary were the experiences of John J. Pershing who served in Mindanao in three different tours to the Philippines. As a captain he had gone alone and unarmed into the Forbidden Kingdom, the heart of the Moro land near Lake Lanao. No white man had ever entered the Forbidden Kingdom before, under any circumstances. Pershing had been ordered by Brigadier General Davis to "Do everything possible to get in touch with the Moros of central Mindanao and make friends of them."<sup>9</sup> He believed that the only way he could truly demonstrate his good intentions was by putting himself entirely at their mercy. Pershing always carefully avoided the issue of slavery and polygamy, appealed to the Moros' self-interest, founded his policies in honesty and justice and resolutely avoided useless bloodshed. He led the expedition against the Moros at Bud Dajo, the Moro Sacred Mountain, where they made one of their last concerted stands against American arms. The slaughter was one-sided and great, and Pershing was to try later to refuse the Congressional Medal of Honor awarded to him for his role in this action.

In a letter to the Assistant Secretary of War, Pershing's superior described his success in this way (Pershing was by now a general and Governor of the Mindanao District):

He is today the one great American to the Moro minds. They regard him as a supernatural being and the great mass of Malanaos [sic] are now his fast friends. He always treats them just and fairly, never makes a promise which he cannot fulfill and at the same time he has shown them that he can punish wrongdoers swiftly and well.<sup>10</sup>

Pershing was made a Moro datu (tribal chief) in one instance and was asked to be the adopted father of their children by three Moro datus.

These remarks on General Pershing have been included for two reasons. First, Pershing's experience demonstrates that American policies -- and necessarily those who implemented them -- had gained

Moro respect and allegiance. So there was a precedent for good relations between the Moros and the Americans on Mindanao. Secondly, it is extremely doubtful that Filipino leadership alone could have successfully dealt with the Moros. The Americans, who by chance and not design, were the senior leaders of the Mindanao guerrilla organization could act as honest brokers with the Moros on behalf of the Christian Filipinos. The available sources do not record in much detail the dynamics of the relationship between the American and Moro leaders, but it is safe to assume that in Pershing's example we find some clues as to what made the Americans, especially Ferlig, Hedges and McGee, successful. Their task was probably no less difficult than Pershing's.

In 1936 Vic Hurley included a prophetic observation in his book on the Moros of Mindanao. He wrote:

Given arms, the Moro fears no Filipino. Disarmed, he looks to America for the protection she assured him...The Filipino, on the other hand, carries in his mind a memory of the old days of jura-mentado and piracy. He has no assurance that these practices will not be resumed when America leaves the islands.

And he goes on to quote a Moro chieftain: "I will never be able to hold my men in check under the rule of Filipinos. They will take to the hills and never submit. The old days of jungle warfare I saw thirty years ago will return to Mindanao and Sulu."<sup>11</sup> And return it did. Even before the American surrender reconnaissance patrols in the Cotabato sub-sector had reported civilians fleeing in terror from the Moros who were looting and burning their homes.<sup>12</sup> The Moros who served in General Fort's Bofo Battalions appeared to get caught up in the Moro revanche, deserted Fort and dug up the arms and ammunition he had cached to be available for future guerrilla resistance.<sup>13</sup> Hagerty estimated that the number of rifles dug up by the Moros and taken from slain USAFFE and Japanese

soldiers numbered as high as 12,000 to 15,000.<sup>14</sup>

With the surrender of the USAFFE forces and the dissolution of the Constabulary -- whose primary mission on Mindanao had been to contain the Moros -- the slaughter began in earnest. The Moros shot or hacked "every man, woman and child they could find," leaving countless hundreds dead, crippled or limbless. The Lowland Christians plowed their fields with bolos at their belts, formed their own vigilante groups and wiped out entire Moro villages. One of the more infamous Christian leaders, Froilan Matas, a one-time U. S. sailor, led a band which killed 300 men, women and children. Christians buried Moros alive, and Moros returned the favor by burying Christians alive in privies.<sup>15</sup>

The animosity between the Moros and Christians was deeply rooted in Mindanao history, and it was something of a cultural imperative. Moros were greatly feared, and "There never was a Moro who was afraid to die. Death on the field of battle is a privilege and they guard their privileges jealously."<sup>16</sup> The importance of that privilege could be found in the religious rites peculiar to the Islamic Filipinos. The juramentado was an elaborately planned ceremony which had connotations of a jihad, or Holy War. But the Moros were not strictly orthodox Mohammedans, and the juramentado had no foundation in the Koran. In this strangely ceremonial kind of suicide-by-murder, the Moro, after careful preparations of his body and clothing and a blessing from his religious leader, would in a frenzy set upon as many infidels (Christians) as he could before finally being felled himself. This death would bring the Moro warrior a martyr's crown, and he would ascend on a white horse to a land of crystal streams and fruit laden trees. There his passions would be tended to and gratified by dark-eyed houris, and his Moro wives would be restored to

their virgin youth to contend for his attentions. Each Christian that he had killed would be his slave to eternity in this paradise. The Christians killed were borne no particular animosity, for they were victims only by happen-stance. They were tickets to an end for a man who sought death as a blessing.

The amok, a desperate, hysterically mad killing, was a distant cousin to the furied killing of the baresark, the berserker of Scandinavian legend. The difference was that the amok was not a killing in battle but could be a frenzied killing of Christian women and children in the village marketplace. It had no accepted religious connotation.<sup>17</sup>

The Japanese did not concern themselves to a large degree with the feuds between the Moro and Christian villages. But the Japanese themselves fit the definition of infidels, and so they saw fit to curtail the juramentado. The sultans and datus were called together and told that the punishment for juramentado would be death to the children, parents and grandparents of the Moro who killed.<sup>18</sup> The juramentados diminished, but whether it was due to Japanese or American influence is anybody's guess, although it is probably a combination of both.

Not all who were witness to the Moro warriors in action testified to their courage. Colonel Fertig did not think that the Moros relished a "stand-up, face-to-face fight," at least not in the Western concept of combat, but he did believe that once cornered the Moro would "fall somewhat joyously upon his foe, shouting and shrieking, insensible of his wounds."<sup>19</sup> After the American surrender, General Sharp concluded that "this evidence of fear or timidity on the part of the Moro [Moro withdrawal during the initial Japanese invasion] should have been sufficient warning to place no faith in the fighting ability of the Moro, but the

legend persisted..."<sup>20</sup> Father Haggerty found the Moros to be "very cowardly" and that they would fight only from an "overwhelming advantage."<sup>21</sup> And, of course, there is a difference between courage and stupidity, as Pershing himself observed:

No one who is familiar with Moro character is at all surprised at any turn affairs may take. The more foolish and assinine the thing is, the more likely a Moro is to do it. They make a sudden resolve to die and try to get as many people to die with them as they can. If they are given some time to think this over it is often possible to bring them out from under the influence of the spell.

One example of this is a Moro wedding reception where an insult was exchanged, the kris were unsheathed, and minutes later after the melee had ended 40 of the family and guests lay dead.<sup>22</sup> This is what Beth Day is referring to, perhaps, when she talks of the "fight-first -- think-later" Moros.<sup>23</sup>

Colonel Fertig had good information on the Moros, and the counsel that Edward Kuder gave to him before Kuder was evacuated to the United States must have been invaluable.<sup>24</sup> Fertig never had any doubt concerning the motives of the Moros. They had little sense of patriotism as the Americans would have understood it, and they had no loyalty whatsoever to the Philippine Commonwealth. Their loyalties were unpredictable. Some did actually feel loyalty to the United States. Others were ardent collaborators with the Japanese. Most sought separatism as the ultimate goal, and these were tenaciously independent Moros who opposed any outside domination. Once this was understood, Fertig was able to take a practical approach to his dealings with the Moro chieftains. Who offered what benefits; whose currency was more valuable; who pays spies more and which markets for rice were nearer? These questions could be negotiated objectively. The question of most concern to the datus in the long-run,

of course, was would the United States return to the Philippines, and if so, when? As the answer to that question became more and more apparent, the dealings with the Moros did become easier.<sup>25</sup>

Many of the older datus were wiley in the ways of politics with the Americans. A chieftain would produce a bamboo tube and withdraw a personal letter to him signed by "Lieutenant Colonel John J. Pershing" or "General Arthur MacArthur." These letters were something of an anting-anting, a magic charm.<sup>26</sup> That was effective enough when dealing with Americans -- but not so helpful when talking with the Japanese. The old-timers did have influence, though, and the senior American commanders recognized this. Sultan Mohammed Jenail Abir II was the spiritual ruler of the Sulu Moros. A half-century before Abir had fought fiercely against the American soldiers and had surrendered to Captain John J. Pershing. The Sultan kept the American flag flying throughout the Japanese occupation, and for this he was paid a personal visit by Douglas MacArthur.<sup>27</sup>

Fertig was able to extract promises of support or assurances of neutrality from various Moro chieftains by using different stratagems, most tailored to meet the peculiar situation of each datu. He is reported to have made the following threat to them:

We want the Moros on our side, because we have the same cause -- to drive out the invader from our land. Americans have always kept their promises to the Moros, and will continue to do so. You play fair with us, and we will play fair with you; but if you don't, if you attack Christians, loot, wound and slay, we will wipe you out, and if we can't, then blank, blank, blank, the American Marines will come to our aid and wipe you out to the last man!<sup>28</sup>

The datus gave their oaths to Fertig that they would refrain from stealing until the victory over the Japanese was a reality. Any Moro caught breaking the oath would be executed by the Moros themselves, irrespective



of the magnitude of the crime.

One of Fertig's strategies was to place Americans in command of Moro units. The Americans had learned from their early experiments with the Philippine Constabulary that the Moros had a tendency to lionize their leaders, and if a leader possessed the leadership qualities of courage and fairness the Moros would follow him loyally through any hardship. But because the Moros identified closely with their leaders, the leadership had to be stable and leaders not changed often. The Moros would never serve under a Christian Filipino, and Fertig simply did not trust the Moro leaders to carry out his orders without some influence or presence from him there. He remembered too well how General Fort's Moros had deserted him, and he wanted no resurgence of the bloodletting between the Moros and the Christians.<sup>30</sup> Fertig wrote to Frank McGee when Fertig was trying to unify the Cotabato Moros under the guerrilla organization and neutralize Pendatun: "I need, desperately, an American officer to take command of the Cotabato area. This thing cannot be handled well by remote control, as witness the imbroglio with Pendatun."<sup>31</sup> Hedges with his "no nonsense" approach to leadership was given command of the Maranao Militia Force which operated separately for political reasons but was under the operational control of the 108th Division.

Fertig occupied much of his time by hagglng with Moro leaders over agreements for construction of airfields, contracts for the delivery of rice, and negotiations to engage the Japanese, among other things. As an Army surgeon at Camp Vicars had once put it:

A conference with Moros is a matter of hours, not moments. I cannot conceive anything requiring more tact, patience and courage than is requisite to deal properly with the Moros of Mindanao, and to extract the truth from people who pride themselves on their ability to lie and deceive.<sup>32</sup>

Sometimes fortune aided Fertig at the critical moment. When Morgan revolted against Fertig, some of the Moro leaders appeared to be gravitating towards Morgan. This was a clear indication that they would side with the infidel if need be if it were seen to be in their best interest to do so, for Morgan had made his reputation as a Moro killer. In a fortuitous stroke of timing, a recently arrived submarine had delivered among its military and general supplies a copy of the May 31, 1943 Life Magazine. The magazine contained a lengthy article on King Ibn Saud, King of Saudi Arabia. The article was replete with pictures and expressions of friendship by the king for the United States. The impact of all this was not lost on the Moro leaders. The Moros were strongly religious in their own way, and the support for America demonstrated by King Saud to the world quickly sealed the decision for the Moro leaders. One hundred or more Moros on Mindanao had actually made the pilgrimage to Mecca, and the meaning behind the interview with King Saud meant infinitely more than any promise Fertig could make. Fertig radioed GHQ to send as many of the magazines to him as they could.<sup>33</sup>

Among the Moro datus with whom Fertig negotiated support was Busran Kalaw who commanded the Fighting Bolo Battalion. Kalaw was the pre-war mayor of Mumungan in Lanao. "His xenophobia was benign. Kalaw was merely anti everyone who was not a Maranao Moro." He was celebrated for his famous letter to the Japanese commander in Lanao, Major Hiramatsu. Hiramatsu had ordered Kalaw to report to Japanese headquarters. Kalaw wrote back, concluding: "So stop writing and try hiking to attack us so that we will have some more war trophies. Your friend and enemy, Busran Kalaw." Angered, Hiramatsu sent a sizable punitive expedition after Kalaw. It was destroyed to the man, ambushed and trapped in a swamp.<sup>34</sup>

Datus Lacub and Dimalaung of Basak pulled the same stunt with Captain Taka Ichi, commander at Dansalan. They destroyed his force of 125 soldiers.<sup>35</sup>

Fertig secured the loyalty of the legendary bandit lord Datu Pino by paying him 20 centavos and one bullet for each set of Japanese ears Pino brought him. By 1945 he was delivering ears by the jar. Pino swore his loyalty to Fertig, eternal enmity to Morgan, and many matched ears. Until then he had been earning his keep by selling carabao bones to the Japanese represented as the remains of Japanese soldiers so that they could receive a proper burial according to Japanese custom.<sup>36</sup> Sultan sa Ramin was neutral, but he agreed with Fertig that he would sell rice to the Japanese and then tell Fertig when the Japanese trucks would pick up the rice. He got paid, the Japanese got their rice, and the guerrillas got both the Japanese and the rice.<sup>37</sup>

Not all Moros supported the guerrillas or were neutral, of course. Datus Pain and Sinsuat Balabaran openly supported the Japanese. Many played both ends against the middle.<sup>38</sup> Many of the difficulties with the Moros arose simply because they refused to work with or serve under one another. Family rank and social standing were more important than the military titles.<sup>39</sup> Though unusual, there were Moro leaders who worked well with Christians on their staffs, or at least there was no open violence. Salipada Pendatun has already been cited as having an integrated staff. Datu Ogtog Matalam, a powerful leader in Cotabato, arranged for sacraments for his Christian guerrillas. One of the more picturesque of the minor guerrilla leaders was Captain Hamid. Hamid was a Moro who wore a crucifix, was married to a Christian Filipina, and commanded a battalion of Christian guerrillas. He was an audacious commander in the

bargain.<sup>40</sup>

Japanese intelligence reports were initially bright on the Moros, but soon reports began to focus on the American efforts to organize the Moros, "carrying on feverish propaganda" and "inciting the rebellious Moros." They acknowledged the success achieved by the Americans in "pacifying the Moros by supplying them with large sums of emergency paper currency and large amounts of weapons and ammunition." Ultimately, in an obtuse way, the reports admitted that Japanese failure in dealing with the Moros "was caused by bad treatment of the Moros."<sup>41</sup>

The Mindanao resistance movement was pulled together against very long odds, certainly against any historical probabilities that the plan would work. Post-war writers wrote colorful assessments like "never before in the history of our country did the Moro and Christian Filipinos understand and cooperate with each other more closely than during the resistance movement in Mindanao." And they extolled the contribution "towards developing a strong nationalistic feeling among our Moro brothers."<sup>42</sup> The loose alliance was not long-lasting, but it lasted long enough to keep the guerrilla organization unified and the resistance movement alive. The fact that the alliance was a success is a tribute to the quality of leaders fate provided the guerrillas. They made the organization work and survived, an important accomplishment of itself alone. Hal Richardson perhaps best summed up the American success in this observation:

Those lean Americans were tough, fearless men who had earned the respect of the Moros... They were as much at home on the rough terrain of Mindanao as any Moro. Many of these men were almost legendary in the Moro country. They were faithfully befriended by most of the savage Moros, and knew where to find food and shelter when the Japanese sent in special forces to smoke them out.<sup>43</sup>

## CHAPTER 6

### ENDNOTES

<sup>1</sup>Catherine Porter, Crisis in the Philippines, 1942, p. 103; U.S. Army, Headquarters Eighth Army, Report of the Commanding General Eighth Army on the Palawan and Zamboanga Operations: Victor II and IV, no date, p. 31; U.S. Army, X Corps, History of X Corps on Mindanao 17 April 1945-30 June 1945, June 30, 1945, p. 9.

<sup>2</sup>Nena Vreeland and others, Area Handbook for the Philippines, 1976, pp. 85-86; X Corps, History, p. 9. The X Corps history uses somewhat different spellings and classifications, but is included here primarily to reflect the impact the Moro phenomenon had upon the tactical plans.

<sup>3</sup>Vreeland, Area Handbook, p. 86.

<sup>4</sup>Ltr Helen Deisher to J. D. Couch of April 30, 1972 at Ozamis City, Mindanao, re: Moro guerrilla fighting near the city, from the Deisher-Couch Papers, no date. General Eichelberger after having met some Moros on Mindanao in 1945 observed prophetically: "I imagine those Moros are going to be hard to lick now that they have arms. It would not surprise me if the Filipino government will have many a headache in years to come." (They have) Jay Luvaas, ed., Dear Miss Em: General Eichelberger's War in the Pacific, 1942-1945, 1972, p. 256.

<sup>5</sup>Vic Hurley, Swish of the Kris, 1936, p. 35.

<sup>6</sup>W. Cameron Forbes, The Philippine Islands, Vol. I, 1928, p. 31.

<sup>7</sup>Both quotations taken from Hurley, Swish of the Kris, pp. 177-178.

<sup>8</sup>Ironically, this put the United States back into the slave business for the Moros openly kept slaves and they were now within a commonwealth with U.S. territorial limits.

<sup>9</sup>Donald Smythe, Guerrilla Warrior: The Early Life of John J. Pershing, 1973, p. 65.

<sup>10</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 109.

<sup>11</sup>Hurley, Swish of the Kris, pp. 273-274.

<sup>12</sup>U.S. Army, Visayan-Mindanao Force (1941-1942), Historical Report Visayan-Mindanao Force: Defense of the Philippines 1 Sept 1941-10 May 1942, no date, p. 327.

<sup>13</sup>John Keats, They Fought Alone, 1963, p. 44.

- 14 Edward Haggerty, Guerrilla Padre, 1946, p. 201.
- 15 Ibid., pp. 49-50.
- 16 Hurley, Swish of the Kris, p. 10.
- 17 The juramentado and amok are discussed in virtually all books discussing the Moros. See for example: Ibid., pp. 126-131; Smythe, Guerrilla Warrior, p. 162; Hugh L. Scott, Some Memories of a Soldier, 1928, pp. 314-315.
- 18 HQ, 8th Army, Report, p. 35.
- 19 Keats, They Fought Alone, p. 22.
- 20 VMF, Historical Report, p. 43.
- 21 Haggerty, Guerrilla Padre, p. 201.
- 22 Smythe, Guerrilla Warrior, pp. 169-170, example at p. 81.
- 23 Beth Day, The Philippines: Shattered Showcase of Democracy in Asia, 1974, p. 181.
- 24 For example, see Office of Strategic Services, "Prominent Moros of Mindanao and Sulu," February 16, 1946.
- 25 See Haggerty, Guerrilla Padre, p. 201; HQ, 8th Army, Report, p. 31.
- 26 Keats, They Fought Alone, pp. 59-60.
- 27 Rafael Steinberg, Return to the Philippines, 1979, p. 203; Stanley Falk, Liberation of the Philippines, 1971, p. 137.
- 28 Undoubtedly paraphrased, but it probably catches the spirit of Fertig's remarks. Haggerty, Guerrilla Padre, pp. 201-202.
- 29 Keats, They Fought Alone, p. 151.
- 30 Ibid., p. 261; Letter LtCol W. W. Fertig to General Hugh J. Casey, July 1, 1943; Vic Hurley, Jungle Patrol: The Story of the Philippine Constabulary, 1938, p. 280; Ltr Maj H. C. Page 116th Inf Co to LtCol Frank McGee, Midsayap, Cotabato of Sept 29, 1943 found in 10th Military District Correspondence File.
- 31 Ltr Col W. W. Fertig to Maj F. McGee of May 19, 1943 re: Cotabato unification, Ibid.
- 32 Smythe, Guerrilla Warrior, pp. 81-82; Wendell W. Fertig, "Guerrillero," Part I, no date, pp. 23-25.
- 33 Keats, They Fought Alone, p. 275; Courtney Whitney, MacArthur: His Rendezvous With History, 1956, p. 134.

<sup>34</sup> Jack Hawkins, Never Say Die, 1961, pp. 187-188; Uldarico S. Bacilagon, Philippine Campaigns, 1952, p. 292; Quotes from Keats, They Fought Alone, pp. 125, 354-355.

<sup>35</sup> Bacilagon, Philippine Campaigns, p. 293.

<sup>36</sup> Steinberg, Return to the Philippines, p. 158. The trade in enemy trophies went both ways. The Japanese paid the Moros 2,000 pesos for the head of an American or Australian. Hal Richardson, One-Man War: The Jock McLaren Story, 1957, p. 64; Keats, They Fought Alone, pp. 284-285.

<sup>37</sup> Keats, They Fought Alone, p. 306.

<sup>38</sup> Office of Strategic Services, "The Programs of Japan in the Philippines," July 29, 1944, p. 265; Keats, They Fought Alone, p. 275; General Headquarters, Far East Command, Operations of the Counter Intelligence Corps in the SWPA, July 29, 1948, p. 79.

<sup>39</sup> Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Military History, The Philippine Campaign, 1944-1945, "The Philippine Guerrilla Resistance Movement," no date, p. 32; Hurley, Swish of the Kris, p. 32; Ltr Datu Alimain Mamasalakeg to Col W. W. Fertig of Aug 8, 1943, Upper Cotabato Sector in 10 MD, Correspondence File; Ltr LtCol F. D. McGee, CO, 106th Div to Capt Gumbay Piang of Dec 21, 1942, Ibid.; Ltr Col W. W. Fertig to LtCol Frank D. McGee, CAV, of Aug 29, 1943, In the Field of Cotabato, Ibid.

<sup>40</sup> Haggerty, Guerrilla Padre, pp. 136, 138; Travis Ingham, Rendezvous By Submarine: The Story of Charles Parsons and the Guerrilla - Soldiers in the Philippines, 1945, pp. 90-94.

<sup>41</sup> See General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area, Allied Translator and Interpreter Section, "Guerrilla Warfare in the Philippines," Enemy Publications, No. 359, Parts I and II.

<sup>42</sup> Bacilagon, Philippine Campaigns, p. 303; See also Office of Strategic Services, "Guerrilla Resistance in the Philippines," July 21, 1944, p. 303.

<sup>43</sup> Richardson, One-Man War, pp. 74-75.

## CHAPTER 7

### EXTERNAL SUPPORT FOR THE MINDANAO RESISTANCE MOVEMENT

#### The Need for Logistics Support

The practical forms of association between a regular force and the resistance movement it supports are several. The most important form of support would be logistical supply, especially supply of weapons, ammunition and medicine. Food may be sent to the guerrillas, although food is the most difficult to supply and usually the least needed. The sending of officers and agents to act as liaison personnel, training advisers, or perhaps to be actual commanders are other forms. The introduction of non-indigenous personnel into the area of operations, however, can create more problems than it would solve.<sup>1</sup> The support given to the Philippine resistance movement by GHQ, SWPA has been viewed as crucial to the success of the movement. It can be argued, however, that this aid was more of symbolic value and that the real beneficiary of the aid provided to the guerrillas was GHQ, SWPA itself. In return for the aid, GHQ received an abundance of intelligence information which greatly facilitated naval operations in the Southwest Pacific and which greatly assisted in the tactical and strategic planning for the invasion of the Philippines. Irrespective of who benefitted the most from the support, it is certain that the assistance was important for it provided some measure of usable military materiel and it served as a symbol of hope



to the Filipinos in a most dramatic way.

In August 1943 Colonel Fertig wrote a letter to Datu Gumbay Piang which characterizes well the logistic problems faced by the Mindanao guerrillas: "You will note that it is necessary for every applicant for induction in the Magindanao Militia Force to be armed. We do not furnish the arms; the men furnish their own."<sup>2</sup> He had written to GHQ two months earlier that he desperately needed supplies to fight the Japanese and to demonstrate that the United States was coming back to the Philippines else the "civilians will succumb to the cumulative effects of Japanese propaganda."<sup>3</sup> Fertig did not really care how the supplies arrived on Mindanao, although he did believe as early as July 1943 that aerial resupply was feasible. He had gotten this idea from William E. Dyess, an aviator who had served on Bataan and later escaped from Davao Penal Colony. Fertig himself had overseen the construction of airfields on Mindanao so he knew what the guerrilla capabilities might be. He wrote to General Hugh Casey that he did "not believe there are technical difficulties which could not be overcome if the desire were there."<sup>4</sup> As it was, aerial supply did not begin in the Philippines until after the Leyte landings in October 1944. Mindanao, Cebu and Panay would receive approximately 280 of the 500 sorties flown to the Philippines.<sup>5</sup>

#### Submarines Deliver Supplies

The method used to bring supplies to the guerrillas was the submarine. While on Corregidor, General MacArthur had maintained a top-secret file code-named "George." The folder contained his plans for conducting guerrilla warfare in the Philippines.<sup>6</sup> Although the guerrilla movement never got started as he had envisioned, ideas were beginning to form in his mind on how a guerrilla movement might be sustained. At

that time submarines were running the Japanese pickets and minefields to resupply the beleaguered Bataan-Corregidor garrison. It required only a short step to envision submarines resupplying the guerrillas.

Thus "Spyron" was born, one of the closest guarded secrets of World War II. Essentially a one-man operation at its inception, "Spy Squadron" was a code name for Commander Parsons who initially established the Special Mission Unit that provided the supplies and submarines for the clandestine supply drops in the Philippines. The Spyron activities lasted two years, during which time supplies were delivered, evacuees were taken out, and special intelligence teams were landed in the Philippines. U.S. Navy records indicate that of 41 submarine resupply missions to the Philippines officially conducted, 16 visits were made to Mindanao by six different submarines: Narwhal - 9; Trout - 2; Stingray - 2; Nautilus - 1; Tambor - 1; and Bowfin - 1. The Gudgeon sailed the very first mission on January 14, 1943 to Negros and the Stingray made the last run on January 1, 1945.<sup>7</sup> Only one submarine was lost during these two years, the Seawolf, which went down enroute to Samar in September 1944. The Special Mission Unit was dissolved after the last run in January 1945. During the two-year period, 1325 tons of supplies and equipment were delivered with none falling into enemy hands before or at delivery. Three hundred thirty-one persons were landed, 472 evacuated, and 19 different submarines in all carried out "Spyron" missions.<sup>8</sup>

The first submarines used in the resupply missions were patrol submarines (attack submarines in current terminology). As these submarines left Australia for missions in the Western Pacific they would stop briefly off the Philippine coast and discharge a small amount of

cargo or a small penetration party by rubber boats. The 7th Fleet was not enthusiastic about using its few submarines to support what appeared to be at best marginally important missions, particularly when the missions called for surfacing in enemy waters virtually under enemy guns. In addition, any cargo or personnel transported meant the removal of one torpedo for every man and his gear that came aboard the submarine (the maximum load was six of these Spyron passengers).

The benefits of having coastwatchers in the Philippines soon became evident, however. Reports from the coastwatchers on weather conditions and on enemy ship and air movements soon caught the Navy's attention. One routine report in particular from an observer near Davao City caught their attention. A Navy submarine had sunk a Japanese ship, and this had been routinely reported by the observer. The Navy was interested in the report because with their "hit and run" tactics submarines often did not have the opportunity to confirm their kills and to assess the damage on their targets. The coastwatchers could do this from their mountaintop hideouts. The equation was straightforward. To improve survivability, the Navy needed coastwatchers. To improve their survivability, coastwatchers and radio teams needed guerrilla protection. And to improve their survivability, the guerrillas needed weapons, ammunition, radios and medicine -- which meant, of course, that they needed submarines.<sup>9</sup>

Initially the patrol submarines Seawolf and Stingray were assigned to GHQ, and in September 1943 the Navy assigned the Narwhal to support the Philippine Regional Section of GHQ. The Nautilus, the Narwhal's sister boat, was reassigned from COMSUBPAC, Pearl Harbor to COMSUBSOWESPAC, Brisbane on May 3, 1944 and assigned to support GHQ.<sup>10</sup>

The importance of these two vessels is that they were both cargo-carrying submarines. The small fleet-type submarines could carry from five to ten tons of supplies, and their use was dependent upon the submarine's operational schedule. The cargo-carrying submarines with their larger 3,000-ton displacement had dedicated supply missions and could transport from 50 to 100 tons of supplies.<sup>11</sup>

The Narwhal and Nautilus were commissioned in 1930 and were called "super subs." With speeds of 17 knots on the surface and eight knots submerged the submarines were large cumbersome workhorses. Their diving time was not rapid, and their torpedo capacity was limited. The boats had 10 torpedo tubes, carried 26 torpedoes, had two six-inch deck guns and machine guns. Each had a boat's complement of eight officers and 80 men. The crew and torpedoes carried could be reduced to permit the submarine to comfortably carry 92 tons of supplies. Before coming to Australia the submarines had been used to land Marines and Army scouts, evacuate civilians and conduct photographic reconnaissance elsewhere in the Pacific.

The "super subs" were noted for their engineering problems, and the Nautilus had been undergoing overhaul which had delayed her earlier assignment to the Special Mission Unit within the Philippine Regional Bureau. The Narwhal was referred to affectionately by her crew as "Inchcliff Castle Maru" after a fictional run-down tramp steamer with noisy engines in a then currently popular Saturday Evening Post series. The Narwhal underwent overhaul in the Spring of 1944. When she put to sea again on her first trip she "hogged" -- bent in the middle -- presumably from loading too much cargo in her torpedo rooms. By summer 1944 she was even more noisy and was leaving an oil slick and a smoke

trail. Her best condition for operating was heavy weather.<sup>12</sup> By this time the Narwhal was under her new skipper, Lieutenant Commander J. C. Titus. Commander Frank Latta, who had commanded the Narwhal during her early trips to Mindanao and had to put the old submarine through her greatest tests, had been reassigned to command the patrol submarine: Lagarto.<sup>13</sup>

The first submarine to be sent by GHQ, the Gudgeon, was to go to Pagadian Bay, Mindanao to land Major Jesus Villamor and a radio team called the "Planet Party." Villamor carried microfilm with a high grade cipher system for both Fertig on Mindanao and Peralta on Panay in a dental alteration and under a patch on his gym shoes. The submarine was unable to rendezvous at Mindanao so it made for Negros and dropped the landing party there.<sup>14</sup> GHQ followed up this attempt with a second, successful one. Charlie Smith and "Chick" Parsons' "Fifty Party" arrived in Pagadian Bay four miles southeast of Labangan aboard the Tambor. When met by a guerrilla leader on the beach, Parsons asked how the submarine could be unloaded of the supplies he had brought for the guerrillas. The guerrilla promptly produced a lighter to transport the two tons of stores brought aboard the Tambor to the beach. It took 40 minutes to move the shipment: 50,000 rounds of .30 calibre and 20,000 rounds of .45 calibre ammunition; radio equipment and spare parts; medicine, clothing, food, soap, cigarettes, bandages and surgical kits. There was even a can of wheat flour for making communion wafers -- and \$10,000 in cash.

Colonel Fertig was impressed with the amount of supplies brought and knew that their delivery to him would raise the level of respect for his position as fledgling leader of the Mindanao guerrilla movement.

To a starving man a piece of bread is a banquet, so it is no surprise that Fertig was appreciative of the effort. And it must have seemed plentiful to those who had to carry it. Still, it was very small, and Fertig knew it -- it amounted to only a pound per man in his small force. When he pressed Parsons on how frequently future deliveries might come, he was told that supplies were coming only because MacArthur was personally interested in the welfare of the Filipino guerrillas. The War Department was not especially interested in the guerrillas, for it had concerns of much greater magnitude. The guerrillas saw the situation quite differently. It is not an overstatement to say that each action against a Japanese patrol on Mindanao was seen as a great Allied victory by the guerrillas, and for them that was the war in the Pacific. General Morimoto, the Japanese commander for Mindanao-Sulu belittled this first supply effort in a public communique and said: "The only thing I wish, should anyone find American cigarettes, bring me a package so I may smoke."<sup>15</sup>

The submarine deliveries which arrived on Mindanao were very diverse but limited by the capacity of the submarines, the diameter of the submarine hatch (23 inches), and the mission of the guerrillas. Items such as radios were broken down into component parts, and military supplies, magazines, clothing, chocolate bars, soap and cigarettes were put into waterproof tins. Popular items were sewing kits, pencils and shortwave receivers to be smuggled into the villages and towns occupied by the Japanese. If caught by the Kempei Tai, death was the punishment for possessing a radio receiver. Although viewed as frivolous by GHQ, the guerrillas pleaded for heavy duty sewing machine needles. Every village had a sewing machine and a generator, and the heavy burlap

material used for dresses was wearing out the sewing machine needles. Oranges sent to the island were stamped "USA" whether they were grown there or not. Candy wrappers and matchbook covers were stamped "ISRM" and "I Shall Return MacArthur" as were cigarette packages, chewing gum wrappers, pencils, and other small items. Magazines with news of America's victories were also brought in large number. These items developed considerable propaganda value, and they would often turn up on the desks of Japanese officers. Five gallon kerosene tins were three-quarters filled with wheat flour used to make communion wafers, and a half-dozen bottles of Mass wine filled the remaining fourth. Religious medals, candles, rosaries and holy pictures were wedged in among the bottles. These supplies were highly valued because there was no wheat for making flour or grapes for making wine in the Philippines. Priests used eyedroppers to serve the wine at communion. Among the most important supplies were cathartic pills, sulfathiazole, and atabrine and quinine for combatting malaria. Parsons even took pains to ensure that the guerrilla leaders' pride was assuaged. Pendatun received saddle soap for his shiny cavalry boots, Kangleon on Leyte received adhesive for his dentures (his gums had shrunk from malnutrition resulting from his internment), and Fertig received six bars of toilet soap.<sup>16</sup>

Things did not always go just right, of course. Plates for printing money and paper arrived on Mindanao, which meant there was just one more thing to haul around and one more administrative task to perform. On one occasion, the guerrillas unloaded 20 mm guns but no shells for them. They were told the shells would be in the next submarine shipment: the guns were on Navy requisitions but the rounds were on Army requisition and were not yet available. Hammocks with zippers

arrived, but the guerrillas needed medicine more and ammunition was far more useful than a hammock in a surprise attack. Several cases arrived with markings showing that the contents were submachine guns. The cases actually contained cavalry sabers. Boxes of whiskey and pesos did not always make it through the long supply line. GHQ began marking these boxes "military rations," and the problem ceased.<sup>17</sup>

A shipment of supplies brought in by patrol submarine might have these items:<sup>18</sup>

6 radio sets	4 batteries
10 cases .45 calibre ammo	12 cases .50 ammo
10 cases hand grenades	13 Tommy guns .45 calibre
1 aircooled .50 calibre MG	3 Springfield rifles
Several cases of CL VI (personal items) and CL VIII (medical) supplies	

By March 1944 the breakdown of supplies by type within a shipment, listed by priority of importance to the guerrillas, would look like this:<sup>19</sup>

<u>Percent</u>	<u>Item</u>
60	Ordnance
8	Medical
10	Signal and engineering
5	Currency requirements (paper, ink, plates)
10	Sundries (specific requisitions)
7	QM items and propaganda items
<u>100%</u>	

Dissette and Adamson conclude that the supplies brought in by submarine "gave new life and hope" to the guerrillas throughout the Philippines. That is the accepted view, but they go on to add that "without them [submarines] the guerrilla movement would have collapsed long before Allied forces could return to the Islands."<sup>20</sup> The accuracy of that latter statement is doubtful, and it gives little credit to the very strong hatred the Filipinos had developed for the Japanese and the Filipino desire to regain their democratic way of life. The submarines



did make the guerrillas more effective and enabled the leaders who received the supplies to retain control over their organizations. And the submarines undoubtedly facilitated the early return of the invasion force to the Philippines because they brought in the coastwatchers trained in Australia and the radios that transmitted the intelligence information on the Japanese strength and dispositions.

The aim of Spyron was to have a rifle in the hands of every guerrilla by the time the invasion force reached the Philippines.<sup>21</sup> This goal was achieved, and some stories of the success of the supply missions are apocryphal:

How extensive this work of the submarine was I learned one day when two ladies of the underground came to see me. I outlined Saturnino's project of raiding Muntinlupa for the 2,000 rifles stored there. They only stared at me; they almost sniffed. 'Only 2,000 rifles! Why that is nothing!' The other said, 'It is not worth the risk!'<sup>22</sup>

However, the supplies sent to the guerrillas have also been described as a "mere bagatelle," and that characterization is supportable if we look only at the raw figures. Sources put the tonnage of supplies shipped by submarine to the Philippines at between 1,325 tons and 1,600 tons.<sup>23</sup> If we use the figure for the number of guerrillas actually recognized as having fought in the resistance movement, 260,715, and the more liberal figure for tonnage, 1,600, then we have a per guerrilla supply rate of 12.3 pounds per guerrilla for the two year period over which submarines had been making deliveries, or just over six pounds per year. That is not much once the chewing gum, magazines, packaging materials and the like are eliminated. Tonnage sent to Mindanao is reported to have been 750 tons.<sup>24</sup> Much of this was cached on MacArthur's orders and much of it was sent to the islands to the north, so the Mindanao guerrillas did not use nearly this amount. Fertig's guerrilla strength

was estimated at between 25,000 and 40,000, with most sources agreeing on 36,000. If we use the accepted strength figure along with the 750 ton figure for supplies sent to Mindanao, we have a figure of 41.6 pounds per guerrilla between March 1943 and September 1944 when the last submarine put in at Mindanao. Regardless of how the allocations per guerrilla are computed, the conclusion is the same. The Mindanao guerrillas had by far the largest allocation of supplies per guerrilla, but even this tonnage does not suggest an adequate resupply rate to the guerrillas. If the 41.6 pounds per guerrilla were ammunition alone, which it was not, it was barely enough to get him through a couple of good fire fights. It is obvious that the guerrillas fought mostly with heart and with the hope brought by the submarines.

The distribution of the supplies was a different problem. GHQ, SWPA generally regarded the Mindanao guerrilla movement as the best organized of the guerrilla organizations in the Philippines and as the center of resistance in the archipelago. Furthermore, MacArthur's plans called for returning to the Philippines with Mindanao as his first objective in the islands and subsequently using the island as his toe-hold for the push north to Manila. Mindanao had much to recommend it as a location for pre-positioned supply storage, for Mindanao was relatively convenient to MacArthur's supply lines and the island was not heavily garrisoned with Japanese.<sup>25</sup> General MacArthur had written Fertig a letter directing him to act as his supply point for furnishing supplies to the other islands. Fertig was also to hide stores of supplies on Mindanao for future use by the invasion force and for the guerrillas to use when the invasion force arrived. He was not to use the weapons against the Japanese so as not to invite retaliation and

increased Japanese anti-submarine activity.<sup>26</sup> In this last regard Fertig was directed to keep submarine deliveries absolutely secret. Fertig could keep the arrival time and location of the submarine rendezvous secret, but he could not keep the arrival of the submarine secret after the fact. The arrival of a submarine was a cause for great rejoicing among the Filipinos on Mindanao, and they celebrated its coming with fiestas. These celebration activities had a salutary effect on the morale of the guerrillas and strengthened the resistance movement as a whole. In any case, with "ISRM" matchbooks and candy wrappers turning up frequently on the desks in Japanese Army offices, the conclusion to be drawn by the Japanese was pretty evident.

The distribution requirement called for extensive planning on the part of both Fertig and the guerrilla commander who unloaded the shipment of supplies from the submarine. Cargadores had to be brought together in sufficient numbers to carry the supplies but not so soon as to betray the pending rendezvous. A banca fleet and lighters had to be gathered, again under the same stipulations. Supply routes through the mountains had to be planned for and then given additional security where needed. If a submarine brought 90 tons of supplies, it would take 3,600 cargadores to pack the supplies across the mountains if each man carried 50 pounds and carabaos were not used. The supply column would have extra cargadores and a security force, so put the column at about 4,000 men. If they had a march of 14 days, seven days each way, and they ate two meals a day, the column would require 112,000 meals which would have to be carried with the column or provided for along the way. And, of course, each cargadore would have to be paid for his labor. The logistical problems could multiply very rapidly.

By Spring 1944 the supplies were coming into Mindanao rapidly for redistribution to the north.<sup>27</sup> Inevitably, commanders both on Mindanao and elsewhere would complain that they were receiving fewer supplies than they felt were due them and that they needed. Worse, allegations were made that the Americans got the best equipment in the distribution.<sup>28</sup> These complaints have been heard for as long as there have been armies and quartermasters. Perhaps it could be called "trickle-down supply," but it was inevitable given the tonnage brought in that the individual units would not receive much. For example, Company I, 3rd Battalion, 94th Infantry on Leyte received the following supplies on March 11, 1944 from Mindanao: three carbines, one sub-machine gun and one Browning automatic rifle.<sup>29</sup> These weapons were added to the less than 30 rifles Company I already had.

The Japanese learned of the submarine deliveries primarily from their agents. Their intelligence reports showed a continuing and growing concern with the submarine deliveries. They had inflated notions of what the submarines were accomplishing, for their reports speak of guerrillas unloading "parts of five airplanes" from one submarine. They also believed that the submarines were apparently bringing in field artillery pieces and anti-aircraft guns. They thought that the delivery of small arms ammunition was plentiful and that each guerrilla carried between 20 and 30 rounds of rifle ammunition. They fixed the favorite rendezvous locations used by the guerrillas very quickly and accurately and sent large forces into these areas to control them. The Japanese focussed especially on Pagadian Bay, Butuan Bay and the east coast. As the submarine visits increased, the Japanese tracked an increase in the guerrilla activity. They believed that a large number of Americans --

they do not say how many -- were being landed on Mindanao by submarine. By mid-1944 18 percent of the Japanese submarine sightings were off the Mindanao coast, and they had the submarines delivering supplies most often at Butuan Bay and Illana Bay.<sup>30</sup> Figure 4 depicts the actual rendezvous locations at Mindanao between March 1943 and September 1944.

Along with this new Japanese attention to the submarine deliveries came an unwelcome change in Japanese policy on the treatment of Americans. It went from very bad to very much worse. The Japanese proclaimed that any unsundered American found in the islands would be executed on the spot after January 25, 1944.<sup>31</sup> They meant it, and a relentless search for Americans hiding in the mountains commenced. Colonel Peralta radioed to Fertig before January 25th, and therefore, before the so-called "amnesty" period was up: "Report thirteen American nationals, among them women and children, have just been slaughtered by the Japanese on Panay."<sup>32</sup> Fertig's brother Claude and his wife who was eight months pregnant were on Panay, and they had barely escaped by seconds the Japanese patrol which had killed the 13 Americans and their Filipino friends and workers.

On being notified of this new situation, MacArthur reassigned the patrol submarines to an evacuation role, and Fertig coordinated many of the evacuations by radio from his headquarters. In all, 472 people were evacuated from the Philippines. The condition of many of the people was pitiful. Captain Olsen of the Angler picked up 58 evacuees in March 1944 from Panay, among them Claude Fertig, his wife and his newly-born daughter. He had this to say of their condition: "The ship was immediately infested with cockroaches and body and hair lice. A large percentage of passengers had tropical ulcers, plus an odor that was unique

SUBMARINE RENDEZVOUS POINTS  
MINDANAO MARCH 5, 1943 - SEPTEMBER 30, 1944




Figure 4

in its intensity." He called the boat's compartment where the people were billeted the "Black hole of Calcutta."<sup>33</sup> This description is accurate and is borne out by Louise Reid Spencer in her book Guerrilla Wife in which she details the many months her family, the Claude Fertig family and others spent avoiding and fighting the Japanese in the mountains of Panay.

A number of the 472 Americans were evacuated from Mindanao.<sup>34</sup> One of the most gruesome evacuations took place on Mindanao and stemmed from an event that took place just off Sindangan Point near Sindangan Bay on September 6, 1944. By Summer 1944 the Japanese had begun transporting American prisoners from the Philippines to labor camps in Japan, Korea and Manchuria. The ships were of all types, from military troop ships to merchant vessels. On September 7th, five ships of a seven ship convoy transporting American prisoners were sunk. Many prisoners were not permitted to leave the ship as it sank, for Japanese guards gunned them down in the holds from the hatches above. Many who did manage to escape from the ships were shot or clubbed to death in the water by hysterical Japanese guards. Only 80 of the approximately 800 prisoners survived from the five ships, and they made their way ashore at Sindangan Point. Five hundred corpses washed ashore with them. There they were picked up by guerrillas, and later those who were still alive were put on the Narwhal near Siari Bay.<sup>35</sup>

The submarines themselves were always subject to danger on their guerrilla supply missions. As already described, the Filipinos would have a fiesta on the arrival of a submarine, and they could put a fiesta together on very short notice. Many a submarine commander felt his heart in his mouth when he surfaced to carry out his super secret

mission only to find a bar and dancing girls waiting on the shore.<sup>36</sup> The Japanese were rarely more than a few miles away, so the Captain's misapprehension was well-founded. In one instance Commander Latta took the Narwhal right up to a pier at Nasipit in Butuan Bay, probably the only time an American warship had tied up to a pier to discharge cargo in enemy territory.<sup>37</sup> The Narwhal was in a later visit to proceed up the Agusan River itself to discharge cargo and pick up 32 evacuees. She beached, and with the Japanese only three miles away, the crew commenced "sallying" -- running fore and aft the length of the ship -- to rock the boat from the sandy shoal upon which she was lodged.<sup>38</sup>

If a submarine was unable to keep a rendezvous, things could become difficult very quickly. The boat could steam to another location if need be, but the cargajores and banca fleets could not be shifted quickly at all. And if dignitaries had been invited to see the submarine rendezvous, then the guerrilla leader could "lose face" very quickly as well.<sup>39</sup>

World War II submarines spent about 90 percent of their time on the surface and submerged only to avoid attack. Sometimes they would lie off the coast of Mindanao submerged waiting for the signal from the guerrillas ashore or just observing the rendezvous area. The water was so clear in places that on a moonlit night, and often during the daylight hours, a person could sit ashore, especially on a hill, and see a huge dark object resting on the white sand. The dark object looked just like, what else, a submarine.<sup>40</sup> The guerrillas would go to great lengths to protect the submarines. When Parsons left Mindanao on July 15, 1943 he sat in a boat which "resembled a greenhouse." It was piled high with potted palms lashed to the railings, banana leaves hanging from the guy



wires and a coconut tree strapped to the mast. It was supposed to look like a small island in Pagadian Bay.<sup>41</sup>

On occasion the submarines ran afoul of the Japanese and had to defend themselves. The Narwhal had several close calls near Mindanao but managed to survive the depth charges.<sup>42</sup> The submarines were also vulnerable to air attack because they spent so much time on the surface. A friendly air patrol in the area almost always improved the security of a submarine. But towards the end of the war the American submarines were not necessarily any more secure with American fliers aloft. It seems that the Army Air Force pilots enjoyed forcing a submarine -- pilots called them "pigboats" -- to dive just for sport. The only submarine to be lost supporting the guerrillas was the Seawolf which was mistakenly sunk by Navy pilots from the carrier Midway while the Seawolf was steaming from Australia to Samar.<sup>43</sup>

#### The Allied Intelligence Bureau, GHQ, SWPA

From May 7, 1942, all policy relative to guerrilla activities and guerrilla recognition emanated directly from GHQ, SWPA. To organize the supply effort to the guerrillas and to coordinate the resources used in gathering intelligence information in the Philippines MacArthur created the Philippine Subsection of the Allied Intelligence Bureau (AIB) on October 21, 1942. The AIB was itself organized on July 6, 1942 to train, equip and dispatch agents to collect intelligence behind enemy lines in the Southwest Pacific area. The AIB was supported equally by the United States, Australia and the Netherlands East Indies. The AIB had four sections: special operations, secret intelligence, combined field intelligence and propaganda -- sections A-D. Section C, combined field intelligence, was the United States' responsibility, and this section

handled the Philippine Islands.

The Philippine Subsection was charged with establishing military intelligence and secret service nets. On April 15, 1943 the Subsection was redesignated as the Philippine Regional Section (PRS). The PRS was responsible for agent penetration, intelligence net organization, guerrilla supply and control, political direction and the coastwatchers. Colonel Courtney Whitney assumed control of the PRS on May 24, 1943, and he reported directly to MacArthur's chief-of-staff, Major General R. K. Sutherland, thereby circumventing the chain of command. Whitney handled anything having to do with guerrilla recognition but he did not handle intelligence. After the PRS was established, the AIB ceased its connection with activities in the Philippines. On June 2, 1944 the functions of the PRS were divided between two sections, the G-3 and G-4.<sup>44</sup>

The guerrilla activities within the Southwest Pacific Area are generally divided into three phases. The first phase was the study of the guerrilla movement by the AIB while working under the operational control of the SWPA G-2. The Special Philippine Subsection was established in this phase. In phase two, beginning in June 1943, the Philippine Regional Section was established with Whitney at the helm. In phase three the functions of the Philippine Regional Section were decentralized and the direction of the guerrilla movement was apportioned among the General Staff sections for purposes of efficiency. A nucleus of the PRS was retained as a coordinating agency.<sup>45</sup>

On Major General Sutherland's recommendation, MacArthur brought Colonel Whitney from the United States to run the newly created PRS. Whitney had been a lawyer in Manila for many years and knew a great many

Filipinos. He was tasked with expanding the program of promoting resistance activities in the Philippines. To this end he organized, trained and dispatched the intelligence teams and coastwatcher groups that were sent to the islands. The section also oversaw the logistical support for the guerrillas.<sup>46</sup> Whitney soon became a close confidante of MacArthur, and his reports were the first seen by MacArthur each morning.<sup>47</sup>

Apparently, there was a disagreement between General Willoughby, the G-2, and Whitney over the potential usefulness of the guerrillas. Keats records that Parsons related to Fertig during his first visit to Mindanao that this fundamental disagreement existed. Willoughby felt that there was no genuine resistance in the Philippines and no chance that any would arise. Therefore, there was no reason to send any guns or ammunition to the Philippines. Whitney thought otherwise, and he further believed that the guerrillas had potential value for combat against the Japanese.<sup>48</sup> Whitney made the more convincing argument, because the submarines sailed laden with arms and ammunition.

Colonel Allison Ind, an American who worked in the AIB, ties to another weakness of GHQ in the business of running a guerrilla resistance. He asserts that Willoughby went "regulation" in running the guerrilla operations, something of which Fertig constantly complained, and that he put in charge of the AIB "a grizzled old campaigner who did not know much of clandestine operations but did know Army regulations."<sup>49</sup> The Army drew its own conclusions on how well its own leadership carried out guerrilla operations. In referring to the World War II experience, the Army's current manual on doctrine for supporting guerrilla operations reads: "Military professionals generally did not understand

the art of guerrilla warfare and many of them regarded it as illegal and dishonorable. The strategic and tactical relationships of guerrilla forces to conventional forces were rarely appreciated.<sup>50</sup> The manual further observes that the headquarters running the guerrilla operations would often shift the responsibility for organizing, supplying and exploiting guerrilla forces from the cognizance of one staff section to another or pass the problems off to a special agency when they became too difficult.<sup>51</sup> Colonel Ind supports this contention and writes that some officers in MacArthur's headquarters questioned the sincerity of the guerrilla intelligence reports and had a general indifference to the reports. An internal Army report on the guerrillas drew the same conclusions by saying that some officers at GHQ, SWPA "questioned the dependability of Filipinos" and differed on how to use them as guerrillas.<sup>52</sup> An unhappy example of this lack of trust is seen in the case of Major Villamor. GHQ did not believe the report of Villamor's penetration party on the situation in the Visayas. Villamor, a highly decorated Filipino national hero was discredited, over the objections of Ind and Willoughby. It was not until well after the war in 1959 when President Dwight Eisenhower publicly exonerated Villamor at a White House ceremony that the wrongheadedness of the GHQ doubters was atoned.<sup>53</sup>

Perhaps the key figure in the AIB structure was the man who ran Spyron, Commander Parsons. Born a Tennessean, Parsons had gone to the Philippines in 1921 at age 19 aboard a merchant ship. A bright young man, he had a long list of accomplishments to his name by 1941. He had first served as secretary to General Leonard B. Wood, the Governor-General of the Philippines, and had later been supervisor or manager in telephone and telegraph, trading and import, lumber and stevedoring

concerns. He joined the Navy Reserve on January 6, 1932 and was called to active duty on December 14, 1941. His tale from that point is a remarkable adventure which rivals the most creative fictional adventure novels. For his service during the war he received the Navy Cross and the Bronze Star. He was one of only four Americans to ever receive the Philippine Medal for Valor, and only nine people had ever received it at all. The only other Americans to receive this medal were MacArthur, Nimitz, and Wainwright.<sup>54</sup>

Parsons was MacArthur's agent to the Philippine resistance movement, and he was charged with assessing its potential and its needs. He had the authority to take whatever action was necessary to ensure that the movement was unified to the greatest degree feasible. Parsons made six trips to the Philippines in all, and he made three visits to Mindanao: Spring 1943, October 1943, and February 1944. Like Villamor, Parsons was widely known and recognized throughout the Philippines. To ensure the Filipinos' respect, but primarily because he preferred to work that way, Parsons traveled unarmed and without a disguise on every visit. Parsons was short and slender, and the years had given his skin a chestnut color. He looked like a Filipino, and he knew how to move unobtrusively among the Filipinos. He had many close calls with Japanese patrols, but he managed to allude capture during all his visits. This is the more remarkable because the Japanese had publicly put a price on his head of 100,000 pesos -- \$50,000 in gold -- a staggeringly large sum to a Filipino, especially in the 1940's. Unable to catch Parsons or his brothers-in-law, Army Captain Tom Jurika and Navy Lieutenant Stephen Jurika, the Japanese settled for executing Mrs. Jurika, mother of Parsons' wife Katsy. She was beheaded on August 25, 1944 with a

group of 29 other internees and buried in a mass unmarked grave.<sup>55</sup>

Parsons worked for Whitney in the Philippine Regional Section, but he coordinated with Captain A. H. McCollum, the 7th Fleet staff officer who coordinated the submarine deliveries and designated the coastwatcher station locations in the Philippine Islands. McCollum, who was the Southwest Pacific Force Intelligence Officer, recalls that Parsons "was more or less working for me."<sup>56</sup> In either case, Parsons was essentially a messenger and liaison officer with no command authority. Because he was gone to the Philippines so much of the time the politics between the Army and the Navy in Brisbane did not bother him that much. But the politics did follow him to Mindanao once, for on his first visit to Mindanao Parsons and Charlie Smith had flipped a coin on disembarking the submarine to see who would lead the "Fifty" Party, as it was called. Parsons won the toss, but the issue lacked any real significance to either at the time. Later, when both were radioing their reports back to Australia, each kept the contents of his report secret from the other, and Parsons used a Navy code whereas Smith used an Army code. Parsons, as head of the party, believed Smith should send his reports through him, Parsons, to the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI). Smith said he represented Army intelligence and that, because Parsons worked for AIB, he had no right to withhold information from the Army. Both chastised Fertig, a senior officer, for allowing the other to even use the radio. The incident merely served to confirm Fertig's worst opinions of GHQ and the people who worked there. It was especially irritating to him because he knew that the reports were assessments of his leadership and the potential of the Mindanao guerrilla organization.<sup>57</sup>

As described earlier, MacArthur wanted absolute secrecy for his submarine deliveries. The training camps in Australia where Filipino recruits from the 1st Filipino Infantry Regiment and the 2d Filipino Infantry Battalion in California were indoctrinated and trained for intelligence teams was closely guarded. The submarine operations were kept so secret that even the penetration parties did not know the date of their departure. An agent would be roused from bed, put into a pair of dungarees, and joined with a labor crew loading a submarine in the middle of the night. Then on one trip into the submarine, he would be kept inside and a confederate agent would leave the submarine to take his place in the labor crew. His personal gear would be brought aboard the vessel for him later.<sup>58</sup> In this manner the coastwatcher teams and special intelligence agents made their way to the Philippines.

The AIB operations were not part of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) operations, nor were they supported by the OSS. The OSS was authorized by President Roosevelt and the Congress in July 1941. The first American organization of its kind, it was patterned after the British Special Operations Executive (SOE) and MI6. The OSS had two functions. One was to conduct research with units in the United States and overseas, and to provide agents to gather, analyze and evaluate strategic information and report it. The second function was to sabotage lines of communications behind enemy lines and to aid and train resistance groups and encourage underground forces with propaganda. General William J. Donovan repeatedly offered to send OSS agents to assist MacArthur in the guerrilla operations in the Philippines and elsewhere in the SWPA theater. MacArthur consistently refused the offers, and Willoughby assured MacArthur that they were not needed. As

D. Clayton James describes the GHQ position, MacArthur was "not about to have Allied personnel in his theater who were not under his control, as would have been the case with the OSS."<sup>59</sup> MacArthur already had several organizations available to him in Melbourne. He had the British SOE to conduct sabotage and espionage, he had the Netherlands Indies Forces Intelligence Service (NEFIS), and he had the Australian propaganda units and their coastwatcher network. For MacArthur the AIB would be his counterpart to the OSS, although it would have far fewer financial resources available to it.<sup>60</sup>

MacArthur did his best to keep the OSS out of his theater, and the small amount of work done by the OSS on the Philippines reflects this. There are virtually no OSS reports on the Philippine resistance movement, and the information the OSS did put together was brief, summary in nature, and came from interviews and not from their own agents in the Philippines.<sup>61</sup>

In a rare instance, an agent from the War Department, Captain Harold Rosenquist, did manage to make it to Mindanao through the good offices of Major Steve Mellnik and General Sutherland. Mellnik had escaped from Davao Penal Colony, and Rosenquist was in the business of springing POW's in Europe. Mellnik had met Rosenquist at a debriefing at the Pentagon, where Rosenquist became intrigued with the possibilities for liberation of the Davao prisoners. He made his way to Australia where Mellnik, who now headed up the Philippine Section in Willoughby's G-2, sponsored the idea. Willoughby and Sutherland supported Mellnik, although Whitney disapproved of the idea. Rosenquist, now an AIB agent, arrived alone at Davao just after the prisoners had been removed from the prison. These prisoners were among those who were drowned and shot



at Sindangan Bay. The incident raised some fundamental questions between Fertig and GHQ on command relationships, command authority within the 10th Military District, and the capabilities and mission of the guerrilla organizations.<sup>62</sup>

The conclusion must be that the GHQ, SWPA support to the guerrillas was fundamentally important to the success of the resistance movement. In the main, the support could not be sufficient in amount to redress the balance between the Japanese and the guerrillas. As Robert R. Smith concluded, "Late--and, it would appear, often overcautious--recognition, encouragement and help from outside the Philippines hardly nourished the guerrilla movement."<sup>63</sup> But as one observer said of supplies to the guerrillas: "It may also be worthy of note that in many ways the man in the guerrilla movement was much less important for there were ten ready and willing to take his place. The loss of a weapon, on the other hand, was much more seriously felt."<sup>64</sup> The work Parsons achieved in consolidating the resistance forces was successful beyond what could have been expected of one man and so few supplies. The important contribution of the submarine visits and the penetration parties was the clear signal it sent to the Filipino people and the guerrillas that "The Aid" would one day come to their country. As such, the belief in the future of the Philippines remained alive, and the Japanese were caused to tie up much needed combat forces to suppress the resistance movement and to stem the trickle of supplies which were reaching the guerrillas.

## CHAPTER 7

### ENDNOTES

<sup>1</sup>For discussion of this aspect see: Otto Heilbrunn, Partisan Warfare, 1962, pp. 112-113; Marco J. Caraccia, "Guerrilla Logistics," Student Thesis, Army War College, April 8, 1966, p. 37.

<sup>2</sup>Ltr Col W. W. Fertig, HQ 10 MD Office of CG In the Field to Datu Gumbay Piang, Cotabato Area of Aug 4, 1943, in Correspondence Files, 10th Military District.

<sup>3</sup>Letter, Lieutenant Colonel W. W. Fertig to General Hugh J. Casey, July 1, 1943.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid. This theme of GHQ's "desire," or lack thereof, runs through much of what Fertig has to say about the GHQ support. He never really seemed to believe that MacArthur's staff of "sycophants" ever really cared what went on in Mindanao.

<sup>5</sup>U.S. Aerospace Studies Institute, Air University, Concepts Division, "The Role of Airpower in Guerrilla Warfare (WW II)," December, 1962. Ways in which U.S. airpower helped guerrillas is found on p. 235 (hereinafter ASI, "Role of Airpower").

<sup>6</sup>Edward Dissette and H. C. Adamson, Guerrilla Submarines, 1972, pp. 13-16.

<sup>7</sup>U.S. Seventh Fleet, Memorandum, subject: "Submarine Activities Connected with Guerrilla Organizations in the Philippines," no date (hereinafter 7th FLT Memo).

<sup>8</sup>Ibid. The text of this report varies slightly from the tables, but the differences are small.

<sup>9</sup>For discussion on various positions see: Ibid.; Courtney Whitney, MacArthur: His Rendezvous With History, 1956, pp. 132-133; Allison Ind, Allied Intelligence Bureau: Our Secret Weapon in the War Against Japan, 1958, pp. 181-182; Dissette, Guerrilla Submarines, pp. 181-182. There was a large amount of electronic intelligence available to the War Department on Japanese fleet movements gained through breaking Japan's code. The coastwatchers validated much of the information.

<sup>10</sup>General Headquarters, Far East Command, Operations of the Allied Intelligence Bureau, 1948 (hereinafter GHQ, FEC, AIB). The Navy records indicate that both boats were assigned in October 1943. The Narwhal may have been, but the Nautilus certainly was not. See 7th FLT Memo. Dissette and Adamson give November 1943 for the Narwhal's assignment and add that the cargo subs were made available to the Philippine Regional Section

because President Quezon convinced President Roosevelt of this necessity. Dissette, Guerrilla Submarines, pp. 23, 80.

<sup>11</sup>Dissette, Guerrilla Submarines, p. 23; GHQ, FEC, AIB, p. 69. Ind, AIB, p. 182.

<sup>12</sup>U.S. Naval Institute, Reminiscences of Rear Admiral Arthur H. McCollum, U.S. Navy, (Retired), 1973, Tape 12, p. 560; Dissette, Guerrilla Submarines, pp. 23, 80-82, 95, 130, 132-133.

<sup>13</sup>Latta was killed when the Lagarto was sunk by the Japanese minelayer Hatsutaka on May 4, 1945 in the Gulf of Siam. See Samuel Eliot Morison, The Liberation of the Philippines: Luzon, Mindanao, The Visayas, 1944-1945, 1959.

<sup>14</sup>Ind, AIB, pp. 122, 125-126.

<sup>15</sup>For discussion of this first delivery to Mindanao see: William Wise, Secret Mission to the Philippines: The Story of "Spyron" and the American-Filipino Guerrillas of World War II, 1963, pp. 77-78, 84-85; Dissette, Guerrilla Submarines, p. 35; Ind, AIB, pp. 164-167; Travis Ingham, Rendezvous By Submarine: The Story of Charles Parsons and the Guerrilla-Soldiers in the Philippines, 1945, pp. 164-167; John Keats, They Fought Alone, 1963, pp. 190, 192-193; Rafael Steinberg, Return to the Philippines, 1979, p. 27; Peralta on Panay had radioed GHQ in early 1943: "Still hoping grass arrives before the horse dies" in reference to the need for supplies. Charles Andrew Willoughby, The Guerrilla Resistance Movement in the Philippines: 1941-1945, 1972, p. 71.

<sup>16</sup>Ind, AIB, p. 164; Wise, Secret Mission, pp. 136-137; Edward Haggerty, Guerrilla Padre, 1946, p. 23; Dissette, Guerrilla Submarines, pp. 72, 75-76; Jack Hawkins, Never Say Die, 1961, p. 194; Reminiscences-McCollum, Tape 13, p. 595.

<sup>17</sup>Keats, They Fought Alone, pp. 330, 342; Whitney, MacArthur: Rendezvous, p. 147.

<sup>18</sup>Jose Demandante Dormal, The War in Panay: A Documentary History of the Resistance Movement in Panay During World War II, 1952, p. 87.

<sup>19</sup>Headquarters, Philippines Command, "U.S. Army Recognition Program of Philippine Guerrillas," no date, p. 234, Appendix I, p. 4.

<sup>20</sup>Dissette, Guerrilla Submarines, p. 234.

<sup>21</sup>Ingham, Rendezvous By Submarine, p. 199; Wise, Secret Mission, p. 145.

<sup>22</sup>Forbes J. Monaghan, Under the Red Sun: A Letter From Manila, 1946, p. 223.

<sup>23</sup>The Navy claims 1,325 tons; see 7th FLT Memo. The 1,600 ton figure comes from an Army Department historian, see Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Military History, "The Philippine Guerrilla Resistance Movement," no date, p. 216 (hereinafter OCMH, "Resistance Movement").

<sup>24</sup>ASI, "Role of Airpower," p. 140.

<sup>25</sup>Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Reports of General MacArthur: The Campaigns of MacArthur in the Pacific, Volume I, 1966, p. 309 (hereinafter SCAP, Reports, I); Uldarico Bacalagon, Philippine Campaigns, 1952, pp. 302-304; OCMH, "Resistance Movement," p. 216; Reminiscences - McCollum, Tape 13, p. 596; Ind, AIB, p. 125.

<sup>26</sup>Keats, They Fought Alone, p. 332.

<sup>27</sup>SCAP, Reports, I, p. 305.

<sup>28</sup>Keats, They Fought Alone, pp. 336-337.

<sup>29</sup>Elmer Lear, The Japanese Occupation of the Philippines, Leyte, 1941-1945, 1961, p. 87, f.n. It is little wonder that the guerrillas on Leyte thought they were in a "begging position" when it came to getting supplies from the 10th Military District. See also page 88.

<sup>30</sup>Information on submarines appears throughout but see: General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area, Allied Translator and Interpreter Section, "Guerrilla Warfare in the Philippines," Enemy Publications No. 359, Part I, pp. 3, 6-8, 18-20, 36, 56-57, 63 and Part II, pp. 21, 62.

<sup>31</sup>Ingham, Rendezvous By Submarines, p. 181.

<sup>32</sup>Ibid., p. 182.

<sup>33</sup>Dissette, Guerrilla Submarines, pp. 113-116.

<sup>34</sup>Ind, AIB, pp. 203-204. Contains the names of those evacuated.

<sup>35</sup>Dissette, Guerrilla Submarines, p. 157; See also Keats, They Fought Alone, pp. 387-390, 397; Steve Mellnik, Philippine Diary 1939-1945, 1969, pp. 290-291; Haggerty, Guerrilla Padre, p. 239; D. Clayton James, The Years of MacArthur, Volume II, 1941-1945, 1975, p. 511.

<sup>36</sup>Reminiscences - McCollum, Tape 13, p. 601. Hawkins, Never Say Die, pp. 193-194.

<sup>37</sup>Keats, They Fought Alone, p. 327.

<sup>38</sup>Dissette, Guerrilla Submarines, p. 88.

<sup>39</sup>Ibid., p. 100; Keats, They Fought Alone, p. 321.

<sup>40</sup>Reminiscences - McCollum, Tape 13, p. 601; Dissette, Guerrilla Submarines, p. 84.

<sup>41</sup>Mellnik, Philippine Diary, pp. 274-275.

<sup>42</sup>For example see Dissette, Guerrilla Submarines, pp. 94, 101-103, 107; Ind, AIB, pp. 195-196.

<sup>43</sup>Dissette, Guerrilla Submarines, pp. 159-160.

<sup>44</sup>For discussion on the AIB see: HQ, Philippines Command, "Recognition Program," Appendix 1, pp. 3, 5; General Headquarters, Far East Command, A Brief History of the G-2 Section, GHQ, SWPA and Affiliated Units: Introduction to the Intelligence Series, 1948, p. 46; Ind, AIB, Foreward.

<sup>45</sup>SCAP, Reports I, p. 308.

<sup>46</sup>Willoughby, Guerrilla Resistance Movement, p. 71; James, Years of MacArthur, II, pp. 509-510. In all there were 264 intelligence party missions sent by the AIB to the Philippines. Among these parties, 164 agents were KIA; 6 WIA, 75 captured and 178 MIA. Ind, AIB, p. 72.

<sup>47</sup>Whitney, MacArthur: Rendezvous, p. 132.

<sup>48</sup>Keats, They Fought Alone, pp. 202-203, 346.

<sup>49</sup>Ind, AIB, p. 174.

<sup>50</sup>Headquarters, Department of the Army, Special Forces Operations, Field Manual 31-20, September 1977, p. 96.

<sup>51</sup>Ibid.; See also OCMH, "Resistance Movement," p. 228.

<sup>52</sup>OCMH, "Resistance Movement," p. 228.

<sup>53</sup>Ind, AIB, p. 157.

<sup>54</sup>The Parsons story is the subject of several books and makes truly remarkable reading. Colonel Ind included a chapter on Parsons in his book on the AIB. The books about Parsons are annotated in the bibliography.

<sup>55</sup>See especially Ingham, Rendezvous By Submarine, p. 170. Reminiscences - McCollum, Tape 13, p. 688; Ind, AIB, pp. 159-188; Louis Morton, The Fall of the Philippines, 1953, p. 160; Steinberg, Return to the Philippines, p. 28.

<sup>56</sup>Ingham, Rendezvous By Submarine, p. 136; Reminiscences - McCollum, Tape 13, p. 595.

<sup>57</sup>Keats, They Fought Alone, pp. 212-213.

<sup>58</sup>See Ind, AIB, p. 123; Dissette, Guerrilla Submarines, p. 65; Mellnik, Philippine Diary, p. 285; OCMH, "Resistance Movement," pp. 227-228.

<sup>59</sup>James, Years of MacArthur, II, pp. 510-511; See also Reminiscences - McCollum, Tape 13, p. 594.

<sup>60</sup>Ind, AIB, p. 12; Willoughby, Guerrilla Resistance Movement, p. 71.

<sup>61</sup>For example see Office of Strategic Services, "Guerrilla Resistance in the Philippines," July 21, 1944 and "Japan and Its Occupied Territories During World War II," in A Guide to O.S.S./State Department Intelligence and Research Reports, I, 1977.

<sup>62</sup>Mellnik, Philippine Diary, pp. 282-286, 288, 290; Keats, They Fought Alone, pp. 387-390, 397.

<sup>63</sup>Robert Ross Smith, "The Hukbalahap Insurgency: Economic, Political, and Military Factors," 1963, p. 31. See also page 44.

<sup>64</sup>Gene Z. Hanrahan, Japanese Operations Against Guerrilla Forces, 1954, p. 16.

## CHAPTER 8

### OPERATIONAL EMPLOYMENT OF THE GUERRILLAS

Thus far the discussion has focused on who the guerrillas were, how they were organized, and what the circumstances were under which the guerrilla organization grew. This chapter will discuss what the guerrillas did -- how they fought, how they survived, and what real effectiveness their operations may have had on the Japanese operations on Mindanao.

#### Guerrilla Tactics and Logistics Support

Aside from General MacArthur's orders to avoid combat with the Japanese, there were some imperatives of the guerrillas' circumstances which dictated that this would be so irrespective of MacArthur's orders. Although the guerrillas wanted to engage the Japanese in offensive operations, thereby violating the spirit of MacArthur's orders, pitched battles with the Japanese were not feasible because of the small amount of ammunition and number of weapons available to the 10th Military District. Furthermore, pitched battles meant heavier guerrilla casualties, and with no doctors or medicine with which to treat the wounded, most wounds were in the long-run mortal.<sup>1</sup> Colonel Fertig identified another factor when he wrote:

They [Filipinos] are damned fine guerrilla fighters, but they never will be first class combat troops, as we do not have officers to lead them, and absolutely no way of giving them the sound training necessary to make combat troops.<sup>2</sup>

So Fertig implemented what he called his "pillow defense."<sup>3</sup> The only ground the Japanese soldier occupied was that beneath his feet -- when he moved he gained new ground, but he lost all that he had. With this tactic in mind, Fertig deployed the guerrillas near their own barrios. He believed that near their own homes they would fight better, and they would certainly be easier to feed and clothe. Because they were in the barrios where their families lived, the guerrillas rarely accepted combat with the Japanese near the barrios. When the Japanese patrols conducted a sweep through a barrio, the guerrillas would withdraw.

The Japanese feared the bruising guerrilla attacks when they did come, and at the Davao Penal Colony, where guerrillas would snatch soldiers guarding prisoners working in the fields, the Japanese would actually walk in the middle of a prisoner formation for security. Whereas elsewhere in the Pacific Theater the Japanese were feared for their night fighting abilities, in the Philippines the situation was quite the reverse. The Filipinos owned the night. The Filipinos would use soyac traps, pointed bamboo stakes driven in to one foot above the ground on both sides of a trail. As a Japanese patrol would come along the trail, the guerrillas would fire several shots and shout. The Japanese soldiers would dive into the high grass onto the spikes. The Filipinos would then kill them with bolos.<sup>4</sup>

The guerrillas claimed that the Japanese soldier was easy to detect at night because he smelled badly from poor personal hygiene.<sup>5</sup> During the daytime the Japanese were easy to track because all the soldiers wore distinctive "tabby toe" boots, a soft boot with a separate toe for the big toe. The Filipinos often took the uniforms from dead Japanese in order to have clothes to wear, and they looked much like



Japanese soldiers because of their dark skins and small stature. But the Filipinos of necessity went barefoot and the Japanese never did, so that is how they could be distinguished from each other.<sup>6</sup>

Japanese tactics were stereotyped, therefore predictable, and thus they were easily ambushed. They would move troops in "boxcars," the huge trucks used to move sugar plantation laborers before the war. The "boxcar" could hold 150 troops. The Japanese always moved at the same hour of the day, and they rarely had a choice of roads on which to travel. Their tactics on contact were always the same, and ambushes became almost set-piece, choreographed affairs.<sup>7</sup>

Lieutenant Colonel McGee wrote of the Filipino as a fighter: "Most of the Filipino leaders are active and aggressive to a fault. It is difficult to keep them from exceeding authority, encroaching on the domain of others and to make them serve under others."<sup>8</sup> The Japanese even admitted to the fighting spirit of the Filipino: "Resistance is stubborn and widespread. Even when flight is impossible because of enveloping or surprise attacks, the bandits do not surrender but resist to the end."<sup>9</sup>

The Japanese also related the increase in aggressiveness of the guerrilla to the increase in ammunition being brought in by submarines. They experienced disruption in their rear areas, especially in Bukidnon from Grinstead's forces. The Japanese even believed that a Chinese force was operating in Cotabato with the 119th Regiment, which would have been a bad omen since the Chinese had almost uniformly remained out of the fighting and had not chosen sides.<sup>10</sup>

The Japanese intelligence on the size of the guerrilla force was never good, and except for the one time when they so badly overestimated

Fertig's strength in Misamis, they consistently underestimated the guerrilla numbers. Lieutenant Colonel Bowler believed that the Japanese estimated his strength at five percent of what it really was.<sup>11</sup> Japanese intelligence from early 1943 until 1945 had the 10th Military District with a nucleus of 100 Americans and a few Filipino headquarters staff members; 3,000 Filipino and American guerrillas; and, 2,000 "rebellious Moro bandits." They never had the guerrilla strength above 6,000 on Mindanao, only one-sixth of the actual strength. They did have the order of battle and unit designations correct, except they called the 10th Military District "10 Army Group," using their own military notation, and they always had Fertig shown as "Major General" or on occasion as "Brigadier General."<sup>12</sup>

Casualties for the guerrillas are harder to pin down. Robert Ross Smith concludes that there are no reliable casualty figures for the Philippine guerrillas except for those on Northern Luzon.<sup>13</sup> The Japanese give their own figures, plus estimated guerrilla casualties in their intelligence reports. As a sample, the Japanese reported their own casualties as 13 officers and 325 enlisted killed in action and 20 officers and 454 enlisted wounded for all of the Philippines during a five month period January through May 1944. For the month of June 1944 alone, the Japanese claimed that the Kyo Group on Mindanao engaged 2,690 guerrillas in 51 engagements, capturing 79 and killing 75. The Kyo Group was one of four groups.<sup>14</sup> This report showed 18 Japanese killed in June on all of Mindanao. The Mindanao guerrillas claimed 100 Japanese casualties for every one of their own. Father Haggerty concluded that over the period of the Japanese occupation he conducted 300 times as many baptisms as he did funerals, and most of the funerals were conducted for

people who had died of malaria.<sup>15</sup>

The distances traversed by the guerrillas in Mindanao greatly affected their tactical schemes, ability to communicate, and supply efforts. For example, to go from Iligan to Misamis took six hours by banca or as long as three days on foot for the 25 mile trek through the jungle. The overland route from Misamis to the east coast of Mindanao took three weeks one way. A courier system was established, much like the messenger systems of the earlier Greeks. The runners would travel unescorted except through areas patrolled by the Japanese where they would pick up armed guerrilla escorts. The "bamboo telegraph" was faster but the message almost always became distorted in the sending. Guerrillas figured a 30 day period for Japanese informants to travel the length of the Agusan River to Davao to report of guerrilla activities near Butuan to the Japanese commander at Army Headquarters. Even without cargadores a guerrilla could make only seven miles a day through jungle occupied by hostile pagans or Moros.<sup>16</sup>

News among the guerrillas could travel in another way and that was by newspaper. McLish's unit periodically published the Free Man with news received on shortwave radio broadcasts and in magazines brought by the submarines. Father Haggerty published the Ateneo War News prior to the surrender. Mindanao had fewer such "free press" papers than did some of the guerrilla organizations in the northern islands.<sup>17</sup>

The problem faced by Colonel Fertig in providing food for the guerrillas and cargadores has been alluded to in Chapter 7. To have food for travel, carabao meat was cut into thin strips, dipped in tuba vinegar and brine, and dried in the sun. The jerky-like substance, called tapa, cured in two days and would remain preserved indefinitely.

Another common practice was to simply tie a live chicken to a waist belt. In one unique case, a guerrilla "quartermaster" walked a carabao to the edge of a cliff, slit its throat, and rolled it over the edge of the cliff into the sea. It was taken aboard the Athena, the flagship of the guerrilla navy which was waiting below, cut up and cooked.<sup>18</sup>

The Church of Mindanao solved many of the guerrillas' communication and intelligence problems in addition to looking to their spiritual welfare. Priests were the only truly secure means of sending messages between guerrilla commands, both on and off the island. There was no central clearing house to screen credentials of emissaries. To send an emissary without credentials "was to send him to sure death." Fertig used Father Hurley, a Jesuit Superior, to screen his emissaries, and Father Haggerty carried many messages within Mindanao.<sup>19</sup> The priests would perform their ecclesiastical duties during the day, but at night many would dress like peasants and work with the guerrillas. On Mindanao a priest was freed by the Church to serve his parish as his conscience dictated, and some accompanied guerrillas on their combat missions.<sup>20</sup>

Civilians in many cases worked as double agents and counter-intelligence agents for the guerrillas, duties with great inherent risk. The Moros were especially good at this since that was their modus operandi when dealing with others in any case. Japanese counterintelligence was not very effective, for evidently their soldiers were not very circumspect in their private conversations with the Filipinos or among one another when Filipinos were near. A Japanese intelligence report concludes that "Those [Filipino agents] who mingle among the men of the units quickly discover our activities and plans."<sup>21</sup> In some instances the propaganda

war had a humorous twist. A Japanese commander in Surigao published a leaflet offering a 1,000 peso reward for "the severed head of Sergeant Paul Marshall, U. S. Army." Marshall made up a leaflet of his own offering a reward for the Japanese officer's head -- then nailed it on the officer's door one night.<sup>22</sup>

Production and maintenance of weapons and daily necessities on Mindanao was always a problem for the guerrillas. Guerrillas were ordered to police up their cartridge casings after an ambush so they could be refilled and reused. Failure to bring back the casings could mean reassignment to the guerrilla farm -- a demotion and loss of face. Bullets were made from lead poured into handmade sand molds or fashioned from ".30 caliber" curtain rods. Amatol was removed from Japanese anti-ship mines and mixed with low-grade miner's dynamite to make powder for the cartridges. An alternative source was powder from duds and Chinese firecrackers. Fuses were made from tinfoil, potash permanganate and matchbox scrapings. Cannons were made from brass pipes and catapults from bamboo and rubber inner tubing. Homemade grenades were made of coconuts charged with dynamite, or a dynamite stick with a short fuze would be placed in a tin can and the remaining space filled with nails, pieces of chain, nuts and bolts. The top of the can was sealed with pitch. Dynamite was found in many of the old mines on Mindanao. Incendiary bombs were made from beer bottles filled with gasoline, stoppered with a detonator and connected with a safety fuze -- a rare device because there was rarely any gasoline.<sup>23</sup>

The guerrillas naturally preferred the .45 caliber Thompson sub-machine gun and the .30 caliber Browning automatic rifle over their ancient weapons and homemade arsenal. But in a pinch they would make

a paltik, a homemade shotgun. With a block of wood, piece of water pipe, copper wire and a nail a guerrilla could make one of these devices designed to use a shotgun shell. They were said to be "effective." GHQ, SWPA wanted to wean the guerrillas to the lightweight carbine, but in the meantime the Enfields, Springfields and captured Japanese rifles had to be repaired. An ejector spring for the Enfield could be fashioned in two days using only a hammer, chisel, rattail file and a steel strap from an automobile spring.<sup>24</sup>

Items other than weapons were in short supply, too. Lye for soap was produced by first burning coconut palms and then making lime from roasting coral or sea shells. When blended together this created the lye. With coconut oil mixed with it the lye made a good lathering soap. Its one fault was that it tended to dye the hair a "brilliant henna." Another method of making soap was to boil shreds of cocconut, then add an extract of hardwood ash to the coconut oil. The ash and oil when stirred and boiled together made soap. Ink for printing currency and making typewriter ribbons could be made by mixing soot with glycerin.

Perhaps the favorite necromancy was making the native tuba drink. To make tuba one first bled the sap from a frond on a coconut tree, then fermented it with pulverized tanbark from a mangrove tree. Alcohol was extracted by using a still made from a Socony can with bamboo tubes running beneath a stream for condensation. If the guerrilla lived in Cotabato Province he would extract alcohol from the mash of a gabi root (potato). The alcohol was used to run gasoline engines. But with a little egg, chocolate and sugar the tuba made a potent 9.6 percent proof cocktail, and many of the guerrilla units took great pride in bottling the best tuba in the area and sending the "best labels" to other

guerrilla commanders as gifts. As McLish is purported to have mused on one occasion: "It's not high-test, and it's not Old Grandad, but it'll get you there, or get you drunk."<sup>25</sup>

The best that can be said about the radios used by the guerrillas is that they represented state of the art equipment for the time and the place. To carry the radio, its engine and its barrel of lubricating oil took 50 cargadores altogether. The American equipment was not jungle-proof, and it was generally too large for loading into the submarines and for portage through the mountainous rain forests of Mindanao. Colonel Fertig used the American HT-9 transmitter rigged with a special parabolic-type antenna to communicate with GHQ in Australia. But the HT-9 was American made and not able to withstand the wet tropical heat. It broke down often, and Fertig replaced it with a more rigorous Australian TW-12. Fertig also used a 3BZ radio transmitter as a mother radio to talk to his many feeder stations which used the compatible Australian ATR4As. The ATR4A transceivers carried two-and one-half watts of power, and, on occasion, these radios would themselves reach Australia. Fertig also used the Australian Kingsley receiver and employed a larger Dutch-made set with the observers near Davao. Radio batteries were recharged by bicycles hitched to a generator. A more elaborate method used by Pendatun in Cotabato was to remove the differential and axles from a truck, bolt paddles to the wheel flanges, and suspend the device on a platform over a swift mountain stream. Power was transmitted through the differential into a drive shaft which was hooked up to a generator. The gears could be shifted to adjust to the rate of flow of the stream. The OSS had developed the SSTR series of radios -- SSTR stood for Strategic Services Transmitter-Receiver -- and this is one

case where the OSS would have been of great assistance to General MacArthur. The SSTR radios were used in the European Theater and elsewhere in the Far East, and they were much more sophisticated than those used by the guerillas.<sup>26</sup>

The Mindanao guerrillas had their own navy, a small coastal fleet which was a hodge-podge of boats. The captured Nara Maru was a 60-foot Japanese-made diesel motor launch which the guerrillas ran on clean starting, clean burning coconut oil. The Nara Maru was armed with a .50 caliber gun salvaged from a smashed B-17 from the 19th Bombardment Squadron. The gun had a recoil spring improvised from rubber tubing. The Athena was a two-masted sailing ship skippered by the legendary Zapanta of The River. She mounted a muzzleloader fashioned from four-inch pipe which fired balls cast from melted fishing weights. She had a crew of 150 armed with 20 automatic rifles. Not a pure sailing ship, she had a one-cylinder diesel auxiliary. The Athena accounted for a Japanese Mitsubishi medium bomber brought down with her 20-millimeter cannon, a submarine-type deck gun.

Another unique ship was the So What, a 50-foot boat skippered by Waldo Neveling, a German citizen and soldier of fortune whom Fertig commissioned in the U. S. Army. The So What was armored with steel circular saws on her gunnels and was used to convoy supplies, to raid Japanese inter-island commerce and to protect the mouth of the Agusan River. Another Mindanao guerrilla naval vessel was The Bastard. The Bastard was a 26-foot whaleboat which was captained by Australian Jock McLaren. She mounted a 20-millimeter cannon in the bow, two twin .30-inch guns amidships, and a .50 caliber gun slightly aft. She was unique because she mounted an 82-millimeter mortar in her stern. A fiesty



little ship, The Bastard unhesitatingly sailed into Japanese controlled ports in broad daylight, sprayed the wharf with automatic fire, shot mortars at Japanese boats, turned tail and ran. Her crew even challenged the Japanese to duels by sending them written invitations, and she stood-to and engaged enemy strafing aircraft as if she were a heavily armed battleship.

Ultimately Fertig established a convoy system to protect the inter-island delivery of supplies which had been brought by submarine and to escort the bancas which carried inter-island commerce among the Filipinos. The vessels went out in groups of 10 with escort launches and dalamas, small, fast sailboats, mounting machine guns or 20- or 30-millimeter cannons.<sup>27</sup>

The Mindanao guerrillas had a number of "Farm Projects," at least that is what they called them, operating on the island. On a scale which must have seemed like that used to build the Panama Canal, and with malaria attacking the workers just as it did in Panama, the Mindanao guerrillas built "Farm Project Number 2," a 7,000 foot runway. The labor crews, pagan Subanon who were chosen for their limited contacts outside of their tribe, and Christians took a year to build the airstrip put into the middle of a giant forest. They worked at night by firelight and camouflaged the field by day. It took nearly a year to construct the airstrip. Colonel Fertig had begun building airstrips early because he thought they could be made useful to the guerrilla movement. Later he built them when instructed to do so by GHQ to prepare the island for the American invasion. Mindanao was to be the anchor in the air assault on Formosa. The guerrillas built the airfields and covered them over with topsoil and planted crops on them. All that

was needed then was a bulldozer to scrape the dirt from the runway. Aircraft could land at night with torches burning at each end of the runway. The Japanese were aware of the airfield construction, but seemed to make little effort to end the activity. In one intelligence report the Japanese concluded that the guerrillas had constructed a large underground hanger at the airfield near Domikan, "Farm Project Number 2," a capability beyond even the ingenuity and determination of the Mindanao guerrillas.<sup>28</sup>

The coastwatcher stations in the Philippines were very successful in transmitting weather reports three times each day and reporting enemy ship and aircraft movements. Some of the results were almost spectacular. Information from coastwatchers led to the victories in the first Battle of the Philippine Sea, the Battle of Leyte Gulf and the "Marianas Turkey Shoot." The information from the coastwatchers was compared with that received from ULTRA - decoded Japanese electronic communications - to verify ship locations. Off the coast of Mindanao, a troop convoy of 49 merchant ships and light escort vessels moved just off Surigao enroute to Davao. The coastwatchers acted quickly and watched excitedly as Halsey's fleet units pinned the convoy to the shore. A Grumman pilot bombing Davao City had seen the convoy and had flashed the warning to the battle fleet. Thirty-two vessels were sent aground in the bays along the coast by American aircraft. The Filipinos appeared in large numbers with bolos to welcome the Japanese ashore to Mindanao. They left no survivors, and the ships were stripped of materials as they lay floundering on the coral reef.<sup>29</sup>

### Japanese Counter guerrilla Tactics

The guerrillas were in a dilemma when deciding how often to engage the Japanese. If they attacked too often, or were too successful, then the civilians were open to reprisals and the guerrilla bases became the objective of punitive expeditions. Through mid-1943 the Japanese apparently believed that a show of force would be enough to reduce the guerrilla activities to a "mere nuisance." But after mid-1943 the Japanese commanders were given instructions that the "Guerrillas must be suppressed to the utmost to maintain a state of order before the enemy invades."<sup>30</sup> The build-up on Mindanao of Japanese forces for the American invasion was to have little initial effect upon the guerrilla activities or support because for many months after the surrender the Japanese had been content for the most part to control only the larger towns and to leave the jungle to the guerrillas. With the exception of the concerted effort to eliminate Fertig and his guerrilla headquarters, the Japanese had not expended large numbers of men in pursuit of the guerrillas. Then in late 1943 and early 1944 they launched some brutal operations throughout Mindanao in conjunction with their declaration to kill every living American still free in the islands. Fertig had gotten wind of these attacks from intelligence sources in Manila who said that General Jiro Harada, commander of the 100th Division, had been ordered to end the guerrilla resistance once and for all. The same sources said that an entire division of soldiers specially trained in anti-guerrilla tactics was being sent to Mindanao, but this was not the actual case. The Japanese attack did hit the island very hard. Hedges and Bowler barely escaped the net thrown over the island, and Fertig was driven deeper into the Agusan River Valley.<sup>31</sup> The Japanese were now preparing for the

invasion by American forces, for by early 1944 it was clear what direction the war in the Pacific was taking. The Japanese high command estimated that throughout the Philippines a minimum of 24 battalions would be needed in the rear areas to guard against guerrillas with seven divisions needed to meet the invasion effort, a ratio of three front-line troops to every one soldier tied down in rear area security. The Japanese command was ultimately to conclude that "It is impossible to fight the enemy and at the same time suppress the activities of the guerrillas."<sup>32</sup>

The Japanese knew that MacArthur's instructions to the guerrillas was to organize, build strength and gather intelligence. And they understood the tactics being used by the guerrillas when they did engage the Japanese: "The enemy draws us out by using small units and then carries out an enveloping attack with his main force," or when outnumbered he lies in wait in the jungle "for our return and attacks fiercely."<sup>33</sup> But understanding the guerrilla tactics was not the same as defeating the guerrillas themselves. The Japanese were insulted and outraged at having to fight an enemy who would not give them a stand-up fight. Dealing with a foe who struck silently and quickly and then melted away ran counter to their training and to their military code. This was ironic, of course, because these were soldiers who slaughtered innocent women and children. The Japanese tactical method was to quickly arrive in force in an area with mortars, machine guns and plenty of ammunition and then deploy in the expectation that the guerrillas would accept their challenge to arms. "Their optimism was boundless, previous experience to the contrary, and they would plug away for four or five hours." The guerrillas would tease the Japanese with just enough fire to delay his

advance, thereby permitting the civilians to escape into the jungle. In the meantime the guerrillas would withdraw to favorable ground in the hopes of luring the Japanese onto untenable ground. The Japanese were reduced to dumping leaflets from the air over guerrilla strongholds "calling the guerrillas yellow, urging them to come out and fight like men like the Japanese soldier, who is not afraid to die for his Emperor."<sup>34</sup>

The Japanese employed much the same concept in tactics against the Filipino guerrillas as they did against the guerrillas in China. The Japanese had two types of operations: "alertness," which was conducting rear area security, and "mopping-up," which was an expansion of the geographical area to be occupied by using punitive expeditions and the standard tactical concepts of encirclement.<sup>35</sup> These tactics, regardless of how skillfully executed, were doomed to failure, however. The local Japanese commanders who were charged with conducting counter guerrilla operations did not recognize the political nature of guerrilla warfare, principally because they never understood the nature of the people they were fighting. The counter guerrilla operations were, for the most part, conducted by occupation forces. In many instances the soldiers' first impulse was to solve the guerrilla problem by military means alone. The few successes that the Japanese had were related more to the personality and character of an individual Japanese commander. This was the case in eastern Surigao Province where the Japanese commander had treated the people well and pacified the area, to Colonel Fertig's consternation.

There is no real evidence that the Japanese ever organized a counter guerrilla force or formulated a counter guerrilla strategy that was centrally directed. The better trained Japanese soldiers had been indoctrinated in the tactic of infiltration as a battle technique, and

they had used it elsewhere when confronting large conventional forces. But they never adapted the technique to the counter guerrilla efforts and therefore failed to realize the full potential from their troops.<sup>36</sup>

When their counter guerrilla tactical operations failed the Japanese resorted to the one tactic with which they seemed comfortable, and one which required the least manpower and creativity from the commander. This tactic, of course, was terror. To dissuade others from joining the guerrillas, the Japanese would hang the head of a local guerrilla at the entrance to the family's barrio with a sign on it reading, for example, "Bad man of the woods." Torture, internment and mass executions were commonly used tools, and entire areas were declared "bandit zones," the crops destroyed, and the civilians ordered to leave. The Japanese understanding of the impact that their terror tactics would have on people was good only to a point; for example, guerrilla leaders were paranoid of strangers because the Japanese hired Filipino assassins to kill resistance leaders. This tactic had its intended effect because the Filipinos were unable to trust any but their closest friends, which is why the priests became so important for communicating personal messages between guerrilla commanders. But the Japanese failed to come to grips with the real effect of their policies which was that the policies actually drove more people to the guerrillas, just the reverse of their intended effect.<sup>37</sup>

In some cases the local Japanese commander simply made his deal with the guerrillas. When the Japanese commander in Misamis Oriental Province was unable to pacify the area, he negotiated an agreement with Governor Palaez. Palaez agreed to keep McLish's guerrilla force from attacking the Japanese garrisons if the Japanese would agree to stay out

of the area. The Japanese commander demanded and received one concession, and that was the right to send patrols periodically through Medina, a town on Gingoog Bay. Palaez agreed, and every two months the people of Medina would leave the streets as the Japanese patrol passed through the town.<sup>38</sup> There were cases in the Philippines where high-ranking Japanese commanders dealt in the black market, and in some rare cases where they sold captured American weapons to the guerrillas.<sup>39</sup> There is not evidence of the latter occurring on Mindanao.

The Japanese tactics and policies failed to either pacify Mindanao or defeat the guerrillas. The Japanese blamed this failure on having too few troops to root out the guerrillas and on the terrain of the island which gave the guerrillas sanctuary. In addition they lamented the "constant rampancy" of the Moro tribes and the guerrillas "radio activities" which brought the submarines to Mindanao.<sup>40</sup>

The Japanese were never able to exploit the wealth of the island -- the lumber, chrome, iron, manganese and coal -- and the Filipinos would not build airfields or bridges nor raise crops for the Japanese willingly. Two Japanese divisions plus their support troops were tied down on Mindanao, and these suffered continued attrition from guerrilla inflicted casualties and from disease. While it was beyond the capabilities of the guerrillas to bring the Japanese to any kind of decisive engagement, their tactics were, indeed, effective. The effectiveness of the guerrillas can be measured by the continued resistance of the civilians to the Japanese and the necessity for the Japanese to station over two divisions of soldiers on Mindanao to combat the guerrillas. The Japanese soldiers continued throughout the occupation to suffer casualties, and the success of the guerrillas gave heart to the civilians so that they would continue

to resist.

#### American Forces Invade the Philippines

Assistance had been provided to the guerrillas in good measure because the American leadership thought that they would be valuable to the prosecution of the war effort itself. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had concluded that Mindanao would be the anchor for the assault on "the vital Luzon-Formosa-China Coast Area." Mindanao could be reduced and secured in two months because "Several thousand guerrillas under U.S. Army command are operating on and control many parts of the island," and "Prior to the operation the strength of the guerrillas can be augmented by men and materials."<sup>41</sup>

The Montclair Operation plans for the reoccupation of the Western Visayas-Mindanao-Borneo-Netherlands East Indies were formulated to carry out a landing on Mindanao on November 15, 1944 with a subsequent strike at Leyte Gulf on December 20, 1944. Mindanao was to be designated GOA #1 (Guerrilla Operational Area Number One) of 14 GOA's. But Admiral Halsey discovered a weakness in the air defense of the Philippine Islands over Mindanao while supporting landing operations in Morotai with his carrier task forces. His pilots tested the air defenses over the Visayas and found them to be weak as well. He recommended an immediate change in the initial landing site, and MacArthur agreed. The Montclair plans were scrapped, and the Victor plans quickly drawn up. Leyte would now become the site of the first assault on October 20, 1944. Although the guerrillas on Mindanao did not know it at the time, Mindanao, the second largest island in the archipelago, would be the 21st island to be invaded.<sup>42</sup>



After the landing on Luzon, MacArthur never really had authority to continue the liberation of the southern islands in the archipelago. Had Eighth Army troops and shipping been needed elsewhere at the time, it is doubtful if these additional landings would have been conducted. At Yalta in February 1945 the American Joint Chiefs had told their British counterparts that they had no intention of sending major American forces to conquer the southern islands. General Marshall "assumed that the Filipino guerrillas and the newly activated Army of the Philippine Commonwealth could take care of the rest of the country."<sup>43</sup> This concept for the use of Filipino forces was explicit in the staff study for Operation Musketeer which had as one of its stated assumptions that support would be provided by the guerrillas to reoccupy the islands and to assist SWPA forces in the re-establishment and defense of the constituted government of the Philippines.<sup>44</sup> For whatever reasons MacArthur may have undertaken the liberation of Mindanao, the Mindanao guerrillas were very relieved that he had done so.<sup>45</sup> They had experienced great disappointment when the first blow had not fallen on Mindanao, they had had no clue that it would not, and they certainly did not relish the prospect of engaging single-handedly the by-passed Japanese troops.

Lieutenant General Tomoyuki Yamashita, overall commander of the Philippine defenses, had written off the 100,000 man 35th Army in the Visayas under Lieutenant General Sosaku Suzuki. Suzuki was to tie down as many Allied divisions as possible in the Visayas and Mindanao. Suzuki planned to make his stand in east-central Mindanao where he "hoped to set up a little self-sustaining empire that could hold out indefinitely."<sup>46</sup> Fertig's guerrilla force of 36,000 would have had a tough time dislodging such a force which could still be formidable.

Suzuki was not able to establish his small empire for he was killed April 16, 1945 while attempting to reach Mindanao.

Lieutenant General Gyosaku Morozumi commanded the 30th Division and had overall command of all Japanese forces east of Lake Lanao. Lieutenant General Harada still commanded the 100th Division and forces in the rest of the island. These were not first-rate troops. The 30th Division, the better of the two, had come from Korea but had lost four of its nine battalions to Leyte where they had been annihilated. The eight battalions of the 100th Division had been living the easy life. Not more than 10 of its officers were regulars, and the quality of the junior officers and noncommissioned officers was "lamentable." A third of the division were Korean conscripts, soldiers not normally enthusiastic for their fate decreed by Emperor Hirohito. The troops were poorly trained and the units widely scattered. They were understrength, poorly equipped and their communications were inadequate. The leaders had a defeatist attitude, and the troops were complacent because they had been by-passed by MacArthur's forces. Nevertheless, they felt that they could cope almost indefinitely with the guerrillas, a less worthy foe in their estimation than the American forces. But guerrilla attacks and air strikes had destroyed most of their transportation capability, and they had just enough military supplies to defend initially against a conventional invasion force, although not enough to sustain the fight. If left to fight only the guerrillas they would fare better. They had no malaria preventives left, and medical supplies were short. When they left the settled areas for the interior, food would no longer be plentiful. Ultimately, if the "little empire" did not work, they would be left to their deaths by one of three means: disease, starvation or combat. By

Spring 1944 the total Japanese force on Mindanao totalled 55,850, only 15,000 of which could be considered anything approaching combat effective.

Against this force the United States threw in 42,000 combat troops, 11,000 service troops and approximately 36,000 Filipino guerrilla troops. American forces in Central Mindanao included:<sup>48</sup>

Bugo-Del Monte Area Command  
 24th Infantry Division  
 31st Infantry Division  
 162nd Regimental Combat Team, 41st Infantry Division  
     3rd Battalion, 163rd Infantry  
 108th Regimental Combat Team, 40th Infantry Division  
     3rd Battalion Combat Team, 164th Regimental  
     Combat Team, Americal Division  
 X Corps Troops

The place of the 10th Military District in the organization for the invasion is shown in Figure 5.<sup>49</sup>

On April 17, 1945 the 24th and 31st Infantry Divisions landed at Cotabato, drove east to Davao City and north to join the 108th Regimental Combat Team which landed at Macajalar Bay on May 10th. Figure 6 depicts the invasion strategy, one which nearly duplicated the Japanese attack on the American-held island in 1942. On June 30, 1945 MacArthur announced that the organized enemy resistance on Mindanao had ceased with the capture of Davao City, and the victory operation was officially declared closed with mopping-up and security missions continuing. This was news to the American soldiers and Filipino guerrillas. General Eichelberger was to comment that "There were many hard weeks ahead for the GI's who had no newspaper to tell them that everything was well in hand."<sup>50</sup> Soldiers of the 24th Division regarded the post-Davao operations as "the hardest, bitterest, most exhausting battle of their ten island campaigns of the war."<sup>51</sup> By August 15th, American Army casualties had reached 820 killed and 2,880 wounded. Of the 55,850 Japanese in Central Mindanao,

# 8TH ARMY ORGANIZATION CHART




FIGURE 5

## X CORPS INVASION OF MINDANAO

APRIL 17 - JUNE 30 1945




Figure 6

47,615 were accounted for by August 15th as dead, wounded or surrendered. That left 8,235 Japanese -- using Japanese sources -- for which there was no accounting. These soldiers probably slipped into the jungle and died of starvation, disease, or fell prey to the guerrillas, Moros or pagans.<sup>52</sup> Figures are nowhere recorded for estimated guerrilla casualties.

#### The Intelligence Mission of the Guerrillas

The most important mission that GHQ, SWPA had given to the Philippine guerrillas was that of gathering intelligence information. In a report made to the U. S. Congress after the war the information gathering effort by the Filipinos received this assessment: "One of the most dramatic examples of practical intelligence in the war, in the Southwest Pacific Area, is represented in the development of the Philippines underground."<sup>53</sup> Carlos Romulo, had this to say:

Japanese plans, copies of their most secret advices, military dispatches, accounts of troop movements, number and location of enemy planes, all had been reported by native patriots directly to GHQ. The entire Japanese plan in the Philippines lay open here for General MacArthur to see and set his plans by...Everything was carefully worked out between a powerful force working on the outside and a weaker but no less valiant force working from within.<sup>54</sup>

The relationship between GHQ, SWPA and the Philippine resistance movement was a classic demonstration of how Otto Hailbrunn describes the cooperation between a regular force and its client guerrilla force. The ideal relationship has two primary facets: the partisans collect and pass on information to the sponsoring army, and the army "seconds its own intelligence officers to the partisans."<sup>55</sup>

The Mindanao guerrillas were involved with relaying information from other islands through the 10th Military District communications equipment and in sending intelligence information on their own circumstances in Mindanao. There were the usual sources of information available to

the guerrillas, such as civil servants and service industry people, and there were also some other, less usual, sources. Priests were generally treated as neutrals, so they were able to move freely in Japanese occupied areas and thus they could carry intelligence as well as personal messages to the guerrilla leaders. In Davao Illocano natives were hired by the Japanese to work as laborers in ammunition dumps, at airfields and in the Japanese headquarters in Davao. Many of these young men had college educations and had bilingual capabilities.<sup>56</sup> Perhaps the most unique source of information for Colonel Fertig was the mistresses of the ranking Japanese officers. Before General Homma left the Philippines his mistress was a good source of information. And one of Fertig's couriers had a cousin who was the Filipino lover of General Morimoto's mistress.<sup>57</sup> The Japanese sources were not so productive, for Colonel Kobayashi, the 14th Area Army operations officer, claimed that "While the Americans steadily received intelligence from their guerrillas, our group never gave us any information that we could use."<sup>58</sup> To ensure that their information was useful, the guerrillas often went to great lengths. For example, when reporting the location, number and type of antiaircraft guns, the guerrillas would sometimes make pencil-and-paper rubbings of the guns' serial numbers on the identification plates to prove the accuracy of their information.<sup>59</sup>

The consensus was that the Mindanao guerrillas were proficient in the gathering of information for use by the invading forces for planning the Victor V operation.<sup>60</sup> The Commanding General, Eighth Army had directed his subordinate commanders to utilize the guerrillas for the gathering of information: "The Force Commander will utilize guerrilla forces for information gathering agencies and establish direct signal

communication between the local guerrilla intelligence net and his own headquarters."<sup>61</sup> The reports contributed to quicker decisions, a reduced requirement for patrolling, and they enabled the commander to conduct pursuit operations more aggressively.<sup>62</sup> Users of the information received from guerrillas on Mindanao agreed that the sketches of enemy positions and concentrations and hand-drawn maps showing details not shown on photographs were invaluable. Maps were especially important because even though there had been extensive surveying by Army engineers of the area before the war, the printing of the maps had not been completed before the Japanese attacked. The fight on Mindanao and in the Visayas was done on oil company maps and sketch maps.<sup>63</sup> The estimates of enemy strength was another matter, and all sources generally agree that the estimates of Japanese troop strength was invariably high. Some sources say that estimates were "exaggerated," but that implies a willful manipulation, which may or may not have been the case.<sup>64</sup>

Major General Willoughby diplomatically finds in this propensity to overestimate the enemy strength a "richness and variety" in guerrilla reporting. MacArthur's historians wrote that "within its limits of accuracy" the information from Mindanao was very useful in planning invasion operations. The 31st Infantry Division called their intelligence reports "models of accuracy," but tempered this praise by stating that their real value was realized when the reports were carefully collated with other sources. Willoughby agrees that the use of aerial photos combined with the guerrilla reports gave a very reliable picture of the actual situation.<sup>65</sup> The information was sufficiently accurate that the Eighth Army found it gained little by sending in their own intelligence agents ahead of the landing on Zamboanga. Little new information was



learned from that which had already been provided by the guerrillas and aerial reconnaissance, and the agents if detected could compromise the secrecy of the landing. Eichelberger prohibited any teams from entering Central Mindanao before the landings there.<sup>66</sup>

The American estimates of the Japanese strength on Central Mindanao are instructive. Historians accept the figure of approximately 55,000 Japanese personnel on the island: over 43,000 troops and nearly 12,850 Japanese noncombatant civilians. Eighth Army estimated the strength at 34,000, X Corps put the estimate at 40,000 and Colonel Fertig estimated that there were 42,600.<sup>67</sup> This latter figure comes from Robert Ross Smith. A 10th Military District intelligence summary of February 1945 puts the estimate of Japanese strength at 69,140, however.<sup>68</sup>

The Japanese were convinced that the guerrilla intelligence was accurate for they were on the receiving end when the bombs struck home.<sup>69</sup> Colonel Ind relates the story that the Japanese released an official communique which declared that the Americans had "perfected a new aerial bomb which was attracted by concentrations of ammunition and fuel."<sup>70</sup> The guerrilla intelligence effort was not without its detractors, however. General Eichelberger, who commanded the Eighth Army, had nothing good to say in his unofficial comments about the guerrillas or about their information gathering capabilities. In briefing the Commanding General of the 40th Infantry Division on the Victor I operation for the landings on Panay and Western Negros, he directed that "no credence is to be given guerrilla reports and tactical decisions are not to be affected by them."<sup>71</sup> He was no more enthusiastic about guerrilla intelligence for the Palawan landings: "...My bete noire is going to be guerrilla reports."<sup>72</sup> These observations by Eichelberger came from

his diaries and letters to his wife, so they may be more representative of Eichelberger's opinions than the conclusions reflected in his official Eighth Army reports.<sup>73</sup> Eichelberger did write of Mindanao that "We did have considerable information about dispositions of enemy troops, since guerrilla forces on Mindanao were the most efficient and best organized in the Philippines."<sup>74</sup> He said nothing of enemy strength in that passage. He did make some criticism of the strength estimates reported by the guerrillas, however: "Part of my personal aggressive policy in Mindanao...was based on erroneous intelligence of the Japanese strength."<sup>75</sup> Eichelberger had pushed the 24th Division hard, had them strung out over 50 miles, and Eichelberger himself was at the head of the column. The problem here was evidently not overestimation of the Japanese strength but rather underestimation of their strength. General Eichelberger was also to claim that the guerrillas overestimated the Japanese strength as they followed the Japanese retreat up the Agusan River Valley.<sup>76</sup>

The Mindanao guerrilla intelligence reports were not always accurate as the 162nd Infantry found when it followed a guerrilla sketch map and attacked in the wrong direction from the enemy's position.<sup>77</sup> Certainly, it is difficult to estimate enemy strength in a jungle, and Fertig believed that the increased movement of Japanese units because of air attacks made the reporting even less reliable.<sup>78</sup> The 24th Infantry Division observed that "Information of the enemy and of the Mindanao roads and trails prior to the operations was sketchy. Guerrilla reports greatly exaggerated the enemy strengths and dispositions. Civilian reports were much more reliable."<sup>79</sup> Oddly, on this last point the 31st Infantry Division had this to say "Guerrilla reports were usually more accurate than civilian reports reflecting, naturally, at least a bit of military

training."<sup>80</sup> So it seems that, just as with any military operation anywhere in the world, there was both good and bad intelligence information supplied to the invasion forces. But Colonel Fertig had a solution, albeit macabre, to the problem of accuracy and credibility. Keats elaborates:

Once, when Headquarters disbelieved Fertig's estimate of Japanese casualties, Fertig sent them two demijohns filled with matched pairs of ears that the Moros had collected. Headquarters never publicly doubted Fertig's estimates of enemy casualties thereafter.<sup>81</sup>

#### Tactical Employment of the Guerrillas with the Invading Forces

The success of the guerrillas in fighting along-side the regular forces was much the same that they had in providing intelligence information: there were mixed reviews. There had to be cooperation between the invasion forces and the guerrillas so that the operational plans of the invading forces were not adversely affected by guerrilla activities. Coordination was needed to ensure that bridges, roads or facilities required by the attacking forces were not destroyed. The commander had to ensure that guerrillas did not affect enemy movements planned for by the conventional force, such as attracting undesired reinforcements or preventing the movement of reserves in response to a feint.<sup>82</sup> In the broad concept the guerrillas would launch an offensive prior to the American assault to clear or isolate objectives. Then they would fight along with the conventional units to secure further objectives, and, finally, the guerrillas would conduct the mopping-up operations. In order to satisfy the command and control over the guerrillas necessary to carry out these tasks, the commander X Corps was given operational control over guerrilla units attached to his combat units. The Commander,

10th Military District retained administrative control.<sup>83</sup> Eighth Army had a Guerrilla Subsection in the general staff G-2 and the expectation was that the guerrillas would be used to the maximum in sabotage and harassing operations and intelligence gathering.<sup>84</sup>

Eighth Army gave many missions to the guerrillas which they were expected to fulfill on Mindanao. These missions were very diverse, and for the most part the guerrillas carried out the missions as expected. They would initially assist advance parties by providing security and information to signal and intelligence teams and hydrographic survey parties. They would provide combat intelligence, guides, interpreters, and reinforce communications and reconnaissance agencies. They could assist pilots downed behind Japanese lines and conduct harassing ambushes and sabotage in enemy rear areas. Guerrillas could destroy aircraft and coastal guns prior to the invasion as well as attack areas deep in the enemy's rear after the invasion. They could provide labor for local working parties, cargadores for supply movements, guards for prisoners of war and provide security guards for roads, supply dumps and key bridges. The guerrillas could provide supplemental supply in certain rare instances, assist with the evacuation of the wounded, and provide a military police function to restore order in liberated areas. The guerrillas could assist civil affairs units in identifying and interrogating collaborators and in working with the local civil governments. Finally, although their capabilities were limited to do so, the guerrillas could fight alongside the conventional force as a conventional unit integrated into the tactical planning and organization. They would more usefully be employed in mopping-up operations in this regard.

By April 1945 the guerrillas had "added greatly to the woes of Morozumi and Harada" with demolition of supplies, roadblocks, bridge

destruction and attacks upon small Japanese garrisons.<sup>86</sup> The guerrilla intelligence reports had pinpointed targets for bombing, thereby eliminating the need for an advanced aerial reconnaissance. Surprise was achieved, and aircraft were destroyed while on the ground by both air attack and sabotage.<sup>87</sup>

During January and February 1945 the guerrillas had seized the Dipolog airstrip in Northern Zamboanga and had held it while surrounded by Japanese. Marine pilots flew out of Dipolog to carry out bombing in Zamboanga City 150 miles away. On March 8, 1945 two reinforced companies of the 21st Infantry, 24th Division flew into Dipolog to reinforce the defense of the airfield initially and then to provide blocking forces in the north for the invasion force that landed at Zamboanga City on March 10th.<sup>88</sup> The guerrilla forces under Captain Donald J. Lecouvre, 121st Infantry, 105th Division provided blocking forces in the Bolong area and at Moroc for the attacking elements of the 41st Infantry Division.<sup>89</sup>

The original plan for a landing on Mindanao called for an assault in Cotabato at Malabang. After a hotly contested fight over the Japanese-held Malabang airstrip, elements of Marine Air Group 24 (MAG-24) and the guerrillas' 108th Division were able to seize the airfield. By April 5th, the Marines were operating out of Malabang. By April 11th the guerrillas had cleared the entire area of Japanese, and two days later, only four days before the planned Eighth Army landing at Malabang, Colonel Fertig radioed Eighth Army that the landing could be made unopposed in either Malabang or Parang, 17 miles away. The landing site was changed to Parang at the last moment, and the Malabang airfield, now renamed Titcomb Field, was used by MAG-24 to support the drive

eastward across Mindanao.<sup>90</sup>

The guerrillas supported the advancing forces as they pushed the Japanese farther back into the interior. Guerrilla units were attached to regular units and shifted from one to the other too often to summarize here.<sup>91</sup> There were some unconventional units formed, even in comparison to the already unusual organization of regular and guerrilla units. Lieutenant Colonel Bowler led an attack on Japanese positions at Sarangani Bay with an oddly configured provisional infantry battalion. The battalion was made up of antiaircraft troops from Battery B of the 496th Antiaircraft Gun Battalion, acting as infantry, and a guerrilla combat company from the 118th Infantry, 106th Division. The battalion used engineer LCM's and was supported by Marine close air support. Also participating in this attack were elements of the guerrilla 116th Infantry and the 108th Division. The expeditionary battalion received very high marks for its fighting qualities.<sup>92</sup> Generally speaking, however, the use of the guerrillas in the conventional combat formations did not work well. The U. S. troops in some cases were actually unaware that Filipino soldiers were also fighting the Japanese in their area, and this made integrated tactical formations especially difficult and hazardous. The Commanding General, Eighth Army concluded that the guerrillas performed their many other missions well but "it is a mistake to use them in the attack as they are critically short of equipment and have little understanding of the tactical principles involved in offensive combat."<sup>93</sup>

With Japanese forces broken and retreating into the Walo area, which had been the last location of Fertig's headquarters before the American invasion, X Corps assigned the primary operational mission to

the 10th Military District to "establish and maintain contact with hostile forces."<sup>94</sup> With Frank McGee commanding, the 107th Division took over from the 24th Division in late July and continued to hunt down Japanese stragglers until the surrender on August 15th. McGee was felled by a sniper's bullet on August 7th, signalling symbolically the end of the American-led guerrilla movement on Mindanao.

## CHAPTER 8

### ENDNOTES

- <sup>1</sup>For example, see Jack Hawkins, Never Say Die, 1961, p. 153.
- <sup>2</sup>Letter LtCol W. W. Fertig to General Hugh J. Casey of July 1, 1943.
- <sup>3</sup>John Keats, They Fought Alone, 1963, p. 225. General Alberto Bayo, Castro's mentor, described this tactic as the "minuet technique" - advance when the enemy withdraws, withdraw when the enemy advances.
- <sup>4</sup>James Dean Sanderson, Behind Enemy Lines, 1959, p. 158; Travis Ingham, Rendezvous By Submarine: The Story of Charles Parsons and the Guerrilla - Soldiers in the Philippines, 1945, pp. 108-109; Margaret Utinsky, "Miss U," 1948, p. 137; Joseph F. St. John, Leyte Calling..., 1945, pp. 123-125.
- <sup>5</sup>Keats, They Fought Alone, p. 343.
- <sup>6</sup>Allison Ind, Allied Intelligence Bureau: Our Secret Weapon in the War Against Japan, 1958, p. 178.
- <sup>7</sup>See for example Ingham, Rendezvous By Submarine, pp. 94-97.
- <sup>8</sup>From Correspondence Files, 10th Military District, Ltr LtCol McGee, CO 106th Div to Maj Herbert Page of December 26, 1943. Of course this statement alluded to politics which were often related to the fighting abilities of the leaders.
- <sup>9</sup>General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area, ATIS, "Guerrilla Warfare in the Philippines," Enemy Publications, No. 359, April 28, 1945, Part I, p. 7 (hereinafter ATIS, I); General Eichelberger took the opposite view of the fighting qualities of the Filipinos. Of the guerrillas on Negros he concludes that they "are outstanding for their willingness to eat rather than to fight." Of those on Cebu he observed that "very time the Japanese advance on those little brown beggars they are inclined to take off with speed and discretion." Eichelberger does not comment on the fighting qualities of the Mindanao guerrillas but does say that the 10th Military District organization was the best that he had observed. See Jay Luvaas, ed., Dear Miss Em: General Eichelberger's War in the Pacific, 1942-1945, 1972, pp. 245, 270, 274, 295.
- <sup>10</sup>ATIS, I, pp. 7, 71; ATIS II, p. 42.
- <sup>11</sup>Steve Mellnik, Philippine Diary 1939-1945, 1969, pp. 259, 299.



<sup>12</sup>ATIS, I, pp. C, 5; ATIS II, p. 49; See also Utinsky, "Miss U," p. 128.

<sup>13</sup>Robert Ross Smith, Triumph in the Philippines, 1963, p. 692. It would be possible to research the Philippine Archives' 10th Military District holdings, however, and a reasonably accurate accounting might be painstakingly derived from the personnel reports and casualty lists of all the units which are contained there.

<sup>14</sup>ATIS, I, p. C; ATIS II, pp. 13-14; Figures for Mindanan alone can be reconstructed using the 10 day reports of each punitive expedition. As a side note, the Japanese removed their dead from the battlefield "tied on poles like wild pig carcasses" and would sometimes burn their dead and even badly wounded on a funeral pyre at an ambush site. See Hawkins, Never Say Die, p. 128; Keats, They Fought Alone, p. 146.

<sup>15</sup>Edward Haggerty, Guerrilla Padre in Mindanao, 1946, p. 66.

<sup>16</sup>Mellnik, Philippine Diary, pp. 250, 261; William Wise, Secret Mission to the Philippines: The Story of "Spyron" and the American-Filipino Guerrillas of World War II, 1968, p. 87; Ltr Fertig to Casey: Ingham, Rendezvous By Submarine, p. 60.

<sup>17</sup>See Hawkins, Never Say Die, p. 167; Haggerty, Guerrilla Padre, p. 11.

<sup>18</sup>Hawkins, Never Say Die, p. 139; Keats, They Fought Alone, pp. 314-315.

<sup>19</sup>Forbes J. Monaghan, Under the Red Sun: A Letter From Manila, 1946, p. 152.

<sup>20</sup>Keats, They Fought Alone, p. 133; Utinsky, "Miss U" is very good on how the priests were integrated into the resistance movement.

<sup>21</sup>Adalia Marquez, Blood on the Rising Sun, 1957, entire; Keats, They Fought Alone, p. 309.

<sup>22</sup>Hawkins, Never Say Die, p. 157.

<sup>23</sup>For samples see: Keats, They Fought Alone, pp. 133, 136, 145; Hawkins, Never Say Die, pp. 179-180; Ingham, Rendezvous By Submarine, p. 83; Wise, Secret Mission, p. 99; ATIS, I, p. 22.

<sup>24</sup>Ingham, Rendezvous By Submarine, pp. 137-138; Keats, They Fought Alone, pp. 152, 342.

<sup>25</sup>Quote from Ingham, Rendezvous By Submarine, p. 64, see also page 88; Ira Wolfert, American Guerrilla in the Philippines, 1945, p. 109.

<sup>26</sup>For information on radios see: Ind, AIB, pp. 167, 207-209, 214; Edward Dissette and H. C. Adamson, Guerrilla Submarines, pp. 75-76; Ingham, Rendezvous By Submarine, pp. 88, 157; Wolfert, American Guerrilla, p. 212; Kermit Roosevelt, War Report of the O.S.S. (Office of Strategic Services), 1976, pp. 137-140.

<sup>27</sup>Ingham, Rendezvous By Submarine, pp. 171-176; Ind, AIB, p. 168; Wise, Special Mission, pp. 90-91, 93; Keats, They Fought Alone, pp. 310-311, 340, 363; Hal Richardson, One-Man War: The Jock McLaren Story, 1957, p. 126.

<sup>28</sup>For information on guerrilla airfields see: U.S. Naval Institute, Reminiscences of Rear Admiral Arthur H. McCollum, USN, (Retired), 1973, Tape 13, p. 596; Ltr, Fertig to Casey; Haggerty, Guerrilla Padre, pp. 193-197; Carlos P. Romulo, I Saw the Fall of the Philippines, 1942, p. 307; ATIS, I, pp. 3, 20, 24, 47, 71, 78; ATIS, II, pp. 55, 62.

<sup>29</sup>See Monaghan, Under the Red Sun, p. 245; General Headquarters, Far East Command, Operations of the Allied Intelligence Bureau, 1948, p. 57; Dissette, Guerrilla Submarines, p. 112; Courtney Whitney, MacArthur: His Rendezvous With History, p. 135; Ind, AIB, p. 210; Keats, They Fought Alone, pp. 404-405; First Demobilization Bureau, "Philippine Operations, Phase Two (Hito Sakusen Kiroku Dai Niki), October 1949," pp. 7-8; Ronald Lewin, The American Magic: Codes, Ciphers and the Defeat of Japan, 1982, general.

<sup>30</sup>General Headquarters, Far East Command, "Philippine Operations Record, Phase II (December 1942 - June 1944), Japanese Monograph No. 3, 1946, p. 53.

<sup>31</sup>Robert Ross Smith, "The Status of Members of Philippine Military Forces During World War II," June 1973, p. 56; Headquarters, Philippines Command, "U.S. Army Recognition Program of Philippine Guerrillas," no date, p. 39; Keats, They Fought Alone, pp. 343-344.

<sup>32</sup>GHQ, FEC, Japanese Monograph No. 3, pp. 41-42; Gene Z. Hanrahan, Japanese Operations Against Guerrilla Forces, 1954, p. 20.

<sup>33</sup>ATIS, II, p. 1; ATIS, I, p. 7.

<sup>34</sup>Both quotes are from Ingham, Rendezvous By Submarine, pp. 89, 107.

<sup>35</sup>Gene Z. Hanrahan, Chinese Communist Guerrilla Tactics: A Source Book, 1952, p. 132.

<sup>36</sup>For general discussion on Japanese counterguerrilla tactics see Hanrahan, Japanese Operations. See also Department of the Army, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, "Counter Insurgency Operations: A Handbook for the Suppression of Communist Guerrilla/Terrorist Operations," 1960, p. 39 for U.S. Army concepts (hereinafter DA, DCSOPS, "Handbook").

<sup>37</sup>For discussion see Bert Bank, Back From the Living Dead: The Infamous Death March and 33 Months in a Japanese Prison, 1945, p. 41; DA, DCSOPS, "Handbook" for discussion of the tactic.

- 38 Mellnik, Philippine Diary, pp. 254-255.
- 39 Sanderson, Behind Enemy Lines, p. 172.
- 40 GHQ, FEC, Japanese Monograph No. 3, p. 11.
- 41 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Future Operations in the Pacific: Report by the Joint Staff Planners, March 10, 1944, pp. 10, 21; See also General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area, "Basic Plan for Montclair Operations," February 25, 1945, pp. 3-4 for the concept.
- 42 Whitney, MacArthur: Rendezvous, p. 152.
- 43 D. Clayton James, The Years of MacArthur, Volume II, 1941-1945, 1975, p. 104.
- 44 General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area, "Staff Study Operation 'George' Musketeer Operations," October 11, 1944. pp. 1, 9.
- 45 A number of reasons are given for the decision to use American forces to liberate the southern islands. A good discussion is in James, Years of MacArthur II, pp. 739-740. See also Samuel Eliot Morison, The Liberation of the Philippines: Luzon, Mindanao, The Visayas, 1944-1945, 1959, pp. 214, 240.
- 46 Smith, Triumph in the Philippines, p. 587.
- 47 For discussion of the Japanese units on Mindanao see especially: Ibid., pp. 587-589, 621-623; Smith puts combat and combat service troops at 28,600 which includes 7,350 civilians recently inducted into the Army; Army Air Force totalled 8,000, Navy totalled 6,450. See also Stanley Falk, Liberation of the Philippines, 1971, p. 134; Headquarters, 31st Infantry Division, Historical Report Thirty-First Division in the Mindanao Campaign 22 April - 30 June 1945, no date, p. 6; James, Years of MacArthur II, p. 549; Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Reports of General MacArthur: Japanese Operations in the Southwest Pacific Area, Volume II, Part II, 1966, p. 549; Keats, They Fought Alone, p. 386, Fertig had put the force as high as 74,000 one year earlier; General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area, "Staff Study Operation Victor-Five," March 8, 1945, p. 2; Saburo Hayashi, Kogun: The Japanese Army in the Pacific War, 1959, p. 127; General Headquarters, Far East Command, "Philippine Operations Record, Phase III, Defense of Leyte by the 35th Army, 1944-1945," Japanese Monograph No. 6, 1946, p. 10.
- 48 Smith, Triumph in the Philippines, p. 648.
- 49 31st Division, Historical Report, p. 12. See also Department of the Army, Order of Battle of the United States Army Ground Forces in World War II: Pacific Theater of Operations, 1959. The actual relationship of the 10th MD is never really specified clearly, or at least it does not appear often in the 8th Army or X Corps reports. On this organizational diagram, the 108th RCT has been added. It was not with the initial invasion force but has been added to the diagram for consistency.

<sup>50</sup>James, Years of MacArthur, II, p. 747.

<sup>51</sup>Ibid.

<sup>52</sup>Smith, Triumph in the Philippines, pp. 647-648, 692, 694; See also Morison, The Liberation of the Philippines, pp. 251. The figures differ somewhat between Smith, Morison, and the 8th Army report of the action. None of the three give estimated guerrilla casualties.

<sup>53</sup>Quoted in Charles Andrew Willoughby, The Guerrilla Resistance Movement in the Philippines: 1941-1945, 1972.

<sup>54</sup>Carlos P. Romulo, I See The Philippines Rise, 1946, pp. 37-38.

<sup>55</sup>Otto Heilbrunn, Partisan Warfare, 1962, p. 113.

<sup>56</sup>Ind, AIB, p. 213.

<sup>57</sup>Keats, They Fought Alone, pp. 135, 203.

<sup>58</sup>Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Reports of General MacArthur: The Campaigns of MacArthur in the Pacific, Volume I, 1966, p. 302 f.n.1, (hereinafter SCAP, Reports I). Taken from the Interrogation Files, G-2, Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.

<sup>59</sup>Keats, They Fought Alone, p. 402.

<sup>60</sup>Headquarters, X Corps, History of X Corps on Mindanao 17 April 1945 - 30 June 1945, 30 June 1945, p. 61; Robert L. Eichelberger, Our Jungle Road to Tokyo, 1950, p. 217.

<sup>61</sup>Headquarters Eighth Army, Field Order No. 26, March 20, 1945.

<sup>62</sup>31st Div, Historical Report, pp. 71-73.

<sup>63</sup>Wendell W. Fertig, "Guerrillero," Part I, no date, p. 54.

<sup>64</sup>Headquarters, Eighth Army, Report of the Commanding General Eighth Army on the Mindanao Operation, no date, p. 104; 31st Division, Historical Report, pp. 71-73; Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Military History, "The Philippines Guerrilla Resistance Movement," no date, pp. 226-227 (hereinafter OCMH, "Guerrilla Resistance Movement"); Commander Amphibious Group Six, U.S. Pacific Fleet, "Report of Amphibious Attack on Zamboanga, Mindanao," March 26, 1945, pp. 52-53.

<sup>65</sup>Charles A. Willoughby and John Chamberlain, MacArthur 1941-1951, 1954, p. 215; SCAP, Reports, I, p. 309; 31st Division, Historical Report, p. 66; Headquarters, Eighth Army, Report of the Commanding General Eighth Army on the Palawan and Zamboanga Operations: Victor III and IV, no date, p. 94.

<sup>66</sup>HQ, 8th Army, Report: V-III, V-IV.

<sup>67</sup>Smith, Triumph in the Philippines, pp. 621-622.

<sup>68</sup>Tenth Military District, Intelligence Summary, No. 13, February 1945, p. 6.

<sup>69</sup>ATIS, I, p. D.

<sup>70</sup>Ibid., AIB, p. 156.

<sup>71</sup>Luvaas, Dear Miss Em, p. 251 f.n.

<sup>72</sup>Ibid., p. 234.

<sup>73</sup>R. R. Smith finds some of Eichelberger's criticisms of guerrilla intelligence overstated and points out instances where it was much better than Eichelberger allowed that it was. For example compare Ibid., p. 249 and Smith, Triumph in the Philippines, pp. 608-609.

<sup>74</sup>Eichelberger, Jungle Road, p. 217.

<sup>75</sup>Luvaas, Dear Miss Em, p. 255.

<sup>76</sup>Ibid., p. 293.

<sup>77</sup>William F. McCartney, The Jungleers: A History of the 41st Infantry Division, 1948, p. 148.

<sup>78</sup>10 MD, INTSUM No. 13, p. 2.

<sup>79</sup>Headquarters, Twenty-fourth Infantry Division, Mindanao Historical Report of the 24th Infantry Division (V-5 Operation 17 April 1945 - 30 June 1945 Philippine Liberation Campaign, no date, p. 109.

<sup>80</sup>31st Division, Historical Report, p. 73.

<sup>81</sup>Keats, They Fought Alone, p. 411.

<sup>82</sup>For example see Heilbrunn, Partisan Warfare, pp. 113-114.

<sup>83</sup>Headquarters, X Corps, Field Order No. 38 "Operations on Mindanao," 30 June 1945, p. 2.

<sup>84</sup>See HQ, 8th, Report: V-III, V-IV, p. 80; GHQ, SWPA, Staff Study, V-5, p. 2; GHQ, SWPA, Staff Study, V-4, p. 2; Smith, Triumph in the Philippines, p. 586; General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area, Operations Instructions No 91, February 14, 1945, p. 11.

<sup>85</sup>The sources which contain samples of these various capabilities of the Mindanao guerrillas are too numerous to list here. Histories, staff studies, personal accounts and field orders already cited contain examples. Four that contain some interesting examples but which have not been cited above are: Headquarters, USAFFE, "Operation of the Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment, 41st Infantry Division at Zamboanga, Mindanao, Philippine Islands," USAFFE Board Report No. 256, April 16, 1945; History of the 31st Infantry Division Training and Combat, 1940-1945, 1946;

Headquarters, Third Engineer Special Brigade, Eighth Army, Third Engineer Special Brigade Historical Report, 1 May 1945 to 31 May 1945, June 11, 1945; Charles W. Boggs, Jr., Marine Aviation in the Philippines, 1951.

<sup>86</sup>Smith, Triumph in the Philippines, p. 623; Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Reports of General MacArthur: Japanese Operations in the Southwest Pacific Area, Volume II, Part I, 1966, p. 356.

<sup>87</sup>Headquarters, Eighth Army, "Staff Study of Japanese Operations on Mindanao Island," no date, pp. 7-8. The previous September 9th the carrier based aircraft using guerrilla reports were able to destroy 68 enemy aircraft in one attack: 60 on the ground and 8 in the air. Mellnik, Philippine Diary, p. 297.

<sup>88</sup>Falk, Liberation of the Philippines, p. 135; HQ, 8th Army, Report: V-III, V-IV, pp. 106-107; HQ, 8th Army, Report: Mindanao Operation, p. 3; Robert Sherrod, History of Marine Corps Aviation in World War II, 1952, p. 496.

<sup>89</sup>McCartney, The Jungleers, pp. 144, 149; Smith, Triumph in the Philippines, pp. 592-596. OCMH, "Resistance Movement." Lecouvre was a former U.S. Army enlisted man.

<sup>90</sup>24th Division, Historical Report, p. 9; Boggs, Marine Aviation, pp. 125, 128-129; Smith, Triumph in the Philippines, p. 621; Eichelberger, Jungle Road, p. 219.

<sup>91</sup>Short summaries are contained in: Uldarico Bacalagon, Philippine Campaigns, 1952, pp. 378-381; HQ, X Corps, History, pp. 62-64; DA, Order of Battle, p. 452.

<sup>92</sup>Smith, Triumph in the Philippines, p. 647 f.n.; Headquarters, Sarangani Bay Task Force, Sarangani Bay Operation 4 July 1945 to 11 August 1945 (Historical Report), no date.

<sup>93</sup>HQ, 8th Army, Report: V-III, V-IV, p. 95; see also Richardson, One-Man War, p. 151.

<sup>94</sup>Headquarters, X Corps, Field Order No. 37 (Operations in Mindanao), June 19, 1945.

## CHAPTER 9

### CONCLUSION

There are many lessons which can be drawn from a study of the resistance movement on Mindanao. The trap which awaits the unwary in arriving at these lessons is the likelihood that the rhetoric of the heroic literature on the subject will seduce the reader into advocacy and sympathy rather than objective appraisal of the information. This was a heroic people who waged a desperate fight against a cruel conqueror. An estimated 1,000,000 Filipinos died in the war, and this with no Philippine battle fleet at sea or grand army in the field. It is very difficult to read the personal accounts of life under the occupation and not feel personally involved somehow. Still, a dogged effort will reveal certain truths which consistently appear throughout the reading, and it is from these facts, distilled and closely scrutinized, that the picture of the Mindanao resistance movement emerges.

The methodology used for the study proved to be a sound one. The four aspects of the model -- terrain, culture, occupation policies, external support -- do provide a simple, workable framework for testing the potential for a resistance movement to succeed. In this particular case, the Mindanao resistance movement lent itself well to study using this method.

The terrain on Mindanao favored the guerrilla, and its obstacles could be overcome to some degree by modern communications -- the radio.

Guerrilla groups could be widely separated within secure mountain sanctuaries yet still be bonded together by communications. A knowledge of how to survive in the jungle and mountainous terrain was perhaps the Mindanao guerrillas' greatest asset.

The culture of the Filipinos on Mindanao would seem to have militated against the successful establishment of an organized resistance movement because of the language, religious, and social differences among the populace. But here is where the American leaders played a crucial role in bringing unity to the movement. The Americans were considered neutral in the struggle for political power on the island, and ultimately the Americans were the only antagonists against the Japanese who had nothing to gain from leadership within the movement other than survival and revenge upon the Japanese. But if the Americans were the thread which drew the diverse Filipino groups together, the Japanese themselves provided the mortar which held them tightly bound.

The occupation policies of the Japanese conqueror did more than any other single factor to unite the Filipino people in resistance to the occupation. For many Filipinos the issue was clearly one of survival. For others the broader, more abstract ideological issues of freedom and democracy drove them into resistance. For some the test became simply one of good versus evil. Both the Christians and the Moros saw the Japanese occupation as a threat to their religion and an assault upon their personal system of values. A proud people, the Filipinos on Mindanao did what they had done historically -- they resisted. For whatever reasons, the Japanese government never understood that the basic tenets of the occupation policies could have only the one predictable effect: to compel the Filipino people to resist.



The external support provided to the resistance movement by GHQ, SWPA, though limited in actual tonnage, contributed to the success of the resistance movement far beyond its apparent capacity to do so. The ammunition and weapons helped the guerrillas sustain the fight at a minimum level, and the radios helped bind the guerrilla groups together. But the real significance of the submarine visits was two-fold: through the recognition of leaders and the shipment of supplies to them, General MacArthur was able to tie the guerrilla force together under one central command and give them credibility in the eyes of their fellow Filipinos. The submarines brought hope to the Filipino people, and this was the second and most important significance of the submarine visits. The submarines represented the keeping of a promise, and they were a tangible sign that one day the Filipino people would be rid of the conqueror.

There are many other lessons which can be drawn from the resistance movement on Mindanao, but there are an equal number which do not have clear answers. The success of the Mindanao guerrilla movement would seem to say something about the type of leaders best fitted to lead a guerrilla resistance, and it does to a point. But the leaders on Mindanao were unique men who in many ways were ideally suited to lead the movement. They were at home in the culture and environment to large degree, they had reputations for being businesslike and apolitical, and they were older and presumably wiser. More important, most of them had bona fide military credentials -- United States Army commissions -- which gave them widely accepted credibility. Their success was greater because they were on Mindanao than it might have been elsewhere because of the unusual situation caused by the need to have neutral leaders for the Moros and Christians.

Another unanswered question is just how successful were Mindanao's

guerrillas? They were surely not as effective against the Japanese as many chroniclers of the movement have concluded. They were not larger than life, nor were they unequalled among other guerrilla soldiers in the world, as some of the more romantic accounts suggest. Still, they were extremely courageous, inured to hardship, and tough fighters. But what affect did they have upon the Japanese? They tied up Japanese troops on Mindanao which could have been used elsewhere, but they did not cause any change in Japan's ability to wage war in the Pacific. They did not deny the use of ports and airfields on Mindanao to the Japanese, nor did they bring an end, or even a reduction, to the oppressive, cruel policies which brought death and poverty to many Filipinos. This does not imply that they were not successful, however, for their real value was that they were a symbol of resistance. They were a manifestation of Filipino pride, an alter ego for the nearly 2,000,000 Filipinos on Mindanao who lived under the yoke, and they were a source of refuge for many. Perhaps the guerrillas were "little more of an annoyance than the mosquitoes" to the Japanese. Even so, any camper who has lain awake nights combatting mosquitoes knows what toll the experience can take on the human constitution.

The contribution of the guerrillas to the success of the American invasion is clear, and it is widely accepted that many lives of American soldiers were saved through the contributions of the guerrillas to the planning for the invasion of Mindanao and during the invasion itself. Still, just how much they contributed to the success of the invasion depends on the objective sought to be achieved. Did they fight as regiments alongside American regiments? No. Did they save lives and hasten the invasion of the Philippines? Yes. The question which this suggests to us today is do we fully appreciate how to realize the full potential from

a guerrilla force, and by extension, do our military and State Department leaders today fully understand how to do so?

This question provides a lead to further research that might be pursued. In addition, it is tempting to propose research which will compare the resistance movement in the Philippines with the resistance movements elsewhere during World War II. When it is alluded to at all, the Philippine resistance is often passed aside as an "internecine struggle." But I suspect that the Philippine resistance was far more widespread and united within the population than in many other resistance movements and as well led as most.

The most fertile area open to further research into the Mindanao resistance movement itself is an oral history which could be conducted with the surviving American members of the Mindanao guerrillas. A major contribution could be made on how the Mindanao guerrillas were first organized and what personal relationships -- politics, decisions -- affected the growth of the organization. In many respects this paper has only barely tapped the potential for the study of this guerrilla organization.

The statement that this paper makes is that the Mindanao resistance movement was successful, and it was successful in part because of the role Americans played in its establishment and sustainment. For the student, the Mindanao resistance movement provides a model of a successful resistance and provides some clues to the requirements for success of any resistance movement. For the man-at-arms, it is an example of courage, ingenuity and duty. For the strategist, the Filipino resistance is an example of a successful resistance and should be used for studying United States' policies for acting in this arena.

APPENDIX A

## APPENDIX A

### 10th MILITARY DISTRICT UNITS: JANUARY 31, 1945

(Notations are made of some of the Americans serving in these units to provide a measure of American leadership in the Mindanao guerrilla organization)

#### 10th Military District Headquarters

Established: September 18, 1942

Commanded by: Colonel Wendell W. Fertig

Personnel: Chief of Staff - LtCol Sam Wilson (Manila businessman)  
Deputy Chief of Staff - Maj. M. M. Wheeler (USNR)  
G-2 - Maj. H. A. Rosenquist  
Signal Officer - Capt. James Garland

#### "A" Corps, Western Mindanao, Headquarters

Established: January 1, 1944

Commanded by: LtCol Robert V. Bowler (38 years old, taught economics at Washington State U. Owned fisheries in Alaska. Reserve officer called to active duty before the war)

Personnel Strength: officers - 142; enlisted - 798.

Personnel: G-2 - Maj. Chandler B. Thomas

G-3 - Capt. Donald H. Wills

Units: 105th, 106th, 108th, 109th Divisions, 121st Separate Regiment and the 116th Separate Battalion.

#### 105th Division

Established: January 23, 1943

Commanded by: LtCol Hipolito Garman (Filipino)

Personnel: officers - 324; enlisted - 4,270.

Units: 106th Regiment, 107th Regiment, 115th Regiment, 121st Separate Regiment - Lt. Donald Lecouvre (former U.S. Air Corps enlisted man). This regiment fell also under "A" Corps.

#### 106th Division

Established: October 7, 1943

Commanded by: LtCol Frank McGee (Mindanao planter before the war. Former U.S. Army officer with World War I service. West Point graduate).

Personnel: officers - 298; enlisted - 3,595.

Units: 116th Regiment - Maj. Herbert Page (68 years old, former Philippine Constabulary officer. Mindanao planter at Glan, Cotabato before the war), 118th Regiment - Maj. Salipada Pendatun (Filipino), 119th Regiment, 116th Separate Battalion. Operated independently under "A" Corps also.

## 107th Division

Established: May 1, 1944

Commanded by: First commander was LtCol Clyde C. Childress (Battalion commander in 61st Division, PA, before the war). Childress was evacuated to join U.S. Army forces on Leyte January 1945. Succeeded by LtCol Claro Laureta, a Filipino PA officer.

Personnel: officers - 141; enlisted - 2,308.

Units: 130th Regiment, 111th Provisional Battalion - Lt. Owen P. Wilson (unsundered sergeant, U.S. Air Corps), 112th Provisional Battalion - Lt. Anton Haratik, Sternberg Detachment - Lt. Adolph Sternberg, Jr. (unsundered sergeant, U.S. Air Corps).

## 108th Division

Established: December 14, 1942

Commanded by: LtCol Charles W. Hedges (Age - late forties. With Kolambugan Lumber Mills on Mindanao before the war. Held U.S. Army Reserve commission. After Japanese invasion he commanded Gen. Fort's Motor Transport Co.)

Personnel: officers - 974; enlisted - 13,012.

Units: 105th Regiment; 108th Regiment; Maranao Militia Force - separate command (for political reasons), 124th Regiment, 126th Regiment, 127th Regiment, 128th Regiment, 1st Provisional Regiment, 2nd Provisional Regiment, Separate battalions - 4 units, Separate companies - 5 units.

## 109th Division

Established: March 14, 1943

Commanded by: Originally commanded by LtCol Robert V. Bowler. Succeeded by LtCol James R. Grinstead (age in mid-fifties. Retired U.S. Army officer - service in Mexico; World War I: twice wounded, received DSC; Philippine Constabulary officer in Moro campaigns. Mindanao planter in Cotabato before the war. Also succeeded to command 106th Division).

Personnel: officers - 327; enlisted - 3,987.

Units: 109th Regiment, 111th Regiment, 112th Regiment - Capt. William McLaughlin (former sergeant, 31st Infantry; commissioned when war broke out), 117th Regiment.

## 110th Division

Established: September 15, 1942

Commanded by: LtCol Ernest E. McClish (Manila businessman before the war. Nov. 1941 assumed command of a PA regiment being mobilized. Left hospital rather than surrender to Japanese. Evacuated to Leyte January 1944).

Personnel: officers - 317; enlisted - 5,086.

Units: 110th Regiment, 113th Regiment, 114th Regiment - Capt. Paul H. Marshall (U.S. Army Private First Class who escaped from Davao Penal Colony April 3, 1943 with 9 other Americans. Succeeded McClish on his evacuation to Leyte).

- Notes:
- (1) There were changes from time-to-time in the guerrilla unit leadership. This listing reflects only the January 31, 1945 leadership as shown in General Headquarters, U.S. Army Forces, Pacific, "The Guerrilla Resistance Movement in the Philippines," March 20, 1948.
  - (2) Some 187 Americans have been listed as having fought with the guerrillas in Mindanao. Not all can be named here for the positions all held are not in the available records.
  - (3) After "A" Corps was established, Fertig maintained the 107th and 110th Divisions under his immediate control, while Bowler, with all of the remaining units, reported to Fertig through "A" Corps Headquarters.
  - (4) Figure 7 shows the operational boundaries of these guerrilla divisions in the 10th Military District.

## MINDANAO GUERRILLA ORGANIZATION

JANUARY 1945




Figure 7



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Dyess, William E. The Dyess Story. New York: G. Putnam's Sons, 1944.

Dyess was interned in Davao Penal Colony before his celebrated escape. Book published to inform Americans of life in Japanese camps.

Earle, Dixon. Bahala Na...Come What May. Berkeley, Ca.: Howell North, 1961.

Story of Mission ISRM. Good on how SWPA penetration parties operated in conjunction with the guerrillas.

Eichelberger, Robert L. Our Jungle Road to Tokyo. New York: The Viking Press, 1950.

Personal memoir by the commander of the 8th Army. Contains a chapter on the Mindanao operation.

Galang, Ricardo. Secret Mission to the Philippines. Manila: University Publishing Co., 1948.

Account of a coastwatcher expedition sent by AIB to Mindoro Island.

Gunnison, Royal Arch. So Sorry, No Peace. New York: Viking Press, 1944.

Very good account by a correspondent interned at Santo Tomas. Details life outside camp as well.

Haggerty, Edward. Guerrilla Padre in Mindanao. New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1946.

Haggerty was a priest who moved with the guerrillas. Very good on details of day-to-day survival. One of the best sources available on Mindanao guerrillas.

Harkins, Philip. Blackburn's Headhunters. New York: W. W. Norton, 1955.

Account of one of the guerrilla units on Luzon under Voickmann's command. Taken from Lieutenant Donald Blackburn's diaries and personal interviews.

Hawkins, Jack. Never Say Die. Philadelphia: Dorrance, 1961.

Written by a Marine who escaped from Davao Penal Colony. Remained to fight as a guerrilla on Mindanao. Good account.

Travis, Ingham. Rendezvous by Submarine: The Story of Charles Parsons and the Guerrilla-Soldiers in the Philippines. Garden City: Doubleday, Doran and Co., 1945.

Good on Parsons's activities on Mindanao.

Keats, John. They Fought Alone. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1963.

Originally to be published as They Fought Alone: Fertig and the Mindanao Guerrillas with Wendell Fertig as co-author. Only source which discusses the political jockeying for leadership of the Mindanao guerrillas. Very strong in praise for Fertig. Must reading for study of Mindanao guerrillas. Partially fictionalized but based on Fertig's personal papers. Lacking in dates, structural continuity. No documentation - assumption is that Fertig approved Keats' account. Contains list of names of all Americans who fought with the Mindanao guerrillas.

MacArthur, Douglas. Reminiscences. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964.

Contains MacArthur's personal recollections of the Philippine guerrillas.

Marquez, Adalia. Blood on the Rising Sun. New York: DeTanko Publishers, 1957.

Personal account of a Filipino news reporter who became a double-agent after the Japanese killed her husband.

McCoy, Melvyn H. and S. M. Meilnik. Ten Escape from Tojo. New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 1944.

Adventurous account of the escape from Davao Penal Colony on Mindanao. Details guerrilla participation.

Mellnik, Steve. Philippine Diary 1939-1945. New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1969.

Mellnik escaped from Davao Penal Colony, joined the guerrillas on Mindanao and later worked in the G-2, GHQ, SWPA in the Philippine section. Very useful source.

Mojica, Proculo L. Terry's Hunters (The True Story of the Hunters ROTC Guerrillas). Manila: Benipayo Press, 1965.

Nothing on Mindanao guerrillas. Has good bibliography. Good on various groups on Luzon.

Monaghan, Forbes J. Under the Red Sun: A Letter from Manila. New York: Declan X. McMullen, 1946.

Account by a Jesuit priest on Luzon. Illuminates role of the clergy in the Philippine resistance.

Panlilio, Yay. The Crucible. New York: MacMillan, 1950.

The famous "Colonel Yay" of Luzon. Account of Mestiza (female) guerrilla leader. Broadens concept of Philippine guerrillas.

Reynolds, Bob. Of Rice and Men. Philadelphia: Dorrance, 1947.

Personal account of life in Japanese internment camps. Nothing on Mindanao.

Richardson, Hal. One-Man War: The Jock McLaren Story. Sydney, Australia: Angus and Robertson, 1957.

Adventures of an Australian working with the Mindanao guerrillas. The best account depicting life as a guerrilla on Mindanao.

St. John, Joseph F. Leyte Calling.... New York: Vanguard, 1945.

Coastwatcher who worked with T.D. Richardson on Leyte. Richardson was Kangleon's emissary to Fertig.

Scott, Hugh L. Some Memories of a Soldier. New York: Century, 1928.

Scott served as Governor of Sulu. Good for understanding Moros, U.S. tactics and policies in dealing with the Moros, and pre-war Mindanao.

Spender, Louise Reid. Guerrilla Wife. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1945.

Day-by-day account of life for Americans under the Japanese occupation. Spender's husband was a guerrilla on Panay; she lived in the mountains. Details on Claude Fertig and his family who were close friends of the Spencers. Claude Fertig is Wendell Fertig's brother.

Stevens, Frederic H. Santo Tomas Internment Camp 1942-1945. United States: Stratford House, 1946.

Exceptionally detailed account of life as an internee in Japanese internment camps.

Stewart, Sidney. Give Us This Day. New York: W. W. Norton, 1946.

Personal account of life in Japanese internment camps. Includes Davao Penal Colony on Mindanao.

Utinsky, Margaret. "Miss U." San Antonio: Naylor, 1948.

American nurse who worked with the Philippine underground and later joined a guerrilla unit on Luzon.

Volckmann, R. W. We Remained: Three Years Behind the Enemy Lines in the Philippines. New York: W. W. Norton, 1954.

One of the "standard" sources on the Philippine resistance.

Volckmann was an American colonel who led a guerrilla unit on Luzon.

Weinstein, Alfred H. Barbed-Wire Surgeon. New York: MacMillan, 1948.

A medical doctor's perspective on the Japanese internment camps. Details the medical problems faced by the internees as well as the routine of camp life.

Wise, William. Secret Mission to the Philippines: The Story of "Spyron" and the American - Filipino Guerrillas of World War II. New York: E. P. Dutton, 1968.

Details how Commander Parsons forged the link between GHQ, SWPA and the Philippine guerrillas. Mindanao guerrillas covered.

Wolfert, Ira. American Guerrilla in the Philippines. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1945.

Story of Lt. I. D. Richardson, USN, assistant to Colonel Kangleon, leader of the Leyte guerrillas. Wolfert was a correspondent who also covered the First and Third U.S. Armies in Europe and the landings on Guadalcanal and in the Solomons. Brings a broader perspective to his writings on the guerrillas.

## 7. Books: Secondary Sources

Abaya, Hernando J. Betrayal in the Philippines. New York: A. A. Wyn, 1946.

Strong anti-collaborationist statement. Some information on guerrillas under the puppet government.

Agoncillo, Teodoro A. The Fateful Years: Japan's Adventure in the Philippines, 1941-45, Two Volumes. Quezon City, Philippines: R. P. Garcia Publishing Co., 1965.

Has complete bibliography with many primary and unpublished sources. Provides Filipino sources on the subject which are not readily found elsewhere. Best source for integration of the guerrilla resistance into the larger framework of the historical period.

Baclagon, Uldarico S. Lessons from the Huk Campaign in the Philippines. Manila: M. Colcol and Co., 1956.

Good amalgamation of the Filipino experience in the guerrilla environment. Baclagon is an acknowledged authority on Philippine military history.

\_\_\_\_\_. Philippine Campaigns. Manila: Graphic House, 1952.  
Good on how guerrilla organizations were initially formed. Draws heavily on GHQ, SWPA, "Guerrilla Resistance Movement in the Philippines" (see supra) and uses unpublished monograph on the 10th Military District prepared by the Philippine Army.

- They Chose to Fight: The Story of the Resistance Movement in Negros and Siquijor Island. Quezon City, P.I.: Capitol Publishing House, 1962.  
Baclagon was a guerrilla leader on Negros. Source describes Fertig's role in establishing the guerrilla organization on Negros.
- Bayo, Alberto. 150 Questions for a Guerrilla, ed. Robert K. Brown, trans. Hugo Hartenstein and Dennis Harber. United States: no pub., 1963.  
Handy checklist for organization, tactics, weapons.
- Beck, John Jacob. MacArthur and Wainwright: Sacrifice of the Philippines. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1974.  
Good for background on high level discussions in U.S. Government leading to MacArthur's departure for Australia.
- Bernstein, David. The Philippine Story. New York: Farrar, Straus, 1947.  
Excellent overview of U.S.-Philippine relationship and Philippine society.
- Blacker, Irwin, R. Irregulars, Partisans, Guerrillas: Great Stories From Rogers' Rangers to the Haganah. New York: Simon and Shuster, 1954.  
Provides samples of other successful guerrilla groups. Good for comparison.
- Boggs, Charles W., Jr. Marine Aviation in the Philippines. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1951.  
Written for the Marine Corps Historical Division. Contains detailed account of air support for the guerrillas and the invasion forces on Mindanao.
- Campbell, Arthur. Guerrillas: A History and Analysis. New York: John Day, 1968.  
Useful for background. Does not address Philippine resistance movement.
- Daugherty, William E. and Morris Janowitz. A Psychological Warfare Casebook. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1958.  
Lengthy treatment, good for background. Little on the Philippines.
- Day, Beth. The Philippines: Shattered Showcase of Democracy in Asia. New York: M. Evans, 1974.  
Little on resistance movement. Separatist pressures on Mindanao are covered.
- Dissette, Edward and H. C. Adamson. Guerrilla Submarines. New York: Ballantine Books, 1972.  
Good on Parsons's role in supporting the guerrillas. Only book which details the submarine support to the guerrillas. The text contains no documentation, so information is not always verifiable.
- Dormal, Jose Demandante. The War in Panay: A Documentary History of the Resistance Movement in Panay During World War II. Manila: Diamond Historical Publications, 1952.  
Excellent account of 6th Military District based on radio messages, diaries, official documents. Covers relationship with Mindanao guerrillas.

- Dunlop, Richard. Behind Japanese Lines: With the OSS in Burma. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1979.  
Provides insight into OSS operations in the Far East. Useful for comparison with AIB penetration party activities in the Philippines.
- Dupuy, Trevor Nevitt. Asian and Axis Resistance Movements, (from The Military History of World War II: Vol. 16). New York: Franklin Watts, 1965.  
Introductory material. Brief treatment of the Philippine resistance. Nothing on Mindanao.
- Elarth, Harold Hanne. The Story of the Philippine Constabulary. Los Angeles: Globe Printing, 1949.  
Extremely good account, particularly of the PC's campaigns against the Moros. Contains biographical section on Americans who fought as members of the Constabulary.
- Falk, Stanley. Liberation of the Philippines. New York: Ballantine Books, 1971.  
General treatment of the Allied invasion of the Philippines. Useful for introduction to this campaign.
- Feldt, Eric A. The Coastwatchers. New York: Oxford University Press, 1946.  
Account of the intelligence teams working in the Southwest Pacific. Focuses on the daily operations, survival aspects.
- Forbes, W. Cameron. The Philippine Islands, Vol. I. New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1928.  
Good background history for understanding the pre-war Philippine culture.
- Foreign Affairs Association of Japan. Japan Yearbook 1943-1944. Tokyo, December 1944.  
Contains useful material from Japanese viewpoint on events in the Philippines.
- 40th Infantry Division: The Years of World War II, 7 December 1941 - 7 April 1946. Baton Rouge: Army and Navy Publishing Co., 1947.  
Unofficial history. 40th ID had one unit in Mindanao invasion.
- Frank, Benis M. and Henry I. Shaw, Jr. Victory and Occupation: History of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II, Vol V. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1968.  
Describes use of Marine aviation in support of the Mindanao invasion. Mentions Marine POW's in Davao Penal Colony.
- Friend, Theodore. Between Two Empires: The Ordeal of the Philippines 1929-1946. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965.  
Excellent study of Philippine society and politics under the U.S. and Japan. Extensive annotated bibliography.

A Guide to U.S.S./State Department Intelligence and Research Reports I:

"Japan and Its Occupied Territories During World War II." Washington: University Publications of America, 1977.

Contains the little research done on the Philippines by the OSS during this period.

Hanrahan, Gene Z. Chinese Communist Guerrilla Tactics: A Source Book. New York: Columbia University, 1952.

Translations of principal Chinese works on the subject. (USACGSC) Useful for comparison with tactics of Philippine guerrillas against the Japanese.

Japanese Operations Against Guerrilla Forces.

Washington: The Johns Hopkins University, July 1954. (USACGSC).

Very good for understanding Japanese concepts for fighting resistance forces. Does not address Mindanao specifically.

Hayashi, Saburo. "Kogun": The Japanese Army in the Pacific War.

Quantico, Va.: The Marine Corps Assn., 1959.

History of Japanese plans and policies. Account of operations in the Philippines; makes no mention of the guerrilla resistance. Perhaps this book is important because of this omission because it reflects Japanese military priorities.

Heilbrunn, Otto. Partisan Warfare. New York: Praeger, 1962.

Very good integration of World War II partisan movements. Weak on Philippine resistance. Theoretical study.

History of the Thirty-First Infantry Division in Training and Combat,

1940-1945. Baton-Rouge: The Army and Navy Publishing Co., 1946.

An unofficial history.

Horn, Florence. Orphans of the Pacific. New York: Reynal and Hitchcock, 1941.

Good picture of the Philippines on the eve of the Japanese invasion. Chapters on the Moros, mining industry, Japanese, Chinese, pagans, the Church and Americans.

Hurley, Vic. Jungle Patrol: The Story of the Philippine Constabulary.

New York: E. P. Dutton, 1938.

Describes small unit patrolling and tactics used by the U.S. Army and Philippine Constabulary to fight the Moros.

Swish of the Kris. New York: E. P. Dutton, 1936.

Very good for understanding the Moros. One of the few books available on the subject.

Ind, Allison. Allied Intelligence Bureau: Our Secret Weapon in the War Against Japan. New York: David McKay, 1958.

Of little value in documenting the growth and structure of the AIB. Consists of a series of vignettes or "war story" anecdotes on the more celebrated AIB projects. Has information on Parsons' missions and the submarine deliveries.



Iriye, Akira. Power and Culture: The Japanese American War, 1941-1945. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981.

Background for understanding the clash of cultural values in the Philippines.

James, D. Clayton. The Years of MacArthur. Boston, Houghton Mifflin, Vol. I, 1880-1941 (1970); Vol. II, 1941-1945 (1975).

Good for understanding MacArthur's role in shaping the Philippine Army and his concept for using the guerrillas. Extensive bibliography.

Johnson, Chalmers A. Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power: The Emergence of Revolutionary China 1937-1945. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962.

Study of the Chinese resistance to the Japanese. Useful for understanding Japanese policies and tactics against resistance movements.

Russell, Edward F. Langley. The Knights of Bushido: The Shocking History of Japanese War Atrocities. New York: E. P. Dutton, 1958.

Study of Japanese torture and brutality. Russell did a similar study on the German Nazis.

Lear, Elmer. The Japanese Occupation of the Philippines, Leyte, 1941-1945. Ithaca: Cornell University, 1961.

In-depth case study of the Leyte resistance movement. Good for comparing Mindanao and Leyte guerrilla organizations. Lacking in use of U.S. Government documents, but has extensive bibliography nevertheless. Many letters, interviews, Philippine documents.

Lee, Chong-Sik. Counterinsurgency in Manchuria: The Japanese Experience, 1931-1940. Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, 1967.

Case study of Japanese planning for insurgency and counter-guerrilla warfare. Based on Japanese documents. Good for understanding Japanese approach.

Lewin, Ronald. The American Magic: Codes, Ciphers and the Defeat of Japan. New York: Farrar Straus Giroux, 1982.

Provides a basis for understanding how the intelligence information coming from the Philippines assisted GHQ, SWPA and the War Department in integrating the information received from electronic sources.

Luvaas, Jay, ed. Dear Miss Em: General Eichelberger's War in the Pacific, 1942-1945. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1972.

Contains opinions gleaned from diaries and letters of the commander, U.S. 8th Army on the invasion of Mindanao.

Madej, W. Victor, ed. Japanese Armed Forces Order of Battle 1937-1945. Vol. I. Allentown, Pa.: Game Marketing Co., 1981.

Edited version of the "Order of Battle of the Japanese Armed Forces" issued by the U.S. Army.

Manchester, William. American Caesar: Douglas MacArthur 1880-1964. New York: Dell Publishing, 1978.

Contains brief but valuable references to the Philippine resistance movement, particularly on the aspects of collaboration.

McCartney, William F. The Jungleers: A History of the 41st Infantry Division. Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 1948.  
An unofficial history.

Miksche, F.O. Secret Forces: The Technique of Underground Movements. London: Faber and Faber, 1950.  
Some theoretical construction. Focuses on European experience but makes references to Asian resistance movements.

Molnar, Andrew R. and others. Undergrounds in Insurgent, Revolutionary, and Resistance Warfare. Washington: The American University, 1963.  
Good theoretical and factual background for the study of resistance movements. The Philippines 1946-1954 is discussed in one chapter.

Morison, Samuel Eliot. The Liberation of the Philippines: Luzon, Mindanao, The Visayas, 1944-1945. Boston: Little, Brown, 1959.  
Alludes to guerrilla activity. Emphasis on naval aspects of Mindanao invasion.

Morton, Louis. The Fall of the Philippines. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1953.  
Provides setting for the guerrilla movement. Best published discussion on the series of events leading to the surrender of USAFFE forces on Mindanao.

Ney, Virgil. Notes on Guerrilla Warfare: Principles and Practices. Washington: Command Publications, 1961.  
An earlier theoretical work on guerrilla warfare. Includes a chapter on the Philippines.

Porter, Catherine. Crisis in the Philippines. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1942.  
Focuses on Philippine culture and politics. Describes Japanese role in the pre-war Philippine economy.

Powers, Robert D., Jr. "Guerrillas and the Laws of War," Studies in Guerrilla Warfare, U.S. Naval Institute (Menasha, Wisc.: George Banta, 1963), pp. 23-27.  
Background for understanding extra-legal qualities and claims to legal legitimacy of the resistance fighter.

Recto, Claro M. Three Years of Enemy Occupation: The Issue of Political Collaboration in the Philippines. Manila: People's Publishers, 1946.  
Strongly presented rationale for forgiving those who collaborated with the Japanese. Contains appendices of historical documents useful for understanding the collaborationist issue.

Romulo, Carlos P. I Saw the Fall of the Philippines. Garden City: Doubleday, Doran, 1942.  
Written by a journalist, a close friend of President Quezon, who became an officer on MacArthur's SWPA staff. Romulo is the Philippine Foreign Minister in 1982.

- I See the Philippines Rise. Garden City: Doubleday, 1946.  
References to the guerrillas throughout. Somewhat overstated in its rhetoric.
- Mother America: A Living Story of Democracy. Garden City: Doubleday, Doran, 1943.  
Describes impact of American political values on Philippine culture.
- Roosevelt, Kermit. War Report of the O.S.S. (Office of Strategic Services). New York: Walker, 1976.  
Comprehensive account of the OSS. Valuable for comparison to AIB. Leads to questions of what OSS might have offered GHQ, SWPA had it been used in that theater.
- Sanderson, James Dean. Behind Enemy Lines. New York: Pyramid Books, 1959.  
Stories on World War II guerrillas. Nothing on Mindanao guerrillas. Background only.
- Sawyer, Frederick L. Sons of Gunboats. Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute, 1946.  
Story of small American coastal Navy which operated in Philippine waters to assist U.S. Army in pursuing Filipino guerrillas during the pacification campaigns. Valuable for understanding dynamics of the "sea war" between Fertig's guerrilla navy and the Japanese gunboat fleet.
- Seton-Watson, Hugh. The East European Revolution. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1956.  
Chapter on East European resistance movements is a useful comparison for understanding the Philippine resistance.
- Sherrod, Robert. History of Marine Corps Aviation in World War II. Washington: Combat Forces Press, 1952.  
Details Marine close air support and bombing on Mindanao in support of the invasion forces and the guerrillas.
- Smith, Robert Aura. Philippine Freedom 1946-1958. New York: Columbia University Press, 1958.  
Good on integration of U.S. and Filipino cultures. Useful in understanding the cultural/political basis for the resistance movement.
- Smith, Robert Ross. Triumph in the Philippines. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1963.  
Very detailed account on U.S. invasion of Mindanao. Some good detail on how the guerrillas were used.
- Smythe, Donald. Guerrilla Warrior: The Early Life of John J. Pershing. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1973.  
Very useful for understanding the unique relationship which existed between the Americans and the Moros. Extensive bibliography citing rarely found sources.

Stafford, David. Britain and European Resistance, 1940-1945: A Survey of the Special Operations Executive, with Documents. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1980.

Of some marginal utility for understanding how the SOE worked with the AIB under GHQ, SWPA.

Steinberg, David Joel. Philippine Collaboration in World War II. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1967.

The best English language assessment of the collaboration issue. Very good on describing how the guerrilla resistance movement impacted on the governing of the Philippines under the Japanese occupation.

Steinberg, Rafael. Return to the Philippines. New York: Time-Life Books, 1979.

Has first chapter devoted to guerrilla activities. Concise overview, good for introduction to the subject. Good bibliography.

Sun Tzu. The Art of War, trans. Samuel B. Griffith. New York: Oxford University Press, 1963.

A background introduction to ancient Chinese military precepts which influenced the Japanese. Represents the ideal theoretical construct against which actual Japanese military policies can be measured.

Supreme Commander for the Allied Forces. Reports of General MacArthur: Japanese Operations in the Southwest Pacific Area, Vol. II, Parts I and II. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1966.

Reports of General MacArthur: The Campaigns of MacArthur in the Pacific, Vol. I. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1966.

Very good detail on Philippine guerrillas. Maps, organizational structure, radio nets, intelligence team deployment.

Toland, John. But Not in Shame: The Six Months After Pearl Harbor. New York: Random House, 1961.

Very good on the events which immediately preceded the establishment of the guerrilla organizations throughout the Philippines.

The Twenty-Fourth Infantry Division: A Brief History. Kokura, Kyushu, Japan: U.S. Army Military Institute, 1947.

An unofficial history.

U.S. Army, Department of the Army. Order of Battle of the United States Army Ground Forces in World War II: Pacific Theater of Operations. Washington: 1959.

Special Forces Operation (U), Field Manual 31-20. Washington: September 30, 1977.

Doctrine for assistance to resistance forces.

Stability Operations: U.S. Army Doctrine, Field Manual 31-23. Washington: October 2, 1972.  
Doctrine for assistance to resistance forces.

The Role of U.S. Army Special Forces, Training Circular 31-20-1. Washington: October 22, 1976.  
Basic concepts for assisting resistance forces.

U.S. Marine Corps. Small Wars Manual. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1940.  
Good for understanding U.S. doctrine for operating in a guerrilla environment during the pre-World War II period.

Valeriano, Napoleon D. and Charles T. R. Bohannon. Counter guerrilla Operations: The Philippine Experience. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962.  
Focuses on post-World War II period but draws lessons from the pre-war and wartime experience. Bibliography provides good leads to background reading.

Vreeland, Nena and others. Area Handbook for the Philippines, DA Pam. 550-72. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1976.  
Comprehensive picture of the Philippines: history, culture, geography, politics, and so forth.

Whitney, Courtney. MacArthur: His Rendezvous with History. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1956.  
Whitney supervised the guerrilla activities in the Philippines for MacArthur. Book contains a chapter devoted to the Philippine guerrillas.

Willoughby, Charles A. and John Chamberlain. MacArthur 1941-1951. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1954.  
Devotes one chapter to the Philippine guerrilla movement. Good on GHQ, SWPA view. Nothing on Mindanao.

Willoughby, Charles Andrew. The Guerrilla Resistance Movement in the Philippines: 1941-1945. New York: Vantage Press, 1972.  
Aside from the introduction, this book is a verbatim reproduction of GHQ, U.S. Army Forces, Pacific, "The Guerrilla Resistance Movement in the Philippines" cited above. The book's value is that it makes these documents available through public library circulation.

Zich, Arthur. The Rising Sun. Alexandria, Va.: Time-Life Books, 1977.  
General treatment of Japan's early successes in World War II.  
Introduction to Japan's policies in the conquered territories.

## 8. Periodicals

Chynoweth, E. G. "Lessons from the Fall of the Philippines," The Military Engineer, XLVI, No. 313 (September-October 1954), 369-372.  
Chynoweth commanded the Visayan Force. Expresses his opinion why the U.S. failed to meet the Japanese invasion of the Philippines successfully.

Fertig, Claude E. "American Engineers with the Filipino Guerrillas," The Military Engineer, XLI, No. 283 (September-October, 1949), 366-368.

Written by Wendell Fertig's brother. Relates events on Panay: how American civilian engineers became guerrillas.

"Logistical Support of Guerrilla Warfare," The Review, XLI, No. 6 (May-June 1962), 49-68.

Good introduction to the many problems of supporting guerrillas logistically.

Kuder, Edward. "The Philippines Never Surrendered," The Saturday Evening Post, (A Five Part Series), Vol. 217, No's 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, February 10, 17, 24, March 3, 10, (1945).

Kuder was an educator who had worked among the Moros for many years. These articles are detailed accounts of the events in Lanao Province from the Japanese invasion through September 1943. See also Kuder's article "Moros" in the Far Eastern Quarterly, Vol. IV, No. 2 (1945).

Mac Leish, Kenneth. "Stone Age Cavemen of Mindanao," National Geographic, Vol. 142, No. 2 (August, 1972), 219-249.

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REPLY TO  
ATTENTION OF

**ATZL-SWY**

**5 April 2000**

**MEMORANDUM FOR Defense Technical Information Center, ATTN:**  
**DTIC-OMI (Bill Bush), 8725 John J Kingman Rd,**  
**STE 0944, Fort Belvoir, VA 22060-6218**

**SUBJECT: Distribution Statement Change**

1. Request a distribution statement change to the following document:  
ADB068659, Larry S. Schmidt, "American Involvement in the Filipino  
Resistance Movement on Mindanao During the Japanese Occupation, 1942-  
1945," dated 20 May 1982.
2. The distribution statement (line 22), effective 27 March 2000 per Dr. Gary  
Bjorge, Reviewer, CSI, should read the following: (A) Approved for public  
release, distribution unlimited.
3. POC for this request is Mary Light, Documents Cataloger, DSN 585-3116 or  
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Encl  
as

*Martha A. Davis*  
**MARTHA A. DAVIS**  
Director  
Combined Arms Research Library

Received 18 Apr 00  
Completed 8 June 00